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INTRODUCTION 
Discovery abuse, sometimes defined as "what your opponent is doing to 
you,"! has long been perceived as a persistent and intractable problem in the 
federal courts.2 Some observers have insisted that discovery abuse, "like the 
story of Mark Twain's death, is greatly exaggerated."3 One judge, however, 
1. See ARTHUR R MILLER, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS 
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT 
AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 31 (1984). Arthur R Miller is Professor of Law, Harvard Law 
School, and served as Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States [The Advisory Committee] in drafting the 1983 amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He is also a member of the Advisory Committee that pro-
duced the 1993 amendments. 
2. FED. R. CIv. P. 26 (1983) advisory committee's notes [hereinafter 1983 Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes] ("Excessive discovery and evasion or resistance to reasonable discovery requests 
pose significant problems."), reprinted in 97 F.RD. 165,216-20 (1983); FED. R. CIv. P. 26 (1993) 
advisory committee's notes (advising that "litigants should not indulge in gamesmanship with 
respect to the disclosure obligations"), reprinted in 146 F.RD. 401, 627-31 (1993) [hereinafter 
1993 Advisory Committee's Notes]; see also Alexander Holtzhoff, The Elimination of Surprise in 
Federal Practice, 7 VAND. L. REv. 576, 576-81 (1954) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure restrict 
adversary's ability to withhold evidence, while providing trial judges with discretionary power to 
curb discovery abuse); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery 
and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REv. 795, 798 n.8 (1991) (FED. R CIV. P. 26(f) is 
evidence of rule drafter's repeated attempts to curtail discovery abuse) (Professor Mullenix was 
a Judicial Fellow from 1989-1990 at the Federal Judicial Center headed by Judge Schwarzer); 
Helen H. Stem Cutner, Discovery - Civil Litigation's Fading Light: A Lawyer Looks at the Fed-
eral Discovery Rules After Forty Years of Use, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 933, 985-86 (1979) (discovery rules 
in effect for 40 years "have been more abused than used"). 
3. Mary M. Schroeder & John P. Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475, 476; see PAUL R. CoNNOLLY ET AL., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL 
LmGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY 35 (1979) (suggesting that to extent discovery abuse exists, it 
does not permeate vast majority of federal filings); MILLER, supra note 1, at 31 ("When abuse 
does occur, it can be very significant and frustrating, ... [but] it would be wrong to say that 
abuse is a pervasive problem or that it is easy to define or to identify."); Julius B. Levine, 
"Abuse" of Discovery: or Hard Work Makes Good Law, 67 A.B. A. J. 565, 566-67 (1981) (assert-
ing that empirical studies show reports of abuse have been exaggerated, and abuse occurs pri-
marily in complex, protracted lawsuits). 
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observed that instead of being a "a domesticated bird dog [intended] to help 
flush out evidence," discovery has become a "voracious wolf ... eating every-
thing in sight. "4 
It has been said that, "[t]he history of procedure is a series of attempts to 
solve the problems created by the preceding generation's procedural re-
forms."5 Indeed, decades of amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure have failed to alleviate either discovery abuse or the perceived 
congestion of the federal courts.6 Nevertheless, self-styled reformers con-
tinue to restrict allowable discovery and create other procedural hurdles to 
litigants, despite the historical failure of such measures to cure the problem, 
and despite potentially grave side effects. The 1993 amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure,? including a "mandatory initial disclosure" 
rule, are the latest offering in this vein. 
These new rules severely impair access to the courts for information-
poor litigants, and create serious ethical problems for the counsel of informa-
tion-rich litigants who want to comply in good faith with the new rules' re-
quirements.s Ostensibly adopted for the purpose of counteracting discovery 
abuse in civil litigation, these amendments were enacted over the objections 
of liberal and conservative critics alike, including some of the more conserva-
tive Justices of the United States Supreme Court.9 
4. Edward F. Sherman, The Judge's Role in Discovery, 3 REv. LITIG. 89, 196-97 (1982) 
(reporting on National Conference on Discovery Reform, November 18-20, 1982, at University 
of Texas School of Law in Austin, Texas) (quoting Judge Gerard L. Goettel). 
5. Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 624 (1985). 
6. See, e.g., Priscilla Anne Schwab, Interview With Edward Bennett Williams, LITIG., Winter 
1986, at 28, 30 ("[D]iscovery today is not used primarily to uncover facts. It's used to delay, to 
obfuscate and, too often, to replace real investigation.") (comments of Edward Bennett Wil· 
Iiams); cf Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations By Chicago Lawyers 
About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 226-27 (discussing law-
yers' perceptions of civil discovery in both routine and complex litigation); Arthur R. Miller, The 
Adversary System, Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 23 (1984) (no discovery is em-
ployed in 50% of federal lawsuits while excessive discovery or unwarranted failure to produce is 
not an issue in most of the remaining actions). 
7. FED. R. CIv. P. 26, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 606-27 (1993), as amended in 1993; Rules 
Announced April 22, 1993, 61 U.S.L.W. 4365,4372-76 (April 27, 1993). See 146 F.R.D. 401, 431-
47 (1993) for the text of the 1993 version of Rule 26 without additions or deletions. See infra 
Appendix A for the text of both the previous rule and amendments. 
8. See New Procedural Rules Take Effect, Move To Stop Voluntary Discovery Fizzles, 62 
U.S.L.W. 1077 (Nov. 30, 1993) (efforts in Congress to scrap the controversial voluntary discovery 
provision did not make it to the Senate floor before Congress adjourned for the 1993 holidays). 
9. On April 22, 1993, the Supreme Court of the United States, acting on the Judicial Con-
ference's proposed amendments to the civil discovery rules, ordered that the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure be amended, and pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 2074 (Supp. 1993), submitted the 
amendments to Congress. 146 F.R.D. 401, 403-04 (1993). The Chief Justice noted: 
While the Court is satisfied that the required procedures have been observed, this 
transmittal does not necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed 
these amendments in the form submitted. 
Id. at 403. 
Three dissenting justices questioned, inter alia, the wisdom of putting into effect a "radical 
alteration" to the discovery rules without any prior "significant testing on a local level." Id. at 
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Aptly described as "the triumph of hope over experience,"lO the 
mandatory disclosure rule codifies a suggestion by United States District 
Judge William W. Schwarzer, director of the Federal Judicial Center, for what 
he called a "self-executing system of full disclosure."ll The mandatory dis-
closure rule is touted as an "intentional erosion of the adversary process ... 
which promotes fairness, efficiency and credibility, and thus ... strengthens 
the adversary system by confining it to its proper role of testing the facts and 
issues at trial."12 In their quest to save the adversary system by destroying it, 
however, the drafters have destroyed much and saved little. 
It is simply unrealistic to suppose that the 1993 rules amendments will 
reduce the volume or intensity of discovery (or disclosure) disputes. Elimi-
nating virtually all discovery, and replacing discovery with what amounts to 
an honor system of information exchange,13 is unlikely to reduce significantly 
the more prevalent forms of abuse. More likely, "litigation over a party's 
compliance may take on a life of its own,"14 generating more delays. 
Of far graver concern, however, is the danger that the mindless pursuit 
of speed and low cost may be achieved at the expense of justice for relatively 
powerless litigants. The amended discovery rules will have the effect, 
whether intended or not, of advancing a conservative agenda1S by sharply 
511 (part II of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Souter joined); 
see Griffin Bell et aI., Automatic Disclosure In Discovery-the Rush To Reform, 27 GA. L. REv. 
I, 3 (1992) (Advisory Committee developed automatic disclosure proposal in June 1990 and 
defended it over the next two years against opposition from lawyers, litigants, and trial judges, 
who urged the Committee to withdraw or modify its proposal. The Advisory Committee finally 
rejected the public comments and adopted radical and untested change to Rule 26.). 
10. Mullenix, supra note 2, at 820 (also title of article). 
11. Federal Rules: Major Changes Sought By Judicial Conference Working Group, 60 
U.S.L.W. 2158, 2158 (Sept. 10, 1991); see William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adver-
sary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703, 721-23 (1989) (advocating rule 
requiring disclosure of material documents and information by all parties at commencement of 
action), cited with approval in 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 628. 
12. Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil Discovery, 36 CLEV. 
ST. L. REv. 17,64 (1988). 
13. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, infra Appendix A (instituting mandatory disclosure rule). Some 
defense counsel, active in the redrafting of the discovery rules, have advocated going beyond the 
above restrictions and abolishing discovery entirely. See, e.g., Loren Kieve, Commentary: Dis-
covery Reform, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 79, 81 (advocating elimination of discovery to streamline 
litigation and prevent filing of frivolous lawsuits). Kieve, a partner in the Washington D.C. office 
of Debevoise & Plimpton, has represented such litigants as Mobil Oil in Christopher v. Mobil 
Oil, 950 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1992), an ERISA suit by a former employee. 
14. Victoria E. Brieant, The August, 1991 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: How Are These Sweeping Proposals Likely to Affect Antitrust Litigation in the 
1990s?, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Dec. 21, 1991, available in WESTLAW, C695 ALI-ABA 
459,467. 
15. See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 824-25 (describing resultant "litigation imbalance" that 
favors corporate or governmental institutions over litigants with lesser resources). Ironically, the 
call for further empirical research on the effects of the disclosure rule on certain categories of 
litigants has been criticized as part of a "partisan political agenda[ ] ... infusing the rulemaking 
process and challenging the longstanding trans-substantive philosophy of the federal rules. The 
accepted premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that they are rules of general appli-
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limiting the ability of non-institutional litigants to protect their rights in 
court. This is particularly true in the areas of employment discrimination, 
civil rights, and toxic torts where the defendant controls most of the informa-
tion the plaintiff needs to prove the case. As of December 1, 1993, a defend-
ant need only disclose information relevant to matters "alleged with 
particularity" in the pleadings. With this effective abolition of notice plead-
ing for anyone whose adversary possesses most of the necessary information, 
"[t]he burden ... that will be imposed ... [on such litigants] should not be 
underestimated. "16 
This drastic curtailment of access to the courts for disadvantaged liti-
gants is part of a trend identified several years ago by Professor Eric K. Ya-
mamoto, whereby "recent federal procedural reforms have subtly, yet 
measurably, discouraged judicial access for those outside the political and 
cultural mainstream, particularly those challenging accepted legal principles 
and social norms."1? Creating a smoothly functioning pretrial process18 (like 
cability, without regard to kinds of cases or litigants; thus, they transcend particular substantive 
law application. This trans-substantive theory of the federal rules has been under attack .... " 
Id. 
16. Brieant, supra note 14, at 467. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A), infra Appendix A 
(limiting disclosure to matters alleged "with particularity" in pleadings); 1993 Advisory Commit-
tee's Notes, supra note 2, at 631, acknowledging that 
[t]he initial disclosure requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) are limited to identi-
fication of potential evidence "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the 
pleadings." ... Broad, vague, and conclusory allegations sometimes tolerated in notice 
pleading-for example, the assertion that a product with many component parts is de-
fective in some unspecified manner-should not impose upon responding parties the 
obligation at that point to search for and identify all persons possibly involved in, or all 
documents affecting, the design, manufacture, and assembly of the product. The 
greater the specificity and clarity of the allegations in the pleadings, the more complete 
should be the listing of potential witnesses and types of documentary evidence. 
Although paragraphs (1) (A) and (l)(B) by their terms refer to the factual disputes 
defined in the pleadings, the rule contemplates that these issues would be informally 
refined and clarified during the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f) and that the 
disclosure obligations would be adjusted in the light of these discussions. 
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the information-rich party (usually the defendant) may 
wait for the conference, see what the plaintiff already knows well enough to plead with specific-
ity, and then disclose only that which the plaintiff already knows about. The plaintiff, however, 
must disclose complete evidentiary support for every claim, prior to disclosure or discovery, or 
face dismissal of its claims before the defendant has even responded under the rules. 
17. Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 
25 HARV. c.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341, 344-45 (1990). "That the reformed procedural system operates 
acceptably in individual cases doesn't mean, however, that the sustained, cumulative impact of 
the reforms is litigant-neutral. Procedures may operate well in many cases and yet discretely 
prejudice the interests of certain groups in others." Id. at 359; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
The Federal Rules Fifty Years Later: Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2237, 2237-47 (1984) (discussing Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 50 years after initial promulgation). Professor Hazard also pointed out: 
[T]he Federal Rules have come to be defended on the ground that they afford better 
access to courts and thereby facilitate greater social justice .... Reference is made of 
the uses of civil litigation to remedy racial discrimination. gender discrimination, envi-
ronmental pollution, and other injustices. That the Rules do facilitate such social jus-
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making the trains run on time) is no doubt desirable, but at what cost? Care 
must be taken that the "speedy[ ] and inexpensive determination"19 of cases 
does not supersede the "just . .. determination of every action."20 
The impact of the 1993 amendments on those disadvantaged litigants 
who most need fair and free access to the courts is reason enough to reject 
the tender mercies of contemporary tinkerers21 and to repeal the 1993 dis-
covery rules amendments, but they should also be repealed because they will 
exacerbate the very problems they purport to solve. Hoping against experi-
ence to eliminate discovery abuse by eliminating discovery for litigants in 
unequal positions is a violation of the fundamental principles of fair play that 
are the foundation of our legal system. It is time to ask whether there isn't 
another, better way to address these problems. 
This article examines the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure affecting discovery, and recommends that they be repealed. This 
article further recommends that until the 1993 amendments are repealed, dis-
trict courts should "opt out" of the amendments' application under the op-
tions for local modification built into the 1993 amendments and the Civil 
tice litigation seems little in doubt .... Further, the remediation of these injustices, at 
least up to a point, is essential even for one whose political premises are conservative, 
as I consider mine to be. The examples of Northern Ireland, Lebanon, South Africa, 
India, and now Israel remind us of the social costs of being indifferent to effective 
microcosmic remedies for macrocosmic social injustice. 
The Federal Rules have been an effective instrument of social justice because they 
reduce the barriers to the formulation and proof of claims against the existing systems 
of authority. Formulation of new theories of legal rights is simpler, virtually by defini-
tion, under a pleading system that is not constructed in terms of old legal categories, as 
was code pleading and common law pleading. Proof of new theories of liability likewise 
is simpler with the aid of comprehensive discovery. 
This relationship between civil justice and social justice was not anticipated in 
1938. The social wrongs whose remediation is assisted by the Federal Rules in the 
present era had not then appeared on the civil litigation agenda. The emergence of civil 
rights and environmental litigation hardly could have been anticipated. 
If these commentators are correct, then the 1993 amendments' effective return to code 
pleading may well sound the death knell for plaintiffs seeking to redress societal, as opposed to 
commercial, wrongs, and this denial of access will fall primarily on information-poor plaintiffs, 
inasmuch as the information-rich plaintiffs, as in much business litigation, are not so heavily 
dependant on information in their opponent's control and are freer to exercise their right to use 
notice pleading. 
18. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 18-30 (noting that pretrial process still requires judicial 
involvement). 
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
20. [d. (emphasis added). 
21. See Amendments to the Fed. R. Civ. P., 85 F.R.D. 521, 523 (1980) (Powell, J., joined by 
Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting from adoption of 1980 amendments) ("Congress' ac-
ceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for years the adoption of genuinely effective re-
forms .... Meanwhile, the discovery Rules will continue to deny justice to those least able to 
bear the burdens of delay, escalating legal fees, and rising court costs."); see also Warren E. 
Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. - A Need For Systematic Anticipation, Keynote Address of the 
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice 
(April 7-9, 1976) (quoting Roscoe Pound), in 70 F.R.D. 83, 83 (1976). 
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Justice Reform Act.22 Instead of further misguided attempts at reinventing 
discovery, this article also recommends that all federal district courts adopt 
an approach to case management patterned after that used by the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,23 so that it will 
again be possible to achieve the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action,"24 for all classes of claimants, not just the powerful. 
I. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE DISCOVERY RULES: THE 
EVOLUTION OF DISCOVERY RULES IN THE FEDERAL RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
In 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
drafted, two-party law suits were still the rule, most forms of com-
plex litigation ... were still unthought of, and record keeping, even 
by large enterprises, was still manageable by a small number of cler-
ical employees. Thus information compilation or document produc-
tion was not thought to impose any greater burden than responding 
to a deposition or other routine forms of discovery.25 
As litigation grew more complex, civil discovery was incorporated into 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "to secure the just, speedy, and inex-
pensive determination of every action,"26 by providing "a mechanism for 
making relevant information available to the litigants."27 Discovery was in-
tended to flesh out the information provided by modern "notice pleading."28 
22. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.c. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1992) (enacted as Title I 
of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650 § 103(a), 104 Stat. 5089,5090-96 
(1990)). 
23. See E.D. Va. R. 11.1 & 12 (setting forth court's rules on discovery and case manage-
ment); see also infra notes 240-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia's approach to case management. 
24. FED. R. CIv. P. 1 (emphasis added). 
25. Edward F. Sherman & Stephen O. Kinnard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80's-Mak-
ing the Rules Work, 2 REV. LITIG. 9, 12 n.8 (1981), reprinted in 95 F.R.D. 245, 248 n.8 (1982). 
26. FED. R. CIv. P. 1. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure must be construed in accordance with the language of FED. R. CIV. P. I, "to secure the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action." Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 
(1962). 
27. 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 216. 
28. See United States v. Purdome, 30 F.R.D. 338 (W.O. Mo. 1962) (relying on Hickman) 
("[N]otice pleading ... makes no sense unless considered in relation to the broad philosophy of 
full disclosure."). Until the passage of the 1993 discovery amendments, modem notice pleading 
required, among other things, a "short and plain statement of the claim." FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2); 
see, e.g., Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944) (reversing the district court's 
dismissal of Dioguardi's "inartistically" drawn complaint); cf. O.L. McCaskill, The Modern Phi· 
losophy of Pleading: A Dialogue Outside the Shades, 38 A.B.A. J. 123, 125-26, 174-75 (1952) 
(criticizing liberal "notice pleading" view espoused in Dioguardi). 
The Dioguardi court's affirmation of the fairness of notice pleading was cited with approval 
in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 n.5 (1957), in which the Supreme Court said, "The Federal 
Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel may 
be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a 
proper decision on the merits." Id. at 48. 
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Proponents believed that discovery would "make a trial less a game of 
blindman's buff and more a fair contest, with the basic issues and facts dis-
closed to the fullest practicable extent."29 In 1947 the Supreme Court en-
dorsed a general policy of liberal discovery in Hickman v. Taylor,30 saying 
that "[m]utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is 
essential to proper litigation."31 Hickman has been described as opening a 
"Pandora's box of discovery abuse,"32 and was the apparent starting point for 
Under amended Rule 26, however, this fairness principle no longer applies to litigants such 
as Mrs. Dioguardi who will need information from their opponents. Such litigants must plead all 
claims "with particularity," because if they lack sufficient information to plead a claim with par-
ticularity, the defendant is under no obligation to disclose the material that would make such 
particularized pleading possible. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(I)(A), infra Appendix A. See gener-
ally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 47 (Dell ed. 1961) (explained infra, note 108). 
This newly created requirement of particularity for information-poor litigants is a stringent 
standard that formerly applied only to the pleading of such quasi-criminal civil matters as fraud. 
See FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b) (emphasis added), which provides: 
FRAUD, MISTAKE, CONDmON OF MIND. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the cir-
cumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice, in-
tent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may be averred generally. 
Even when the plaintiff has this sort of information, compliance with the particularity stan-
dard has its own problems. See, e.g., Gordon v. Green, 602 F.2d 743, 744-47 & n.13 (5th Cir. 
1979) (dismissing complaint without prejudice, where complaint and amendments thereto com-
prised approximately 4,000 pages, filling 18 volumes, and required a cart or hand truck to trans-
port it; in dismissing the complaint with leave to refile, the court advised the plaintiffs counsel 
that they were lucky not to suffer the discipline inflicted by the English Chancellor in 1596, who 
ordered a hole to be cut through the center of a particularly prolix document, had counsel's head 
stuffed into the hole, and directed court officers to lead the counsel around as an example to all 
in attendance at court) (citing Richard C. Wydick, Plain English for Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 
727,727 (1978». 
29. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); see Nichols v. 
Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908, 910 (D. Mass. 1938) (referring to intent of drafters of Federal 
Rules on discovery). See generally James A. Pike & John W. WIllis, The New Federal Deposi-
tion-Discovery Procedure, 38 CoLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1180 (1938) ("[T]he new federal deposition-
discovery practice affords the greatest opportunity for adequate trial preparation in the history 
of civil procedure."); Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administration of Justice, 167 ANNALS 
60 (1933); Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 
869-73 (1933) (discussing wide variation among United States jurisdictions in scope of 
discovery). 
Professor Sunderland was an early proponent of courts taking a hand in the pretrial discov-
ery process. See, e.g., Edson R. Sunderland, The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 
MICH. L. REv. 215, 218-19 (1937) (advocating pretrial judicial hearings by which all matters not 
in dispute may be withdrawn). 
30. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
31. Id. at 507. 
32. Margaret L. Weissbrod, Comment, Sanctions Under Amended Rule 26 - Scalpel or Meat-
ax? The 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 183, 184 
(1985) (alleging that Hickman v. Taylor opened door to abusive tactics not contemplated by 
drafters). Hickman's permissive policies, coupled with the inherently adversarial character of 
civil litigation, provided opportunities to use otherwise proper discovery tactics to delay and 
harass one's opponents. See 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 217; see, e.g., 
Ferguson v. Ford Motor Co., 92 F. Supp. 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (in a suit alleging patent infringe-
ment, unfair competition and antitrust violations, depositions of 173 persons consumed more 
than 100,000 pages (before the advent of word-processors); more than 700,000 pages of docu-
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succeeding waves of discovery rules amendments. 
A. Discovery in the 1970s 
The 1970 amendments may have started a landslide when they intro-
duced provisions allowing a party to respond to interrogatories by making 
records available from which the discoverer could determine the answer.33 
The 1970 amendments also attempted to deter abuse by encouraging the use 
of sanctions and protective orders,34 though studies showed that sanctions 
and protective orders did not deter abuse, and that attorneys and judges 
rarely invoked them.35 Discovery costs continued to mount.36 
ments were produced for inspection, with 45,000 marked as exhibits; stenographic costs for the 
depositions alone reportedly ran to approximately $500,000 in 1950 dollars). See Wayne D. Bra-
zil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 V AND. 
L. REV. 1295, 1315-48 (1978) (discussing how attorneys use specific discovery tools to limit and 
distort flow of information). Discovery tools became tactical weapons, violating the spirit (and 
sometimes the letter) of the rules, as litigants engaged in disproportionately costly and time-
consuming discovery activities and evasive responses. 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra 
note 2, at 216-17. Professor [later Magistrate Judge] Brazil's recommendations, along with those 
of United States District Judge Schwarzer, heavily influenced the 1993 amendments. See 1993 
Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 628 (acknowledging Brazil and Schwarzer as pro-
ponents of duty of disclosure). 
33. FED. R. CIv. P. 33(c) (1970) provided: 
OPTION TO PRODUCE BUSINESS RECORDS 
Where the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the business 
records of the party upon whom the interrogatory has been served ... and the burden 
of deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for the party serving the 
interrogatory as for the party served, it is a sufficient answer to such interrogatory to 
specify the records from which the answer may be derived or ascertained and to afford 
to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable opportunity to examine, audit or in-
spect such records and to make copies, compilations, abstracts or summaries. 
This provision remains intact in the 1993 amendments, although it is renumbered 33(d). 
FED. R. CIV. P. 33(d), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 675 (1993). See infra Appendix B for the 
remaining 1993 amendments to Rule 33. 
34. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33 (1970) advisory committee's notes (noting that failure to respond 
or object to interrogatories without applying for protective order will trigger sanctions) [herein-
after 1970 Advisory Committee's Notes], reprinted in 48 F.R.D 485, 522-25 (1970). 
35. See Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 25, at 248 (protective orders not used to shift bur-
dens or costs incident to discovery); Note, Federal Discovery Rules: Effects of the 1970 Amend-
ments,8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 623,641-43 (1972) Gudges reluctant to impose sanctions 
for discovery abuses}. 
36. See Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 32, at 1307 (increase in discovery increased 
litigation costs). Professor Brazil argued that the nature of the adversary system and "competi-
tive economic impulses" conflict with the primary objectives of the discovery process. 1d. at 
1303-05. As Professor Brazil noted, the assumption underlying the modem discovery rules was 
that the "gathering and sharing of evidentiary information should (and would) take place in an 
essentially nonadversarial environment." 1d. at 1303. Thus, "[e]ffective reform ... must include 
institutional changes that will curtail substantially the impact of adversary forces in the pretrial 
stage of litigation." 1d. at 1297. Professor Brazil proposed a replacement of the adversary system 
of discovery in civil litigation with a system of automatic disclosure of relevant information: 
[S]hifting counsel's principal obligation during the investigation and discovery stage 
away from partisan pursuit of clients' interests and toward the court; imposing a duty 
on counsel to investigate thoroughly the factual background of disputes; imposing a 
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During the 1970s, United States Magistrate Wayne Brazip7 identified a 
wide range of tactical uses of discovery, most of which can be characterized 
as "abuse."38 In 1978, he proposed a form of mandatory disclosure as one 
means of eliminating much of the adversarial nature of civil discovery.39 Jus-
tice Powell also noted in his 1979 concurring opinion to Herbert v. Lando40 
that "discovery techniques and tactics have become a highly developed litiga-
tion art-one not infrequently exploited to the disadvantage of justice."41 
The majority agreed, noting that "until and unless there are major changes in 
the present Rules of Civil Procedure, reliance must be had on what in fact 
and in law are ample powers of the district judge to prevent abuse."42 
B. The Federal Courts' Traditional Powers 
The federal courts' traditional powers to control discovery abuse were 
indeed ample,43 both under the existing rules,44 and under 28 U.S.c. § 1927 
duty on both counsel and client to disclose voluntarily, and at all stages of trial prepara-
tion, all potentially relevant evidence and information; narrowing the reach of the at-
torney-client privilege and the work product doctrine; making early discovery 
conferences mandatory; substantially expanding the role of the court in monitoring the 
execution of discovery; and requiring thorough judicial review of, or participation in, all 
settlements that exceed a specified dollar amount. 
Id. at 1349. 
37. United States Magistrate, N.D. Cal., and former Director of the Federal Judicial Center. 
See generally Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 32, at 1326-27 ("winning at all costs" 
mentality of attorneys who lied to adversary and trial judge about discoverable documents); see 
also Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal 
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 787, 798 (failure to respond to interrogatories 
and providing evasive or incomplete answers considered normal or "the nature of the beast," 
rather than difficulty). 
38. See Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 6, at 239 (attributing much discovery abuse to the 
fact that people with perfectionist-compulsive tendencies often perform very well in law school 
and are likely to be attracted by the challenges and rewards of big case litigation. Litigators with 
these psychological characteristics are especially anxious about making errors, and are particu-
larly prone to develop "elaborate systematic procedures for attacking all litigation problems"). 
39. Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 32, at 1349-61. 
40. 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
41. Id. (Powell, J., concurring); see also 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 
216-18 (attempt to use rules as tactical weapons results in exploitation to disadvantage of justice) 
(quoting Herbert, 441 U.S. at 179 (Powell, J., concurring)); Richard W. Sherwood, Curbing Dis-
covery Abuse: Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the California Code of 
Civil Procedure, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 571 (1981) (misuse of discovery has been subject 
of concern to both bar and bench). 
42. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177 (White, J.). 
43. See 1970 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 34 (conferring broad powers on 
courts to regulate or limit discovery through protective orders, but focusing on work-product 
and privilege rather than on discovery abuse); cf United States v. I.B.M. Corp., 79 F.R.D. 378, 
380-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (court order forbidding counsel to instruct deponent not to answer or to 
suggest to deponent that question was appropriate, did not affect parties' substantial rights and 
ensured fair and efficient completion of ongoing depositions); Annotation, Work Product Privi-
lege as Applying to Material Prepared for Terminated Litigation or for Claim Which Did Not 
Result in Litigation, 27 A.L.R. 4th 568 (1986). 
44. See, e.g., 1970 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 34, at 525 (notes to Rule 33(c) 
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and the concept of "inherent power."45 Nevertheless, the "American 
Rule"46 that litigants must pay their own costs and fees, absent express statu-
tory authorization,47 may have reinforced attorneys' traditional reluctance to 
(referring to courts' "usual power" to require reimbursement for assembling records and making 
them intelligible, and using "devices," such as a computer, to translate data into usable form); id. 
(notes to Rule 34(a» (courts have ample power under Rule 26(c) to protect respondent against 
undue burden or expense, either by restricting discovery or requiring that the discovering party 
pay costs or by shifting costs of "check[ing] the electronic source itself' where data compilation 
has been discovered); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(C) (1970) (requiring discovering party to 
pay opponent's expert a "reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery"). 
45. 28 U.S.c. § 1927 (1988). Section 1927 reads as follows: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United 
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreason-
ably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, 
expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct. 
Section 1927 has been used to assess sanctions against an attorney who employed delaying tac-
tics during discovery, consistently failed to meet scheduled filing deadlines, and abused discovery 
privileges, among other improprieties. See, e.g., Lipsig v. National Student Marketing Corp., 663 
F.2d 178, 181 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (advocacy simply for sake of burdening opponent with unneces-
sary expenditures of time and effort warrants recompense for extra outlay attributable thereto). 
Likewise, in Pfister v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Ga. 1980), an attorney was 
held personally liable for his opponent's costs resulting from the attorney's numerous abuses, 
including his failure to initiate discovery for four years and his failure timely to serve documents 
and file appeal bonds. Id. at 933, 936-37. 
For a discussion of the inherent powers of federal courts to control their proceedings, see, 
e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. 370 U.S. 626,628-33 (1962) (affirming dismissal of plaintiffs cause 
of action for failure of plaintiffs counsel to appear at pretrial conference; trial court has inherent 
power, of ancient origin, to prevent undue delays in disposition of pending cases and to avoid 
congestion), reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 873 (1962); see also Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 
766 (1980) (affirming Link, and noting that federal courts had inherent power to assess costs 
against lawyers who "willfully" abuse judicial processes); Charles B. Renfrew, Discovery Sanc-
tions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CAL. L. REv. 264, 268-69 (1981) (discussing inherent authority 
from judge's perspective). Roadway implied that sanctions cannot be imposed unless a court 
finds bad faith. Id. at 767 & n.13. The district court had relied on FED. R. CIv. P. 37(b) and 28 
U.S.C. § 1927, read in conjunction with 42 U.S.c. §§ 1988, 2000e-5(k) (Civil Rights Attorneys 
Fees Awards Act) to assess costs and fees and to dismiss the suit after plaintiffs failed to answer 
interrogatories and disobeyed a court order compelling compliance. Id. at 755. The Supreme 
Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's award of attorney's fees, hold-
ing that "costs" in 28 U.S.c. § 1927 are implicitly limited to costs enumerated in 28 U.S.c. 
§ 1920. Id. at 756-57, 767. Thus, awards under § 1927 may be assessed against either counselor 
client, but may include only costs, not fees. See generally William H. Speck, The Use of Discov-
ery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1142-45 (1951) (discussing usefulness, 
popularity, and versatility of written interrogatories). 
46. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306 (1796) (attorney's fees are not recover-
able as damages by a prevailing party); see also Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 
U.S. 240, 247 (1975) (prevailing litigant ordinarily not entitled to collect reasonable attorney's 
fee from loser). See generally 1 STUART M. SPEISER, ATTORNEY's FEES § 13.1, at 618 n.5 (1973) 
(collecting many of the significant cases affirming American rule); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reim-
bursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REv. 792, 793 (1966) (calling for 
reform of American rule); Calvin A. Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not A Cost of Litiga-
tion?, 49 IOWA L. REv. 75,78 (1963) (if one party takes advantage of court delay to put financial 
pressure on adversary, solution requiring payment for advantage would be appropriate). 
47. See, e.g., 42 U.S.c. § 1988. Courts have also carved out some exceptions to the "Ameri-
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ask for monetary sanctions and the reluctance of courts to grant them.48 
Courts did, historically, exercise some control over discovery,49 occasionally 
can Rule," particularly when a litigant has acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 
678,691 (1978) (court's award of attorney's fees did not violate Eleventh Amendment and was 
adequately supported by finding of bad faith); William A. Harrington, Annotation, Award of 
Counsel Fees to Prevailing Party Based on Adversary's Bad Faith, Obduracy, Or Other Miscon· 
duct, 31 A.L.R. FED. 833, 842 (1977) (federal district courts may, as exception to American rule, 
award attorney's fees where losing party acted in bad faith). This power to levy fees has been 
recognized as an inherent power of the federal courts. See Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 766 
(acknowledging "inherent power" of courts to assess attorney's fees when losing party acts in 
bad faith) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 258-59)). For an analysis of the historical devel-
opment of this power, see Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City S. Ry., 28 F.2d 233, 241-46 (8th Cir. 
1928) (tracing progression of authorities that clearly establish federal courts' jurisdiction to al-
low, in proper cases, costs "as between solicitor and client"), rev'd on other grounds, 281 U.S. 1 
(1930); Joan Chipser, Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS 
L.J. 319, 323-24 (1977) (discussing historical development of bad faith exception, from English 
Courts of Chancery through early federal equity cases to present day application). See generally 
Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorney's Fees For Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L. REv. 613, 
652-53 (1983) (listing contempt, bad faith, and prior frivolous litigation as bases for fee awards 
under American common law). 
However, the bad faith exception authorizes fee awards to prevailing parties only, which 
does not help if the prevailing party is the one who engages in the discovery abuse. See, e.g., 
F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) (court may award attorney's 
fees to a successful party whose opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for 
oppressive reasons). 
48. See Levine, supra note 3, at 567; see also MILLER, supra note 1, at 14: 
Now let us face facts, if lawyers don't ask for sanctions, they don't ask for sanctions 
because of the golden rule .... Judges don't like sanctions, in part because they are 
self-inflicted wounds. Who wants the extra work of a sanction proceeding? Let's face 
it, all judges practiced law, and maybe some judges used to engage in that kind of 
behavior. So it is a sort of "well, boys will be boys" kind of thing. So they don't sanc-
tion it. That has been the traditional view. 
See generally Cutner, supra note 2, at 933-37 (providing illustration of courts' reluctance to sanc-
tion attorneys, indicating that proposed amendments will not result in great judicial use of avail-
able sanctions, and concluding that purpose of Federal Rules will not be met if judges fail to use 
sanctions); John J. Kennelly, Pretrial Discovery - The Courts and Trial Lawyers Are Finally Dis-
covering That Too Much of It Can Be Counterproductive, 21 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 458, 458-74 
(1978) (discussing Identiseal Corp. of Wisconsin v. Positive Identification Sys., Inc., 550 F.2d 298 
(7th Cir. 1977), in which court held that trial judge may not compel counsel to conduct any 
pretrial discovery, but advocating need for rules where discovery is needed) (citing FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, SURVEY OF LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE PREsENT. Ex· 
PRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS (1978)). 
49. For example, some courts have limited discovery to a reasonable time period or to spe-
cific records to ease the burden of a party's searching years of records. See, e.g. , Houdry Process 
Corp. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 24 F.R.D. 58, 63 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (courts should order 
discovery of documents relating to specific subject if subject designated with some "reasonable 
degree of particularity," and period of discovery, if indefinite, should be limited to relevant peri-
ods); Hercules Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 4 F.R.D. 452, 454 (D. Del. 1944) (limited 
inspection of documents to those within two years of commencement of suit); A. W. Gans, An-
notation, Necessity and SuffiCiency, Under Statutes and Rules Governing Modem Pretrial Discov-
ery Practice, of "Designation" of Documents, etc., In Application or Motion, 8 A.L.R. 2d 1134, 
§§ 4, 6, 7, at 629, 630, 631 (1949 & Supp. 1985) (presenting tests or criteria indicating whether 
documents sufficiently designated or specified in pretrial discovery request); W. R. Frothingham, 
Annotation, Discovery or Inspection of Trade Secret, Formula, Or The Like, 17 A.L.R. 2d 383, 
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invoking dismissal as the ultimate sanction for discovery abuse.50 
In 1976, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of sanctions as a deterrent 
to discovery abuse in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 
Inc. 51 Also in 1976, the American Bar Association, the Conferences of Chief 
Justices, and the Judicial Conference co-sponsored a national conference, 
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction With the Administration of Jus-
tice,"52 on the 70th Anniversary of Roscoe Pound's famous address of the 
same name.53 The Pound Conference explored complaints that significant 
numbers of federal trial judges and attorneys viewed burdensome discovery 
as a problem,54 and made recommendations for further rules amendments, 
including the increased use of sanctions. 55 
§§ 5, 8, at 393-94, 401 (1951) (when discovery or inspection will disclose trade secrets, courts 
favor societal interest in facilitating trial and promoting justice over individual interest in ma-
tintaining screcy). 
50. See, e.g., Gates v. United States, 752 F.2d 516, 517 (10th Cir. 1975), in which a tax 
refund plaintiff twice failed to appear for noticed depositions. The court then ordered the depo-
sition to take place on a specific date, and dismissed the complaint when plaintiff again failed to 
appear. The circuit court upheld the dismissal, blaming the lack of notice on the plaintiffs fail-
ure to contact his attorney during a 60 day period, and said, "In the past, Rule 37 may have been 
considered a paper tiger, but the time has now come to put teeth in the tiger." Id. 
51. 427 U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam). In National Hockey League, 17 months after the 
district court had ordered them to answer the defendants' interrogatories, the plaintiffs had not 
given meaningful answers. Finding that such inaction amounted to flagrant bad faith, the trial 
court wrote, "If the sanction of dismissal is not warranted, then the Court can envisage no set of 
facts whereby that sanction should ever be applied," and dismissed the case pursuant to Rule 37. 
Id. at 640-41. 
The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, emphasizing that "the most severe in the spec-
trum of sanctions provided ... must be available ... not merely to penalize those whose conduct 
may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such 
conduct in the absence of such a deterrent." Id. at 643. This endorsement of sanctions as deter-
rents, rather than as remedies for misconduct, reflected a major change of attitude toward the 
imposition of sanctions, and encouraged trial courts to make more frequent use of sanctions. 
See generally Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanc-
tions, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1033, 1041 (1978) (speculating that courts hesitate to punish discovery 
abuse because they perceive constitutional limitations on power to punish sanctions). 
52. Hereinafter cited as The Pound Conference. Former Chief Justice Warren Burger also 
appointed an Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to conduct hearings on discovery abuse. See 
Burger, supra note 21, at 96. 
53. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 
29 A.B.A. REp. 395 (1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 241, 273-91 (1964). 
54. See, e.g., Francis R Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone 
Awry?, Address Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction 
with the Administration of Justice (Apr. 7-9, 1986) (discussing problems associated with burden-
some discovery in complex civil litigation), in 70 F.RD. 79, 202-03 (1976); cf. Alexander v. Par-
sons, 75 F.RD. 536, 539 (W.O. Mich. 1977) (mere fact that discovery is burdensome is not 
sufficient to bar such discovery, provided information sought may lead to discovery of admissible 
evidence). 
55. See, e.g., Burger, supra note 21, at 95-96; see also A.B.A. REPORT OF POUND CONFER-
ENCE FOLLOW-UP TASK FORCE, 74 F.RD. 159, 191-94 (1976) (recognizing need to fashion ap-
propriate remedies for discovery abuse and recommending evaluation of programs making 
appropriate use of sanctions); Griffin B. Bell, The Pound Conference Follow-Up: A Response 
From the United States Department of Justice, 76 F.RD. 320, 328-39 (1978) (one deterrent to 
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C. The 1980 Amendments 
When the 1980 rules amendments were adopted, Justice Powell, joined 
by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, denounced them as mere "tinkering 
changes" which would "create complacency and encourage inertia" that 
could "postpone effective reform for another decade."56 The 1980 amend-
ments ignored the failure of the Rule 30 protective order and existing sanc-
tion provisions to curb abuse,57 and did nothing about abuses of the 
interrogatory process.58 Little was accomplished,59 and almost as soon as the 
1980 amendments took effect, work started on what would become the 1983 
amendments.60 
needless extension of appeals being considered by Justice Department is imposing monetary 
sanctions on party or attorney); William H. Erikson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: 
A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.RD. 277, 288-90 (1978) (if 
overuse of and resistance to discovery were both subject to sanctions, such discovery abuses 
would be curbed). Subsequent studies conducted for the Justice Department's Office for Im-
provements in the Administration of Justice supported the findings of the Pound Conference. 
See C. Ronald Ellington, A Study of Sanctions For Discovery Abuse (May 11, 1979) (report 
submitted to Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice), cited in Frank F. Flegal 
& Steven M. Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: We're Not There Yet, 1981 
B.Y.U. L. REv. 597, 600-01 & nn.12 & 14,602 n.16, 603 nn.20-23. 
56. See Amendments to the Fed. R. Civ. Pro., 446 U.S. 995, 997, 998, 1000 (1980) (Powell, 
J., dissenting); see also Ruth Marcus, Abuses Uncurbed? Court OK's Changes in Discovery - But 
Dissenters Argue Reforms in Civil Rules Don't Go Far Enough, NAT'L L.J. May 12, 1980, at I, 
col. 4; Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REv. 806, 818 (1981) (ability of plaintiffs' attorneys 
to obtain corporate defendant's records, to depose corporate employees, and to send searching 
interrogatories has had a substantial impact in particular areas of law). 
Judge Friedenthal noted that "[ilt would be a sad irony if reforms ultimately prevented the 
less affluent litigant from presenting a valid case that without discovery he could not prove." Id. 
at 813. "If discovery abuse is confined to a relatively few cases, a call for across-the-board limita-
tions is in reality no more than a covert call for a fundamental policy change that would deter 
litigants from obtaining vital information in the many cases where no abuse exists." Id. See 
generally Mark A. Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and Discovery Reforms: The Continuing 
Need for an Umpire, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 543 (1980) (general description and history of the 
amendment process); A.B.A. Section of Litigation, Second Report of the Special Committee for 
the Study of Discovery Abuse (Jan. - Nov. 1980),92 F.RD. 137-48 (1980). 
57. Flegal & Umin, supra note 55, at 616. 
58. See Schroeder & Frank, supra note 3, at 489 (the proposed 1980 amendments are not 
much more than general threats of thunder and lightening against "abuses," and will not help 
evasion or overproduction problems in discovery). 
59. See Joy A. Chapper, Limiting Discovery, 20 JUDGES J. 20 (1981) (proposals considered 
by trial courts to reduce costs and delays of civil litigation have left traditional litigation process 
unchanged). 
60. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 90 F.RD. 451 (1981); EXCERPT FROM THE REpORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE CoM-
MITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, CHAIRMAN; AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (no 
date given), in 97 F.R.D. 165, 189-241 (1983). 
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D. The 1983 Amendments 
By 1983, despite the failure of previous sanctions to curb abuses, many 
believed that the "just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion" could only be achieved by introducing mandatory sanctions.61 The 
1983 amendments, described by one commentator as "radical surgery,"62 
were intended to prompt more aggressive judicial control and supervision in 
the pretrial process.63 
Amended Rule 26 (1983) provided for mandatory sanctions and was in-
tended to counteract judges' perceived reluctance to impose sanctions on at-
torneys64 by explicitly requmng judges to limit redundant or 
disproportionate discovery,65 based on the circumstances of the particular 
case.66 As a result, sanctions were imposed in large numbers, fulfilling one 
commentator's prediction that sanctions would be like "a snowball coming 
down the hill. "67 
The 1983 amendments' mandatory sanctions provisions have been com-
pared both to a scalpel and to a meat ax,68 but despite these cutting edge 
innovations, abuses have proliferated like the hydra's heads.69 The most radi-
cal of the 1983 discovery rule innovations was the amended Rule 26(b){l).7° 
61. FED. R. CIv. P. 1; see 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 217. 
62. Stanley J. Levy, A Defense of Meaningful Pre-trial Discovery, 14 FORUM 781, 782 
(1978). 
63. The Federal Rules were amended effective August 1, 1983. For the complete text of the 
1983 amendments as they were proposed and adopted, see Amendments to the Fed. R. Civ. Pro., 
97 F.R.D. 165, 166-88 (1983); see also 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 220; 
A.c.F. Indus., Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087-88 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari), cited with approval in 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 220. Rules 
26,7, 11, and 16 incorporated new, mandatory sanctions against attorneys and parties who vio-
late the rules. Id. at 190-93. 
64. 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 220 (citing Brazil, Civil Discovery, 
supra note 37; Ellington, supra note 55). 
65. See Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 25; at 46, cf MILLER, supra note 1, at 32 ("In a 
$10,000 damage case, spending $50,000 on discovery is disproportionate.") 
66. Miller, Dinosaur, supra note 6, at 23. 
67. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 38: 
[T]he truth of the matter is that there are more sanctions being awarded out there than 
ever before .... There are a lot of reasons to believe that we are entering an era in 
which cost-shifting sanctions are going to become more and more normative. So I 
think it is a mistake for anyone to believe that sanctions really can't be. They may 
prove to be ineffective, but the case for their ineffectiveness has not been made by the 
dearth of sanctions from 1938 to the present. I sense that there is a snowball coming 
down the side of the hill. 
See also Richard L. Marcus, Reducing Court Costs and Delay: The Potential Impact of the Pro-
posed Amendments to the Federal Rules o/Civil Procedure, 66 JUDICATURE 363, 364 (Mar. 1983) 
(1983 amendments stimulated use of sanctions). 
68. Weissbrod, supra note 32, at 184 (quoting Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 25, at 36). 
69. The hydra, in Greek mythology, was the fabulous many-headed snake of the marshes of 
Lema, slain by Heracles. When one of the hydra's heads was cut off, nine more grew in its place. 
THE OXFORD UNIVERSAL DIcrIONARY (3d ed. 1955). 
70. William W. Schwarzer, Query: Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclo-
sure Be More Effective Than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178 (Dec.-Jan. 1991) [hereinafter 
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A close second was the creation of Rule 26(g), which parallels amended Rule 
11 but applies solely to discovery matters.71 Rule 26(b)(1) was amended "to 
give trial judges extensive discretionary power to manage discovery,"72 but, 
like the 1993 disclosure rules, the 1983 amendments focused only on burden-
some requests, not responses. Nevertheless, the 1983 amendments as a 
whole were presented as an important step toward checking abuses by re-
quiring attorneys to stop and think before acting, or be subject to sanctions.73 
The 1983 rule changes appeared to give judges all the tools they needed 
to deal with discovery abuses,74 but it has become painfully clear that Rule 
26(g),75 like Rule 37,76 is not the panacea that was promised less than a dec-
Schwarzer, Monsters]. United States District Judge William Schwarzer is, at the time of this 
writing, Director of the Federal Judicial Center, and a chief proponent of replacing discovery 
with mandatory disclosure. 
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983). See generally William W. Schwarzer, Sanctions Under The 
New Federal Rule 11 - A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985). Rule 26(g)'s certification require-
ment closely parallels that of its more notorious cousin, rule 11 for pleadings and motions, in 
requiring a "reasonable" pre-filing inquiry to determine that the document or motion meets the 
rule's requirements. 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 219. 
72. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 178. See also FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1)(ii), 
prohibiting discovery not otherwise barred by subsections (i) and (ii), but which is "unduly bur-
densome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." 
1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 218. This disproportionality standard has 
generated considerable satellite litigation as judges struggled to interpret the meaning of the 
terms "unduly burdensome" and "disproportionate" in a given lawsuit without depriving liti-
gants of a fair opportunity to develop and prepare the case. See Marcus, supra note 67, at 368-69 
(rule creates difficult questions about extent to which judges, rather than litigants, should decide 
how to prepare case). At least one commentator has observed that the proportionality standard 
requires a court to use "either a crystal ball or a large amount of guesswork." Weissbrod, supra 
note 32, at 198. 
73. See Miller, Dinosaur, supra note 6, at 19 (message of 1983 amendments, that lawyers 
must stop and think before acting, is clear; experience will determine whether rules represent 
more than just wishful thinking). 
74. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 178. 
75. Under Rule 26(g), the signer has an affirmative duty to engage in discovery, "consistent 
with the spirit and purposes of Rules 26 through 37." 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra 
note 2, at 218. Rule 37 was amended in 1980 to provide that sanctions were available for viola-
tions of pretrial orders. However, none of Rule 37's provisions addresses the specific concerns 
of amended Rule 26. 
76. Under Rule 37, a court may order a variety of sanctions, including: issuing an order 
designating certain facts as established for purposes of the action, see, e.g., Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704-05 (1982) (establishing 
personal jurisdiction over defendant who refused to cooperate with discovery aimed at establish-
ing requisite "minimum contacts"); ordering the disobedient party not to support or oppose 
designated claims; ordering that pleadings be stricken; dismissing the action or rendering a judg-
ment by default; or treating as contempt of court any failure to obey court orders. FED. R. CIV. 
P. 37(b)(2)(A)-(D). The court may also require the offending party or attorney to pay reason-
able expenses, including attorney's fees. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(E); see Societe Internationale 
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197,208,212 (1958) ("refusal" encompassed any failure to comply, but dis-
missal unwarranted when "failure to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad 
faith, or any fault of petitioner"). 
One of the few pre-1983 cases assessing Rule 37 sanctions against a misbehaving attorney 
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ade ago.?7 Clearly, the experience of the past decade establishes that sanc-
tions do not prevent discovery abuse. 
II. THE 1993 MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULE 
Amended Rule 26, Duty of Disclosure,7s is the latest proffered panacea, 
and is supposed to reduce the cost of litigation by all but eliminating discov-
ery.?9 Amended Rule 30 now limits the number of interrogatories to twenty-
personally is Braziller v. Lind, 32 F.R.D. 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), in which the defendant's attorney 
instructed the defendant to refuse to answer 35 questions asked in an oral deposition, then re-
fused the opposing attorney's suggestion that they seek an ex parte ruling on the questions' 
propriety. [d. at 367-68. Finding the objections "utterly groundless," and finding the failure to 
obtain an ex parte ruling "inexcusable," the court imposed sanctions for the "unnecessary and 
unreasonable" expenses caused by the unjustified actions against defendant's attorney. Id. at 
368. 
77. By the late 19705 and early 1980s, Rule 37 sanctions against attorneys and litigants be-
came more frequent. See, e.g., Roadway Express Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-66 (1980) (court 
imposed attorney's fee sanction directly against counsel for failing to comply with court order to 
respond to discovery request; court claimed authority under Rule 37(b) and its inherent power 
to supervise proceedings before it); United States v. Sumimoto Marine & Fire Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 
1365, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1980) (imposing monetary sanctions on government attorney personally 
under Rule 37 despite inability to impose them directly against the United States for failure to 
respond to a discovery order); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures 
Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1067-68 (2d Cir. 1979) (willfulness not required to support district court 
order precluding evidence); Riverside Memorial Mausoleum, Inc. v. Sonnenblick-Goldman 
Corp., 80 F.R.D. 433, 436-37 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (plaintiffs precluded from using evidence at trial 
because of failure to answer interrogatories on time); see also Larry Tell, Magistrate Threatens 
U.S. Over Delays in Discovery, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 26,1982, at 34; Larry Tell, Legal Fee Axed for 
Litton Case Discovery Abuse, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1981, at 2; Joseph P.1Ybor, "Runaway Discov-
ery" Draws Appellate Rebuke, NAT'L L.J. Aug. 24, 1981, at 29. 
The rising tide of discovery abuse made it clear that Rule 37 was not fulfilling its intended 
role. See, e.g., In re !tel Sec. Litig., 596 F. Supp. 226, 235 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (referring to attorney 
Isaak Walton Bader's history in this type of litigation), affd, 791 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1332, 1335 
(5th Cir. 1981) (reporting lower court's finding that Bader had tried to disrupt multidistrict pro-
ceedings "by filing and threatening to file duplicative and harassing litigation"), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 936 (1982); Jackson v. Bader, 74 A.2d 621, 622, (N.Y. 1980) (listing examples of "1. Walton 
Bader's cavalier attitude towards the spirit and letter of the SPLR"); Independent Investor Pro-
tective League v. Touche Ross & Co., 607 F.2d 530, 534 n.5 (2d Cir.) (affirming discovery sanc-
tions against Bader and characterizing his conduct as "utterly intolerable and reprehensible"), 
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895 (1978); Slumbertogs, Inc. v. Jiggs, Inc., 353 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965) (per 
curiam) (affirming sanction of dismissal as appropriate "[i]n view of the dilatory and contuma-
cious conduct of plaintiffs and their counsel in virtual defiance of the rules and orders of at least 
six judges in the district court"), cerL denied, 383 U.S. 969 (1966); see also John Riley & Mary 
Anne Galante, Mr. Outside - A Fiasco Over Fees, NAT'L L.J. Nov. 19, 1984, at 1. 
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, infra Appendix A. 
79. See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 803 (citing 1990 Advisory Committee's Notes). The Ad-
visory Committee on Civil Rules which drafted the 1993 amendments was appointed by Chief 
Justice Rhenquist, and consisted of Chief Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman; Judge Ralph K. 
Winter, Jr.; Judge James Dickson Phillips, Jr.; Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer; Judge Joseph E. Ste-
vens, Jr; Justice Michael D. Zimmerman of the Supreme Court of Utah; U.S. Magistrate Wayne 
D. Brazil; Dennis G. Linder, Esq.; Dean Mark A. Wordenberg; Professor Arthur R. Miller; 
Larrine S. Molbrooke, Esq.; James Powers, Esq.; and Professor Paul D. Carrington, Reporter. 
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five and the number of depositions to ten per side (not per party),SO while 
amended Rule 26 now requires all parties to make "initial disclosure" accord-
ing to a rather complicated schedule81 of facts, witnesses, documents, and 
other materials "relevant" to all matters alleged "with particularity" in the 
pleadings, without any request being made by the opposing party.82 
Judge Schwarzer recommended that a party seeking discovery under the 
1993 amended discovery rules have the burden of showing a need for specific 
information, after first making its own full disclosure, and recommended that 
no further discovery be allowed without a showing of "particularized 
need. "83 As amended in December 1993, Rule 37 penalizes parties who 
move with less than complete success to compel supplementation of incom-
plete disclosures, while providing numerous loopholes and imposing signifi-
cantly lighter penalties on the non-responsive opponent.84 
80. FED. R. CIV. P. 30. The Reporter's Note to the March 1990 draft of proposed amend-
ments stated: 
This draft contemplates significant revisions in the discovery rules occasioned by the 
reduced reliance on discovery to secure information. Except by leave of court, interrog-
atories would be limited in number, perhaps to a number as small as five or ten. Depo-
sitions would be presumptively limited in both number and length. 
Mullenix, supra note 2, at 803 n.28 (emphasis added). See infra Appendix C for the text of the 
amended rule with additions and deletions. See 146 F.R.D. 535, 648-61 (1993) for the text of the 
1993 version of Rule 30 without additions or deletions. 
81. FED. R. CIV. P. 16, infra Appendix F; see also infra Appendix 0 for the 1993 Advisory 
Committee's Notes to Rule 26. 
82. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, infra Appendix A. 
83. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 181. Judge Schwarzer pointed out: 
The disclosure system would not enlarge the power of the court to dismiss a pleading 
on the basis of deficiencies demonstrated by a party's disclosure since it would preserve 
a 'qualified' right to discovery. But, to exercise that right, a pany will be required to 
make a showing of a reasonable basis for asserting the claim or defense, and . .. this will 
often entail demonstrating that the party has used available means of investigation short 
of discovery. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
84. Under amended Rule 37(a)(2) the party who succeeds in obtaining a motion to compel 
disclosure in cases of incomplete or evasive disclosure is entitled only to an award of "reasonable 
expenses incurred in making the motion," but if the moving party is less than completely success-
ful in its motion to compel, subparagraph (B) authorizes the court to assess against the moving 
party or attorney, or both, "the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including 
attorney's fees." FED. R. Cry. P. 37, infra Appendix E. 
Only in cases of total non-disclosure does Rule 37 (subsection 4(c» authorize an "additional 
sanction," for the benefit of the movant, which "may" include "attorney's fees caused by the 
failure" to disclose, unless there was "substantial justification" for the non-disclosure. Thus, if an 
obstructive defendant goes through the motions of some form of disclosure, it is safe from the 
imposition of serious sanctions, because it will certainly be less expensive to pay the expenses 
(not including fees) incurred in "making a motion" than to give the plaintiff the information it 
needs to win the suit. The plaintiff in such a case must accept the incomplete or evasive disclo-
sure or risk incurring the full weight of the defendant's attorney's fees and expenses if it is less 
than completely successful in obtaining a more complete disclosure. The attorney also faces 
potential malpractice liability if the attorney's actions cause the plaintiff to have to pay sanctions 
resulting from an unsuccessful attempt at obtaining more complete disclosure from the 
defendant. 
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Under the originally proposed mandatory disclosure rule, each plaintiff 
would have been required, at the time of filing the complaint, to serve each 
defendant with copies of all material documents and things, the names and 
addresses of all persons believed to have material information, and state-
ments informing the opposing party of the material information possessed by 
persons under its control, such as the individual parties and their managing 
agents.8S The December 1993 amended rule is only slightly less onerous in 
terms of time, requiring "a party" (although in practice this will usually be 
the plaintiff) to provide to other parties, the name, address and telephone 
number of anyone "likely" to have discoverable information, copies or de-
scriptions of all documents, data compilations, and tangible things as well as 
a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing 
party, making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 
the documents or other evidentiary material not privileged or pro-
tected from disclosure, on which such a computation is based, in-
cluding materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries 
suffered ... [insurance agreements must also be disclosed]. Unless 
otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall 
be made at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties .... 86 
Each disclosure must be certified as to completeness, based on a reason-
able investigation, and is subject to a continuing duty to update the disclo-
sures.87 Defendants, however, need not disclose any material unless the 
plaintiffs have alleged the relevant claims "with particularity," and defend-
ants need not make their disclosures until as long as sixty days after the meet-
ing of the parties, which meeting does not occur until some time after the 
defendants file their formal appearance in the case.88 
Under the amended rules, plaintiffs are not required to do any investiga-
tion beyond that required by Rule 11.89 However, the threat of Rule 11 sanc-
tions, and the new ability of judges to "dispose of' claims at the Rule 16 
pretrial conference, make it likely that under the December 1993 amend-
ments, plaintiffs will have to try their cases at the pretrial conference before 
receiving any disclosures from the defendant.90 The defendant initially must 
The disparity in these standards is clear when the rule is read in context with other portions 
of the rules authorizing fee awards in connection with disclosure, all of which refer to fees and 
expenses resulting from the opponent's conduct. Only the information-poor plaintiff faced with 
incomplete and evasive disclosure is subject to a different standard. 
85. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 180. 
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, infra Appendix A. 
87. 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2. 
88. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 180; 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra 
note 2, at 631; see also infra Appendix D. 
89. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 180; see 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes, 
supra note 2 (rule does not demand exhaustive investigation, but one that is reasonable under 
circumstances). 
90. An "issue based" discovery scenario would likely require judges to "get into the 
trenches in the front lines of discovery wars, [and) to evaluate the merits of cases before triaL" 
Diana Huffman, Protracted Litigation, Abuses of Discovery Targeted by Judge, LEGAL TIMES, 
July 26, 1982 at 1, 32 (interview with Judge John F. Grady, N.D. Ill.). 
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disclose only what it has assembled in the course of preparing its answer, and 
then only if the material is relevant to matters "alleged with particularity" in 
the pleadings.91 
Defendants are not required to read all of their documents, and may still 
produce "properly identified" files as they are maintained in the ordinary 
course of business in accordance with the provisions of the pre-1993 Rule 
33.92 Of course, the drafters intended that defendants and their counsel not 
be allowed to feign ignorance of matters known or available to them.93 How-
ever, defendants can still obstruct the exchange by moving for protective or-
ders under the rules governing privilege and work product, and are provided 
a considerable safe haven by the provision excusing them from disclosing 
information relevant to any matters not pled with sufficient "particularity."94 
Judge Schwarzer also recommended that parties be permitted to file mo-
tions for clarification of the scope of their disclosure obligations before mak-
ing disclosure.95 Even a cursory reading of the 1993 amendments will reveal 
numerous opportunities for parties to force their opponents into satellite liti-
gation in the form of a series of "mini-trials" while delaying their own disclo-
sure. The resulting rounds of motions practice will likely be at least as 
extensive (and expensive) as those which prompted the adoption of the 1993 
amendments. 
III. SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE 1993 MANDATORY DISCLOSURE 
AMENDMENTS 
H.L. Mencken once observed, "For every problem there is some solution 
which is simple, neat and wrong."96 The 1993 amendments come danger-
ously close to Mencken's description, and are a 
logical outgrowth of views of the sort expressed by Chief Justice 
Warren Burger and Harvard president Derrick Bok. Each has 
strongly and repeatedly attacked the U.S. legal profession and the 
role of litigation in our society. Their remarks and those of other 
influential commentators portray lawyers as distrusted and lawsuits 
as social pathology.97 
However, lawsuits can also be potent forces for social change, and for eradi-
cating institutionalized pathology from American life,98 a function which is 
91. FED. R. CIy. P. 26, infra Appendix A. 
92. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 180; FED. R. ClY. P. 33, infra Appendix B. 
93. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 180. 
94. Id.; FED. R. ClY. P. 26, infra Appendix A. 
95. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 181. 
96. Frank Daily, Preserve The Lawyer's Tools, 7 A.B.A. J., Feb. 1986, at 38, 40 (quoting H. 
L. Mencken). 
97. Theodore Tetzlaff, Federal Courts, Their Rules and Their Roles, LmG., Spring 1991, at 
1,68. 
98. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), later proceeding coram nobis, 
584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (vacating petitioner's 1942 conviction for being in place 
where persons of Japanese ancestry were not allowed). See generally Eric K. Yamamoto, Kore-
matsu Revisited-Correcting the Injustice of Extraordinary Government Excess and Lax Judicial 
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seriously threatened by the adoption of the mandatory disclosure rules. 
A. The Mandatory Disclosure Rule Will Have a Negative Effect on Access 
to Court for Disadvantaged Minorities and Other Litigants with 
Unequal Resources 
The most serious problem with the 1993 amendments is that even if they 
were to promote efficiency in "disposing of' cases, efficiency, in and of itself, 
does not assure fairness for all litigants, and does not ensure that the public 
interest99 and minority interestslOO will be treated equally with the interests 
of more mainstream and powerful litigants.lOl Judge Schwarzer dismissed 
this concern, arguing that traditional discovery is unnecessary and can be dis-
pensed with in favor of mandatory disclosure because "[p]arties have avail-
able to them a range of investigatory resources and techniques which should 
be utilized before the burdens of adversary discovery are imposed upon the 
courts and parties."102 
This is, of course, theoretically true, but this argument is overly simplistic 
in that it ignores the realities of cases between parties with grossly unequal 
financial and informational resources. There are many categories of cases, 
including civil rights,103. employment,l04 products liability, lOS and mass toxic 
Review: Time for a Better Accommodation of National Security Concerns and Civil Liberties, 26 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1986) (arguing that for courts to avoid making same mistake as Kore-
matsu, they must recognize that standard of review of government restrictions of civil liberties is 
not altered by government claims of "national security" unless martial law is legitimately in 
force); see also, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (overturning long-standing 
"separate but equal" doctrine). 
99. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1281 (1976) (analyzing role of public law litigation in establishing regime of regulation that 
governs society at large). 
100. See Paul D. Carrington, The New Order in Judicial Rulemaking, 75 JUDICATURE 161, 
165 (Oct./Nov. 1991) ("[I]t is a good thing that rule makers be confirmed in their understanding 
that they are not the 8oo-pound gorilla that can sit wherever it pleases. Indeed, if a special 
interest group correctly states that it has a large and particular interest in the text of a rule, that 
serves as a useful caution to rule makers that they should be alert to the risk that a rule may be 
substantive and hence invalid under the Rules Enabling Act."); see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Case 
Management and the Hawaii Courts: The Evolving Role of the Managerial Judge in Civil Litiga-
tion, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 395, 412-20 (1987) (discussing balancing need for efficiency with need 
for fairness in case management). 
101. See Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 17, at 352-53 & n.59 (public interest 
litigants and minorities pay high price for efficiency). 
102. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 181. Judge Schwarzer takes pains to point out 
that the restrictions on 'fishing expeditions' apply both to plaintiffs seeking a claim and to de-
fendants seeking to fish for a defense to a claim. [d. 
103. See Hazard, supra note 17, at 2246-47 ("How far would the NAACP have gotten if it 
had tried to tailor Rule 23 to its purpose in 1938, or in 1956, for that matter? The dynamic of 
social justice litigation has been the use of existing general forms of procedure for new substan-
tive purposes."). 
104. See John R. Myer, Development of a Plaintiffs Fair Employment Practices Case, 
LITIG., Winter 1979, at 8 (discussing vital role of discovery in establishing plaintiffs employment 
discrimination case); Robert S. Carr, Discovery Overview, C517 ALI-ABA 253 (1990) ("How-
ever, to apply the discovery rules more narrowly and to place stringent limits on discovery would 
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tort, for example, in which a defendant will control substantially all of the 
information. Assuming that a plaintiff in these kinds of cases will have 
enough information to meet the "particularity" standard, the plaintiff must 
then depend on the good faith of the defendant to provide, through voluntary 
disclosure, the information that will secure the judgment against that defend-
ant.106 To expect this to occur is optimistic, at best. If the good faith of 
litigants and their attorneys were sufficient to prevent discovery abuse, there 
would be no abuse, and no need for a mandatory disclosure rule. The 1993 
amendments' radical curtailment of discovery is impossible to implement 
without depriving "information-poor" plaintiffs of access to information rea-
sonably necessary to develop and prepare their cases whenever their oppo-
nent controls most of the available information.107 
be to put 'a potent weapon in the hands of employers who have no interest in voluntarily com-
plying with [discovery], and who wish instead to delay as long as possible investigations by the 
EEOC."') (citing EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 81 (1984». 
105. See Friedenthal, supra note 56, at 818 (lawyers would not have pushed in the courts 
and in the legislatures for expanded causes of action hinged on proof that defendants knew or 
should have known of a product's danger, if such proof were normally unavailable). 
The fact that in so many cases the defendant will control most of the information makes the 
new "particularity" pleading requirement set forth in amended Rule 26 particularly unfair to 
information-poor plaintiffs. It is clear that this change was deliberately made for the purpose of 
discouraging such plaintiffs. See 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 631 
("Broad, vague, and conclusory allegations sometimes tolerated in notice pleading ... should not 
impose upon responding parties the obligation at that point to search for and identify all persons 
possibly involved in, or all documents affecting, the design, manufacture and assembly of the 
product."). 
106. The 1983 Advisory Committee specified that employment and free speech cases, 
among others, may merit a balancing of factors, including public policy importance, which may 
far outweigh the monetary amount involved as measured in philosophical, social, or institutional 
terms, and directed that "[t]he court must apply the standards [of Rule 26(b)(1)] in an even-
handed manner that will prevent use of discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to 
coerce a party, whether fmancially weak or affluent." See 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, 
supra note 2, at 218. Unfortunately, the 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes have no such provi-
sions. See 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2. 
107. See Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It 
Again Time For Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155, 162-63 (1991) (criticizing Judge Schwarzer's proposal 
for mandatory disclosure). Professor Mengler noted: 
A second, more serious problem with Judge Schwarzer's disclosure scheme is that it is 
not only untargeted; it may also be mistargeted .... Schwarzer's proposal, if promul-
gated, would affect plaintiffs more than defendants ... in at least two ways. First, as 
Schwarzer himself explains, "[b]y shifting the burden of persuasion from the party ob-
jecting to discovery to the party seeking it, it would reduce the amount of discovery." 
... Second, by defining the disclosure requirement in terms of "materiality," the propo-
sal would [establish] a more stringent standard than the present scope of discovery 
under Rule 26(b)(l). Because, as noted above, plaintiffs typically-though certainly 
not always-have a greater need than defendants for obtaining information from the 
other side, a reduction in the amount and scope of information disclosed will dispropor-
tionately injure plaintiffs. This likely consequence of Schwarzer's proposal is particu-
larly troublesome because there is as yet no empirical evidence to suggest that plaintiffs 
as a class of litigants engage in discovery excess, delay, and abuse significantly more 
than defendants do-that the "discovery problem" is peculiarly or primarily a "plaintiff 
problem." Indeed, . . . defendants have a greater economic incentive to delay the 
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In such cases, the 1993 amendments will put plaintiffs in a classic "Catch-
22"108 paradox. If the defendant controls most of the evidence and chooses 
not to disclose it, the plaintiff will be precluded by Rule l1's stringent re-
quirements from filing legitimate claims for which it does not have control of 
supporting discovery materials at the time of filing, even if it knows of their 
existence. They will likewise be precluded by the 1993 amendments from 
receiving disclosure and conducting discovery into any issues not "alleged 
with particularity" in the pleadings. 
For example, a plaintiff who has been terminated wrongfully may not 
know at the outset whether the reason was age, race, gender, disability, or 
some other factor. Before December 1993, discovery in such a case would 
frequently disclose facts supporting valid claims that the plaintiff was unable 
to plead at the outset because of lack of documentation. Under the 1993 
amendments, however, such a plaintiff will effectively be barred from ob-
taining the factual support necessary to amend the complaint to add addi-
tional, valid claims that would have been revealed by legitimate discovery.109 
Furthermore, the 1993 amendments provide for Rule 16 conferences within 
ninety days of a defendant's appearance (regardless of whether all defend-
ants have been served).110 Under the new rules, the judge can foreclose such 
issues as limitations on expert testimony, and can even adjudicate some 
claims at the pre-trial conference, under Rule 16(c)(5),111 rendering the 
plaintiffs lack of discovery even more devastating to the fair adjudication of 
its claim. 
Open discovery is essential when the evidence is under the opponent's 
control, if only because in many cases a party cannot trust its adversary to 
comply fully with mandatory disclosure. Under the new rules, however, the 
party seeking discovery will have to carry a heavy burden of persuasion in 
order to justify inquiring further, and will pay severe penalties if it is less than 
payment of damages through delays and abuses associated with discovery, by making 
plaintiffs bear the brunt of the discovery reduction burden, Schwarzer's proposal might 
target too heavily one class of litigants. 
[d. (footnotes omitted). 
108. The term "Catch-22" is derived from the 1955 novel of the same name by Joseph HeI-
ler, and refers to a paradoxical situation in which the "only solution [to a problem] is denied by a 
circumstance inherent in the problem." WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 215 (9th ed. 1986). See gener-
ally HELLER, supra note 28. 
109. See Friedenthal, supra note 56, at 811, 818 ("The ability of plaintiffs' attorneys to ob-
tain a corporate defendant's records, to depose corporate employees, and to send searching in-
terrogatories has had a substantial impact in particular areas of law."); see also Myer, supra note 
104, at 8 (discussing vital role of discovery in employment discrimination case); Morton R. 
Galane, Proving Punitive Damages in Business Tort Litigation, LmG., Spring 1976, at 24 (point-
ing out importance of discovery in proving claims of bad faith in suits for commercial torts). 
110. FED. R. elV. P. 16, infra Appendix F. 
111. Under amended Rule 16(c)(5) the court's pretrial order, issued before defendants have 
made disclosure or plaintiffs have obtained discovery, could adjudicate claims and defenses, and 
resolve other issues, and could modify the time for "disclosure" to take place, and detemIine the 
extent of permissible discovery. See id. 
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completely successful. The hearing on the motion for additional discovery 
will thus effectively become a trial on the merits under the 1993 rules. 
One of the strongest arguments for permitting open discovery is that the 
denial of discovery as to matters deemed irrelevant at the pretrial stage may 
prove extremely prejudicial if those matters become material at trial.112 
Judge Schwarzer argued that in such cases 
a party seeking discovery will not only have received disclosure, but 
will have conducted its own investigation. In an employment dis-
crimination case, for example, the plaintiff will have received mate-
rial statistical and other employment data and will have been able to 
conduct interviews and seek other information. A request for addi-
tional discovery, therefore, can be specific and confined to 
essentials.113 
However, Judge Schwarzer's position seems to rest on several unwar-
ranted assumptions. If a company is, in fact, engaging in illegal discrimina-
tion or other tortious conduct, it seems foolish to suppose that it will be 
ethical in complying with mandatory disclosure rules, particularly in light of 
the concurrent restriction on the plaintiffs right to inquire further through 
legitimate discovery.114 Now that the plaintiffs right to probe these areas is 
effectively curtailed, defendants will be able to find out what plaintiff already 
knows, and then destroy or "lose" inculpatory material, the existence of 
which the plaintiff is unaware,l15 with little concern that their misconduct will 
112. See, e.g., Paul Kadair, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 88 F.R.D. 280, 284-89 (M.D. La. 1980) (plain-
tiff precluded from undertaking any discovery partly because of lack of factual allegations to 
support plaintiffs conspiracy theory), affd, 694 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1983); Wallace v. Brownell 
Pontiac-GMAC Co., 703 F.2d 525, 526-28 (11th Cir. 1983) (summary judgment for defendant 
before plaintiff had begun discovery upheld where applicable case law undermines plaintiffs 
substantive contentions); Willmar Poultry Co. v. Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 520 F.2d 289, 291 
(8th Cir. 1975) (summary judgment for defendant before discovery upheld where statute of limi-
tations bars action), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 915 (1976); cf Shaklee Corp. v. Gunnell, 748 F.2d 548, 
550 (10th Cir. 1984) (defendants denied due process when trial court denied discovery on mat-
ters deemed irrelevant during discovery, but which became relevant at trial). 
113. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 182. 
114. Additionally, even if disclosure is made fully, and in good faith, the restrictions on 
discovery may well prevent a plaintiff who has, in fact, been the victim of illegal discrimination, 
from discovering the basis for additional, legitimate claims. The author once represented a 
plaintiff in such a case. The plaintiff had been employed by a large company for many years, 
with regular raises and promotions, and consistently good evaluations. She was fired after re-
turning to work from a company-approved hospitalization for spinal meningitis, and sued for age 
discrimination. During the course of depositions, it became clear that in addition to the ADEA 
claim, the plaintiff had a legitimate ERISA claim. As a result of the discovery, the plaintiff was 
able to amend her complaint to include the ERISA claim. Rule 11 prevented her from pleading 
it initially, since she lacked hard evidence to support it. The amended rules on mandatory disclo-
sure would not have called for disclosure of the ERISA material based on an ADEA complaint, 
and she would have been precluded from discovering the documents and information that sup-
ported the ERISA claim. (Identifying details on this case, which was settled in plaintiffs favor, 
are withheld on behalf of the former client.) 
115. In some recent cases of flagrant spoliation of evidence, only the availability of broad 
discovery has brought the defendants' misconduct to light. See Letter from George S. Gray, 
Esq. to Virginia E. Hench, Esq. (Oct. 9, 1990) Re: Honda Discovery Abuse and Document De-
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come to light. Expecting such a defendant voluntarily to disclose inculpatory 
material is as unrealistic as expecting it to contact victims of its past discrimi-
nation and offer reparations without the need for the victims to bring suit. 
Both would alleviate pressure on court calendars, but neither is likely to oc-
cur. More likely, vital information that is critical to obtaining a fair day in 
court for the plaintiff will never come to light.116 
Some apologists for mandatory informal disclosure, such as Professor 
Mullenix, disparage what she terms "the public interest critique"117 on the 
grounds that such criticisms "jeopardize the Advisory Committee's work by 
falsely imbuing [the] proposed rules with political content," arguing that "if 
these criticisms gain public currency, the legitimacy of the Advisory Commit-
tee will be undermined in its rule reform efforts. "118 This criticism misses the 
point. 
The point is that the Committee's motives are not the issue. The issue is 
that the effect of the rulemakers' efforts will be to deny plaintiffs effective 
access to the courts by cutting them off from the discovery needed to prove, 
for example, a defendant's knowledge of a product's danger, or discrimina-
tory intent119 or discriminatory practices in civil rights cases.120 The point is 
struction, (with attachments) detailing judicial proceedings concerning Honda Motor Company's 
intentional destruction of inculpatory documents related to All-Terrain Vehicle [ATV] litigation 
in Mullins v. Kretchmar (No. 384,282, 200th D. Ct. Travis City, TX) filed Aug. 12, 1985 (on file 
with author); Julie O. Shoop, Suit Says Honda Destroyed Documents on ATV Safety, TRIAL, 
Nov. 1990, at 14. In In re Connair Air Disaster Litig., No. 79-104 (E.D. Ky., Dec. 4, 1986), 
sanctions were imposed on Piper Aircraft for adopting in bad faith a document retention pro-
gram under which the company routinely destroyed all flight records and test data sheets if the 
equipment being tested did not meet minimum standards. Jan Lewis, Discovery Abuse, Plaintiffs 
Fight Back, TRIAL, Oct. 1990, at 70 (discussing Connair and other cases involving destruction or 
suppression of evidence); Kay Latona & A. Hinda Klein, Discovery Abuse: Making Piper Pay, 
TRIAL, Feb. 1987, at 69 (encouraging courts to consider seriously imposing dismissal as a sanc-
tion in cases such as Connair). 
116. Judge Schwarzer dismissed this potential outcome: 
It may be that in the disclosure system, on occasion, some information helpful to a party that 
exhaustive discovery would uncover will not come to light. But the question must be asked 
whether the marginal value of preventing such occasional failures is worth the great cost of 
unrestrained discovery. As Donald Elliott has observed, "Nourishing the fiction that justice is a 
pearl beyond price has its own price." Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 182 (footnote 
omitted) (quoting E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. 
CHI. L. REv. 306, 321 (1986)). 
117. Mullenix, supra note 2, at 823. 
118. Id. at 824. 
119. Cf Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 25, at 50 (addressing 1983 amendments to Rule 
26) (issue of discriminatory intent in civil rights suits might be seen as deserving broad discovery 
to find cumulative evidence of intent; on the other hand, another judge might limit such discov-
ery on the theory that additional discovery is unlikely to shed further light on the issues). 
120. In one such case, the author represented the widow of an African-American factory 
worker who had a mental breakdown during which his automobile collided with a tree in the 
town of Franklin, in Johnson County, Indiana. Police found him wandering nearby, incoherent, 
and took him to jail instead of to the hospital. He died hours later of a condition that the 
medical examiner said had a 99% statistical probability of being cured, had he received prompt 
medical attention. 
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that by implementing these rules the Advisory Committee and Congress are 
effectively denying those plaintiffs meaningful access to the courts,121 regard-
less of the stated intentions.122 
Further, as Judge A. Leon Higginbotham has so eloquently noted, the 
Supreme Court held in Norris v. Alabamal23 "[i]n words that would later 
haunt those who attempted to hide racist motives behind the veil of 'objec-
tive factfinding,' ... [that it] must determine not only whether a federal right 
has been denied 'in express terms,' but also whether it has been denied 'in 
During the course of discovery in the 42 U.S.c. § 1983 lawsuit against city and county offi-
cials, the police department's own records reflected a pattern of police conduct under which 
white persons who were picked up after a fight or other disturbance were routinely taken to the 
hospital (which, in Johnson County, is across the street from the jail), while African Americans 
were taken to jail without medical treatment. This material helped the plaintiff to survive sum-
mary judgment, and to obtain a settlement before trial. Day v. Johnson County et aI., Cause 
#IP-88-1280-C (S.D. Ind. 1990). 
121. See Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 17, at 344-45 (available evidence sug-
gests recent federal procedural reforms have discouraged judicial access for those outside polit-
ical and cultural mainstream); see also Carl Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 270 (1989). Public interest litigation, for purposes of 
Professor Tobias' analysis, is that which "seek[s] to vindicate important social values that affect 
numerous individuals and entities." Id. at 270 n.l. He noted: 
Born of the need of large numbers of people who individually lack the economic 
wherewithal or the logistical capacity to vindicate important social values or their own 
specific interests through the courts, these litigants now participate actively in much 
federal civil litigation: public law litigation. Despite the pervasive presence of public 
interest litigants, the federal judiciary has accorded them a mixed reception, particu-
larly when applying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Many federal courts have 
applied numerous Rules in ways that disadvantage public interest litigants, especially in 
contrast to traditional litigants, such as private individuals, corporations, and the 
government. 
Id. at 270. 
122. Indeed, indifference can be as harmful as intentional discrimination. See Douglas O. 
Linder, Journeying Through The Valley of Evil, 71 N.C. L. REv. 1111 (1993). Professor Linder 
noted: 
Docket management problems rival overidentification as a cause of evil in our legal 
system. There is no dispute that the volume of cases in our court system has reached a 
crisis level. In response, the legal system has placed great importance on caseload re-
duction. In an effort to meet these demands, many courts have elevated docket man-
agement concerns above concerns for individual's rights. . 
Distance from the human consequence of one's decisions can breed the indifference 
and lack of imagination that Hannah Arendt found so closely linked to evil. Empathy, 
which is the enemy of evil, comes from our ability to imagine the details of another's 
life. When knowledge of another's life is reduced to a paragraph or two in a written 
brief, opportunities for empathy are limited, if not foreclosed altogether. 
The temptation is often strong to turn what should be questions of fairness and justice 
into questions of expediency or personal interest. 
Id. at 1137, 1147 (citing HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BA. 
NALITY OF EVIL 287 (2d ed. 1965) (reporting on banality and "ordinaryness" of many Nazi war 
criminals». 
123. 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (one of the notorious "Scottsboro Rape" cases). 
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substance and effect.'''124 The proper analysis of the 1993 rules (and any 
criticisms of those rules) must be directed at their substance and effect, not 
on the parochial standard that such criticisms "undermine" attempted 
reforms. 
Because the 1993 rules amendments will limit access of legitimate, disad-
vantaged claimants to the fair adjudication of their claims, the 1993 rules 
amendments should be repealed. Otherwise, as former Justice Thurgood 
Marshall wrote, the federal courts "can only reinforce in the hearts and 
minds of our society's less fortunate members the unsettling message that 
their pleas are not welcome here."l25 
B. Reliance on the Adversaries to Police Themselves May Create New 
Problems and Abuses 
In a perfect world, adoption of the 1993 amendments would result in the 
immediate abandonment of all obstructive and delaying tactics. In this im-
perfect world, however, the mandatory disclosure rule will likely increase the 
number of pretrial motions. The resulting hearings will exacerbate the inci-
dence of pretrial abuse as parties seize upon ambiguities and loopholes in the 
new standards as fertile new weapons for delay and obstruction.126 
One problem with the mandatory disclosure rule is that it seeks to deter 
abuses by, in effect, wishing them away. Magistrate Judge Brazil has warned 
that factors such as professional pressures are to blame for a large amount of 
abuse; he believes that abuses "cannot be reduced significantly without re-
structuring the professional pressures which in large measure provoke these 
124. A. Leon Higginbotham, The William B. Lockhart Lecture: The Hughes Court and the 
Beginning of the End of the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1099, 1101, 1114 
n.67 (1992) (Higginbotham is Chief Judge Emeritus, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit; Senior Fellow, University of Pennsylvania Law School). 
125. In re Demos, 111 S. Ct. 1569, 1571-72 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (majority's deci-
sion prohibited indigent litigant from proceeding in forma pauperis). 
126. See Letter to Hon. Robert Keeton, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States, from members of the defense bar (July 
12, 1991), including a document dated May I, 1992, entitled Comments on Proposed Amend-
ments To Rule 26 To The Standing Committee on Civil Rules On Behalf of Lawyers for Civil 
Justice and the Product Liability Advisory Counsel, reprinted sub nom Issues and Changes in 146 
F.R.D. 521, Attachment B, and reprinted in FED. R. CIV. P. 527 (West 1992-93 Educational Ed.) 
(copy on file with author). Judge Keeton's letter warned that the addition of a disclosure re-
quirement (without a return to "fact pleading") 
is likely to result in a significant increase in motions for more definite statement under 
Rule 12(c) ... and in order to allow the court to rule on motions for protective orders 
to protect confidential information identified in disclosure. This increase in motion 
practice will call for increased judicial involvement, increased paperwork, and delays in 
the discovery process ... at the outset of the litigation, thereby exacerbating the sys-
temic inefficiency and the drain on judicial resources. 
Id. at 5. See generally Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 433 (1986) (advocating case management and summary 
judgment to avoid trend toward return to "fact pleading"). 
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abuses."127 If Judge Brazil is correct, it is probably unrealistic to expect 
trained litigators to engage in discovery (or disclosure) in a cooperative spirit, 
or as one commentator put it, according to the Marquess of Queensberry's 
rules.128 
Merely requiring disclosure, without a more effective system of case 
management, will not eliminate these problems, nor will wishful thinking 
about "summon[ing] lawyers to the highest degree of professional con-
duct."129 It is inconceivable that those litigants and attorneys who now en-
gage in dilatory and obstructive tactics will change their stripes merely 
because they are told, in effect, to shape up, cooperate with each other, and 
reveal all that they know that might be of interest to their adversary.130 
1. The "Alleged with Particularity" Standard 
An inherent weakness of the 1993 Rule 26 mandatory disclosure rule is 
that it relies on the adversaries to determine what matters have been "alleged 
with particularity" and what is sufficiently "relevant" to those allegations as 
to be subject to mandatory disclosure.131 In theory, a party may not resolve 
doubts against disclosure.132 However, a party having (or professing to have) 
reasonable doubts as to the extent of its disclosure obligation under the new 
rules will almost certainly follow Judge Schwarzer's advice to file a motion to 
clarify that obligation and to define which issues have been pled with suffi-
cient particularity, and will likely also seek rulings on the relevance of avail-
able information and the applicability of various privileges.133 These motions 
127. Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 32, at 1332. 
128. Miller, Dinosaur, supra note 6, at 16 ("Attorneys, steeped in the grand tradition of the 
litigator, are trained to be aggressive, adversarial animals and to employ every weapon in their 
arsenal to achieve the aims of their clients and to frustrate those of their opponents."). 
129. Mullenix, supra note 2, at 827. 
130. Even Professor Mullenix concedes that in cases where a major institutional defendant 
"withholds information under the informal discovery rule, disregards the continuing disclosure 
requirement, and further does not cooperate in formal discovery," the criticism that the informal 
discovery rules will encourage nondisclosure and gamesmanship "seems valid in instances in 
which a defendant decides to withhold harmful information that would not be needed [by the 
defense] at trial and ... would be effective only to the extent that a defendant's defenses or 
counterclaims depended on withheld information." [d. at 826-27. This, of course, would encom-
pass the majority of civil rights, mass-tort, and employment cases. See generally Catherine J. 
Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the "Pretext-Plus" Rule in 
Employment Discrimination Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57,71 (1991) (in some jurisdictions, plain-
tiffs must show both prima facie case and intent). 
131. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26, infra Appendix A. 
132. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 181. 
133. See id. Judge Schwarzer noted: 
A party having a reasonable doubt as to the extent of its disclosure obligation may 
make a motion to clarify, seeking an order defining issues or ruling on the materiality 
of information in the context of specific issues. A party may combine its disclosure 
with such a motion, explaining the rationale for the extent and limitations of its disclo-
sure, and seeking an appropriate ruling. Thus, a defendant may reasonably interpret a 
claim as bringing into issue only a certain period of time, or line of prodUcts, or seg-
ment of the workforce. A motion for clarification would serve as a vehicle for resolving 
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will surely generate endless rounds of satellite proceedings. 
2. Satellite Proceedings 
The 1993 discovery rule amendments will provide an obstinate litigant 
with fresh new sources of dilatory tactics through motions for clarification, 
objections and hearings to interpret every nuance of the new rules. In order 
to avoid endless rounds of "satellite proceedings,"134 and the constant poten-
tial for attorney-client conflict,135 a different approach to pretrial procedure 
[d. 
a dispute over disclosure, but it would be decided in the context of the facts and issues 
of the case rather than in the abstract as is now often done in discovery disputes. 
134. Professor Miller predicted that "the great cottage industry of the 1980s [would] be 
sanctions proceedings-which, of course, means satellite proceedings and more work for the 
judges, which arguably may completely chew up the efficiencies and the economies that [the 
1983 Amendments] might have produced." MILLER, supra note 1, at 40. Professor Miller 
added: 
I wake up in the middle of the night and what I have dreamed is that in a complicated 
case one of the parties has made a gigantic discovery request, and the other party leaps 
up and says; "I move to sanction my opponent for violation of the certification require-
ment in rule 26, because that discovery request is disproportionate, it is redundant, it 
violates this or that." The judge holds a hearing. At the end of the hearing the court 
rules that it was an enormously complex and detailed discovery request, but it did not 
violate rule 26. The sanction motion is denied, at which point the discovering party 
leaps up and says: "Your Honor, I hereby move to sanction the sanction motion." As 
Kurt Vonnegut would say, "and so it might go." 
[d. at 41. 
For cases in .which moving for sanctions or moving to compel discovery has resulted in 
sanctions against the moving party, see Hayes v. National Gypsum Co., 38 Fed. R. Servo 2d 645, 
647 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (sanctions imposed on attorney for, inter alia, serving duplicative motions to 
compel); Jenkins v. Toyota, 40 Fed. R. Servo 2d 1125,1126-27 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (sanctions im-
posed on both client and attorney for moving to compel without first seeking informal resolution 
and for moving for sanctions without first learning why plaintiff had not complied with consent 
order). 
135. The 1993 discovery amendments place an attorney at odds with the traditional profes-
sional role of advocate, presenting serious questions concerning the work-product and attorney-
client privilege issues. It is incongruous with the accepted model of attorney-client confidential-
ity to place upon an attorney the burden of producing everything necessary without the necessity 
of a request from the opposing counsel. Cf Peter M. Fishbein, New Federal Rule 26: A Litiga-
tor's Perspective, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 739, 745-46 (1983) (commenting on then-proposed Rule 
26 limitations on "burdensome" discovery) ("[I]t is incongruous to require a lawyer to advise his 
client that, although the information is relevant, material, and may be helpful in formulating his 
case, the information should not be sought because it would be too burdensome on the other 
party.") 
The availability of sanctions directed at the attorney personally means that an attorney must 
be prepared, in the event that requested discovery (or resistance to proposed discovery) is ruled 
improper, to show the court that the client was responsible for the misconduct. See, e.g., Watkin-
son v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 38 Fed. R. Servo 2d 1310, 1314 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (fees 
assessed against attorney in absence of showing that party was aware of tardiness and evasion). 
An attorney is permitted to break confidentiality when necessary to defend against charges of 
misconduct, but the prospect of converting the attorney-client relationship to an adversary rela-
tionship has serious implications. This problem is heightened by the fact that good faith is appar-
ently no defense under the new rules, for attorney or client. Even under the existing rules, the 
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is needed. Ironically, even though the effects of the 1993 amendments are 
likely to fall most heavily upon the less powerful litigants in the system, coun-
sel representing "repeat players" have also criticized the proposals. Kent S. 
Hofmeister, Chair of the Federal Rules of Procedure committee of the Fed-
eral Bar Association, noted in a letter distributed to committee members that 
"[b]y far the greatest discussion, concern and, quite frankly, overwhelming 
disapproval has centered on the 1993 amendments to Rule 26."136 One Com-
mittee member commented: 
The proposal appears to be based on the assumption that all parties 
have knowledge of relatively equal usefulness at the outset of the 
litigation which they can share with their opponents to reduce costs. 
This assumption is unwarranted. 
First, because the federal rules provide for only notice plead-
ing, a defendant often does not have sufficient information about 
the plaintiffs claim, before discovery from the plaintiff has begun, 
to determine what the basis for the claim is, who the relevant wit-
nesses are, and what the relevant documents are .... 137 
These defense-oriented comments were written about an earlier draft, 
Federal Circuit in 1985 upheld a district court's imposition of sanctions for failure to respond to 
discovery, even though the respondent company had gone out of business while discovery was 
pending, and was therefore unable to respond. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Eco Chern., 
Inc., 757 F.2d 1256, 1258, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Although in 3-M there was a pattern of delay 
and other misconduct before the sanctions were imposed, neither good intentions nor practical 
inability appears to be an acceptable defense. See Samuel Adams & Christopher E. Nolin, 
Pretrial Abuses Now Punished By U.S. Courts, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 17, 1986. The 1993 amendments 
will provide further traps for the unwary. 
136. Letter from Kent S. Hofmeister 10 (Jan. 31, 1992) (on file with author). According to 
Mr. Hofmeister, the Oregon Chapter of the Federal Bar Association 
unanimously opposed those proposed amendments to Rule 26(a) that would require 
early disclosure of information. . . . [A] common sentiment expressed was that 
although laudable in purpose, the changes to this provision likely would lead to new 
motion practice concerning whether material produced by initial disclosure "bears sig-
nificantly on" any claim or defense. 
Id. at 11. Mr. Hofmeister noted, "[a]lmost uniformly, different chapters and individuals charac-
terize the proposed amendments relating to voluntary disclosure as unworkable, unrealistic, un-
necessary and potentially counter-productive." Id. 
137. Comments of Committee member Joyce Ann Harpole. She added: 
[E]ven if the defendant has some understanding about the claim, the standard for dis-
closure ... is different from that applicable to discovery, and is so vague as to cause the 
parties to provide a very broad response, lest they be accused of violating the rule. 
Broad responses are, however, not helpful in focusing discovery, which the rule is in-
tended to aid. The party receiving the broad response will, of course, be inclined to 
request discovery from every identified witness and every document category, out of 
fear of overlooking the critical piece of evidence. Thus, discovery is likely to become 
more, rather than less expansive under this proposal .... 
Finally, the proposed disclosure requirements seem contrary to the notions underlying 
the work product doctrine - that one party may not take advantage of another party's 
thoughts and work. Requiring one party's attorney to decide what is relevant to the 
other party's case and disclose it seems to be a classic invasion of an attorney's work 
product. 
Id. at 11-12. 
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which did not contain the provision limiting the defendant's disclosure obli-
gation to material relevant to matters alleged with particularity in the plead-
ings. Nevertheless, these concerns are still valid. The 1993 amendments will 
put ethical defense attorneys into an intolerable dilemma by forcing them to 
use their professional skills to help the opposition, and by giving no guidance 
as to how to balance their attorney-client and work-product privileges against 
their obligation to make full and fair disclosure. Less than ethical defense 
counsel, on the other hand will be able to spoliate evidence and obstruct 
access to information with little danger of their misconduct coming to light. 
Another perceived problem from the defense perspective is the arbitrary 
response time. While the Advisory Committee optimistically suggests that 
there be "agreement" to extend the response time, the likelihood is that this 
issue will become the battleground for yet another "mini-trial." Members of 
the defense bar have complained that a plaintiff knows in advance that it will 
file suit, and is therefore able to 
plan in detail its case and related strategies long before the filing of 
a complaint, [while] [t]he defendant ... is at a distinct disadvantage 
in trying to marshall its resources to comply with what the proposed 
amendments would require . . . . [T]he predictable result would 
seem to be a glut of routine motions for enlargement of time filed 
by defendants.138 
C. Mandatory Disclosure Fails to Address Many Common Abuses 
Besides adding another layer to the existing discovery structure, the 1993 
amended rules, like their predecessors, leave untouched (and may even en-
courage) such common discovery abuses as over-response to legitimate dis-
covery requests, evasive or misleading responses, frivolous objections to 
requests for discovery, and failure to respond, which have frequently been 
directed by the party with greater resources against the party with fewer re-
sources. The 1993 amendments are therefore unlikely to achieve their osten-
sible purpose of reducing costs and delay.139 
1. Over-Response to Reasonable Discovery Requests 
Discovery (or disclosure) is abused when it is used as a weapon to bur-
den, discourage or exhaust the opponent, rather than to obtain (or provide) 
138. ld. at 13. 
139. Professor Mullenix concedes that "[t]he Advisory Committee is going forward with a 
proposed universal informal discovery rule without having done thoughtful analysis on [various] 
issues. Rather, the Committee is proceeding with a new federal rule based largely on the Com-
mittee's good intentions and anecdotal information from a handful of practitioners and judges." 
Mullenix, supra note 2, at 821. 
Professor Mullenix criticizes Professor Laura Macklin's call for empirical studies, id. at 828-
29 & n.l72 (citing Letter from Professor Laura Macklin to Reporter Paul Carrington), but con-
cedes that "[s]urely the Committee does not have to invoke the research apparatus of social 
science to prove that institutional defendants outspend and delay in litigation against less well-
heeled adversaries. Thus, the called-for empirical study would validate the obvious." ld. at 829. 
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needed information.140 A major weakness in the 1993 amendments is that by 
leaving the obligation to disclose open-ended, and by retaining the "look at 
my files" option under Rule 33,141 the 1993 amendments effectively institu-
tionalize the classic harassing technique of burying an opponent in a sea of 
paper in response to a reasonable discovery request.142 
Under the amended rules, a plaintiff whose case depends on obtaining 
evidence under the defendant's control risks sanctions for filing discovery 
motions which may later be deemed frivolous.143 The defendant, meanwhile, 
is encouraged by Judge Schwarzer's influential views to file dilatory motions 
for clarification of what it must produce, and, in accordance with the un-
140. See Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 178. 
141. See FED. R CIV. P. 33(d) (formerly 33(c», infra Appendix B. 
142. See, e.g., Consolidated Equip. Corp. v. Associates Commercial Corp., 104 F.RD. 101 
(D. Mass. 1985) (plaintiff offered to let defendant look at some 47 feet of files, purportedly 
including the information sought; district court dismissed suit as sanction). See FED. R CIV. P. 
26, infra Appendix A; FED. R CIv. P. 33(d), infra Appendix B. Amended Rule 34, Production 
of Documents and Things and Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other Purposes, retains the 
former provisions in subsection (b), which state, in part: "A party who produces documents for 
inspection shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall organize 
and label them to correspond with the categories in the request." 146 F.RD. at 678-79. 
Amended Rules 26 and 33 are likewise devoid of any requirement that the disclosed or discov-
ered materials be organized or labelled in any way to correspond to the categories of the request, 
if any. 
143. Cf John J. Kennelly, Effective Discovery Vis-a-VIS Abuse of Discovery-Which Is 
Which?, TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE 261,279-83 (John J. Kennelly ed., 1985). Recounting an expe-
rience in an airplane crash case where one piece of evidence, obtained under duress from the 
defendant through discovery, was the turning point of the plaintiffs case, Kennelly explained: 
The "reformers" of the discovery rules would have precluded any further discovery. 
We have always felt that it is not enough to simply ask for production of documents. 
Plaintiffs, in some cases, sometimes must go further, even though there is nothing more 
disheartening to a lawyer's efforts to get to the truth of a case than to have a judge 
peremptorily dispose of a motion for discovery of documents b~cause an objection is 
made that it is a "fishing expedition," or that the defendant "does not know" what 
documents are desired, or that it would take a "truck to bring them in." These trite 
generalities are consistently employed. 
Id. at 281. Kennelly noted further: 
[Olur concern is that under the guise of "reform," there will be too much curtailment of 
discovery. What if a pretrial judge ruled that plaintiffs were "harassing" the defend-
ants, or engaging in "excessive discovery" in seeking to examine all inter-company cor-
respondence and all preliminary drafts of this postaccident article, which was issued by 
the manufacturer? The court and the jury would have been precluded from hearing the 
truth. 
Id. at 283. 
How inane it is to be told to file an interrogatory asking the defendant to list specific 
documents "which are relevant." Such an interrogatory is immediately met by an ob-
jection to the effect that a party should not be required to examine voluminous docu-
ments to determine relevancy and "to search through all their massive files to ascertain 
what documents will help the other side." 
Id. at 281. Inane it is, yet that is the gist of the 1993 amendments: that the defendant will sift 
through its massive files and will voluntarily, and without evasions, provide the plaintiff with the 
crucial, "relevant" evidence the plaintiff needs to win its case. 
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changed provisions of rule 33(d), (formerly Rule 33(c», to inundate the 
plaintiff with warehouses full of unsorted documents as kept in the ordinary 
course of business, under the guise of "disclosure."l44 
In employment discrimination, civil rights, securities litigation, and prod-
ucts liability cases, in particular, a relatively poor plaintiff may need specific 
information from the defendant's voluminous files, but may lack the re-
sources to sift and interpret the discovered material.145 The rigid limits on 
interrogatories and depositions may impose additional hardships, because 
these devices will not be as readily available for purposes of locating and 
identifying the particular records needed to be produced.146 Defendants can 
bury the plaintiff in irrelevant materials, giving the illusion of compliance, 
and forcing plaintiffs to risk severe sanctions if they seek an order compelling 
a more forthright response. 
2. Delay and Evasiveness 
When winning a case may turn on a party's ability to endure discov-
ery,147 rather than the merits of the claim or defense, costly and time-con-
suming discovery activities (including evasive answers) become tactical 
weapons with which to delay and harass one's opponents.148 Sanctions have 
historically had little effect on delay and evasiveness,149 and the mandatory 
disclosure proposal will likely exacerbate the results of the previous tinkering 
changes. 
144. See Schroeder & Frank, supra note 3, at 478 (indicating that over-production of docu-
ments is common example of abuse of discovery rules); Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 
32, at 1325 (discussing obstructive maneuver of burying significant document in mounds of irrel-
evant or innocuous material, a technique recently immortalized in the movie "Class Action"). 
145. See Schroeder & Frank, supra note 3, at 478. 
146. See Hazard, supra note 17, at 2239-40 ("[B]road access to document repositories is the 
most powerful weapon in the Rules discovery armory, particularly in cases involving conduct by 
business or government ... because it feeds the deposition process by providing clues as to 
whom to question and what questions to ask; . . . without documents discovery, depositions 
would be far less effective and interrogatories would have much less purpose."). 
147. See Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 178; MILLER, supra note 1, at 11 ("[T]here 
is also the possibility that if one lasts long enough in the dance marathon contest, the ravages of 
time and expense may cause the opponent to give up and go away."); see also S.C.M. Societa 
Commerciale S.P.A. v. Industrial & Commercial Res. Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 113 (N.D. Tex. 1976) 
("[D]iscovery is often used vexatiously in an effort to obtain a settlement .... [M]any defend-
ants instruct their attorneys to delay the litigation as much as possible thus making the plaintiff 
lose money and interest in his suit."); see also Warren E. Burger, Abuses of Discovery, Judges 
Are Correcting The Problem, TRIAL, Sept. 1984, at 18,20. 
148. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 178; see 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, 
supra note 2, at 217. 
149. See Brazil, Civil Discovery, supra note 37 ("[I]t would be difficult to exaggerate the 
pervasiveness of evasive practices or their adverse impact on the efficiency or effectiveness of 
civil discovery."); see also, e.g., Olga's Kitchen of Haywood, Inc. v. Papo, 108 F.R.D. 695 (E.D. 
Mich. 1985) ($21,600 in costs and fees and penalty of $1,000 imposed on both defendant and 
attorney for misconduct and non-responsiveness including, inter alia, a "fatuous" valuation ap-
proach in discovery), rev'd in part, 815 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1987) (table) (text available at 1987 WL 
36385, at *40) (reducing the amount of sanctions to $16,012.66). 
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There is little reason to think that a products liability defendant, for ex-
ample, will be more forthcoming about other injuries under the new disclo-
sure system than under the traditional methods of discovery, where 
evasiveness is a standard tactic.15o The Advisory Committee's "particularity" 
requirement, and its use of products liability cases as an example of cases in 
which a defendant need not disclose if the allegations are not sufficiently 
particular, give new life to this time-worn tactic.151 
Mandatory disclosure will not change the fact that delays remain ex-
tremely profitable. Economic pressures, including defense firms' hourly bill-
ing practices,152 will still give defendants economic incentives to postpone 
payment of a judgment or settlement,153 profiting from delays by allowing 
money that would otherwise be paid out in damages to accrue substantial 
interest. Delays are also a time-dishonored method of wearing down a less 
well-funded opponent's will to continue the struggle,154 while the defense 
pays out only its tax-deductible legal fees.155 
Occasionally such tactics may rise to the level of contempt,156 criminal 
150. For a classic example of evasive answers, see, e.g., Dollar v. Long Mfg., 561 F.2d 613, 
615-17 (5th Cir. 1977) (when asked about similar accidents defendants answered that there were 
no prior accidents, concealing two subsequent accidents), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978). 
151. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 1993 Advisory Committee's Notes, infra Appendix D. 
152. See Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 6, at 235. Magistrate Judge Brazil noted that 
none of our respondents admitted to "meter running," though many insisted that such 
practices were widespread among other lawyers. Several lawyers who complained 
about "meter running" primarily represented plaintiffs against insurance companies. 
They accused some counsel for carriers of more than occasionally refusing a reasonable 
settlement demand early in the pretrial period solely to run up sizeable fees by con-
ducting and responding to discovery. In support of this accusation, at least one plain-
tiff's lawyer contended that attorneys for carriers often settle cases just before trial for 
approximately the same amount that had been demanded before costly discovery was 
undertaken. 
Another respondent opined that larger firms are guilty of meter running because "they 
have young lawyers, paralegals, and researchers who they must keep busy and bill time 
for." 
[d. at 235 & n.36; see Levy, supra note 62, at 784 ("Many plaintiff's counsel, after being sub-
jected to extensive interrogatories by defense counsel, improper directions not to answer ques-
tions, frivolous motion practice and frequent delaying tactics long ago concluded that the per 
diem - hourly compensation has been a major cause of pre-trial discovery abuses."). 
153. Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 6, at 229 (two motives for excess discovery are to force 
an adversary to settle or to dismiss a claim this postponing payment of judgment or settlement); 
see Sherwood, supra note 41, at 569-70 (well-heeled parties coerce impecunious parties into 
settling or dismissing claims by using discovery to prolong litigation). 
154. See Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 32, at 1325-26 (self-conscious and system-
atic procrastination imposes additional financial strains on opponents, may undermine their will 
to pursue the litigation, and gives the defense attorney time to negotiate a favorable settlement 
before the damaging evidence is disclosed). 
155. See Miller, supra note 6, at 18 ("[T]he tax deductibility of litigation expenses makes it 
cheaper in some cases for defendants to pay legal fees in order to defer the payment of a mone-
tary judgment or the imposition of injunctive relief as long as possible. "). 
156. The federal contempt statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 401,402,3691 (1982), is seldom useful in 
curbing discovery abuse because it provides fines only for specified misconduct, and because the 
procedural protections of FED. R. CRIM. P. 42 must be provided when the contempt power is 
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misconduct,1S? or disciplinary violations.1ss In the average case, however, 
invoked. See, e.g., In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 236 (1962) (counsel's statement of intention 
to press legal claim "unless some bailiff stops us" does not constitute obstruction of justice). 18 
U.S.c. § 401 (1982) provides: 
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its 
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice; 
. .. [Subsection (2) of this section has been held inapplicable to attorneys. Cam-
mer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956»). 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or 
command. 
Even the most serious discovery abuses are unlikely to rise to the level of criminal contempt. 
But see Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 706 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 
1983) (holding defendant in criminal contempt for repeated refusal to obey orders to produce 
documents). See generally Civil and Criminal Contempt in the Federal Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167, 169 
(1955) (discussing statutory and rule provisions defining criminal contempt); Comment, The Ap-
plication of Criminal Contempt Procedures to Attorneys, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 300 
(1973) (questioning necessity of such power). 
157. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (1977), in which one 
of Kodak's attorneys concealed the existence of copies of certain documents he had received 
from one of Kodak's expert witnesses. Walter Kiechel III, The Strange Case of Kodak's Law-
yers, FORTIJNE, May 8,1978, at 188. The magistrate judge ordered production of the documents, 
74 F.R.D. at 614, but the Kodak attorney falsely claimed that the documents had been destroyed, 
and reaffirmed that statement in a sworn affidavit. Damages Voted Against Kodak of $37.6 mil-
lion, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1978, at 5. Eventually Kodak's lawyer admitted that he had known 
all along that the documents had not been destroyed, despite his perjured affidavit to the con-
trary. Kiechel, supra, at 188, 190-94; Kodak Replaces Counsel in Berkey Suit, Cites Erroneous 
Affidavit by Attorney, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1978, at 5; Roger B. May, Judge's Letter Spurs 
Investigation By Prosecutor of Kodak's Lawyer, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1978, at 1. The trial judge, 
denouncing Kodak's attorney's "single-minded interest in winning, winning, winning," referred 
the matter to the United States Attorney for prosecution. Id. at 23. The Kodak attorney, a 59-
year-old full partner in a prestigious New York law firm, pled guilty to criminal contempt 
charges. Former Attorney for Eastman Kodak Sentenced to Prison, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1978, at 
3; Kiechel, supra, at 188; WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1978, at 5. 
158. See, e.g., Standing Comm. on Discipline v. Ross, 735 F.2d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir.) (disci-
plinary action for violation of professional canons pursuant to local rule was valid exercise of 
court's inherent power), cert. denied sub nom. Frontier Prop's v. Elliott, 469 U.S. 1081 (1984). 
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility restricts attorneys from engaging in over-zealous 
discovery, but provides no clear guidelines for determining what conduct is excessive. For 
example, 
[t]he advocate may urge any permissible construction of the law favorable to his client, 
without regard to his professional opinion as to the likelihood that the construction will 
ultimately prevail. His conduct is within the bounds of the law, and therefore permissi-
ble, if the position taken is supported by the law or is supportable by a good faith 
argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of the law. 
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY EC 7-4 (1980). Compare MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDuer Rule 3.2 (1983) ("A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite 
litigation consistent with the interests of the client.") with MODEL CoDE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1)(1980) ("A lawyer shall not: (1) file a suit, assert a position, con-
duct a defense, [or] delay a trial ... when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would 
serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."). The Model Rules further prohibit law-
yers from "mak[ing] a frivolous discovery request or fai1[ing] to make reasonably diligent effort 
to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party." MODEL RULES OF 
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there is often little that the opposing party can do, and the 1993 amendments 
will, if anything, tend to encourage, rather than deter abuses~ 
The adoption of the 1993 amendments thus means business as usual for 
those whose practice is to object to discovery (or disclosure), and to file mo-
tions for clarification and endless quibbling objections.159 
3. Disputes over Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
There is no doubt that justice can be frustrated and litigation enor-
mously protracted when there are no limits on interrogatories.l60 The sheer 
volume of some requests raises serious doubts that the requested responses 
could have any real usefulness other than to burden the opponent.161 
Amended Rule 33 limits written interrogatories to no more than twenty-five, 
including discrete subparts, per side (not per party) without leave of court.162 
This ignores the reality that not everyone on the same side of the "vs." neces-
sarily has identical interests, and seems certain to involve the court in still 
more mini-trials, as it forces the court to micro-manage the discovery process. 
The twenty-five interrogatory limit, on its face, appears to free.litigants 
from the burdens of "shadowboxing interrogatories, "163 and it is at least pos-
sible that imposing limits will help to unify the discovery procedure. Indeed, 
many districts impose similar limits through local rules, though they normally 
limit the number available per party, not per side.l64 However, the limit of 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(d)(1983). However, disciplinary proceedings are of no direct 
help in moving the discovery process forward, and raise the specter of protracted satellite hear-
ings to resolve them. 
159. See, e.g., Societa Commerciale v. Industrial & Commercial Research, 72 F.R.D. 110, 
111 (N.D. Tex. 1976) in which the District Court for the Northern District of Texas observed: 
Id. 
Once again this court has been called in to arbitrate the no show and no tell discovery 
games engaged in by the parties to this lawsuit. I should emphasize at the outset that 
this is not the only game in town. The fact pattern hereinafter recited has repeatedly 
surfaced in other litigation during my tenure on the bench. In fact, I have often 
thought that if the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were in effect in 1492 the Indians 
undoubtedly would have made a motion to suppress Columbus' discovery. 
160. See Brazil, Adversary Character, supra note 32, at 1322 (interrogatories often used to 
harass, to fish for evidence to support new claims, and to uncover opponent's secrets); see also, 
e.g., In re Beef Ind. Antitrust Litig., 419 F. Supp. 720 (J.P.M.L. 1976) (155 numbered interroga-
tories subdivided into about 1,800 separate parts, with extensive cross-referencing bringing the 
total number of questions posed into the tens of thousands); B. Thomas McElroy, Federal Pre-
Trial Procedure in an Antitrust Suit, 31 Sw. L.J. 649, 682 (1977). 
161. See Schroeder & Frank, supra note 3, at 478 (discussing costly and time-consuming 
misuse of interrogatories). The Arizona State University conferees considered a case where one 
written interrogatory had 2,720 parts and another case where the Department of Justice reported 
that 10,000 interrogatories had been filed. Id. at 478 n.18. 
162. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a), infra Appendix B. 
163. Brazil, Front Lines, supra note 6, at 233. 
164. See, e.g., Revised Report of the Special Comm. on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases for 
the E.D.N. Y. to the Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, Chief Judge, reprinted in 102 F.R.D. 357 (1984) 
(proposing standing orders and sanctions for non-compliance with August 1983 amended Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure), in United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
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twenty-five interrogatories per side is as arbitrary as the limit of ten deposi-
tions per side, and will be equally costly in terms of increased court involve-
ment, without an appropriate revision of court management procedures. 
If efficiency is the goal, it would be more efficient for the court to set 
limits only if a party feels that it is being abused.165 Otherwise, without an 
effective pretrial mangement system, the question of whether additional in-
terrogatories, depositions, or requests for production are excessive in a par-
ticular case becomes another delaying tactic. This will be especially true 
under the 1993 rules amendments, where the court will apparently have to 
take the time to pick and choose among the parties and the interrogatories 
submitted to ascertain whether additional interrogatories are warranted, and, 
if so, which party on a given side may propound them. 
Judges under the 1993 amendments will not be able to avoid this type of 
micro-management unless they arbitrarily strike all proposed additional in-
terrogatories,166 or unless they simply specify a maximum, fIxed number of 
interrogatories that will be permitted per requesting party.167 The 1993 
amendments thus provide additional chores for the judges, but accomplish 
nothing that was not already possible under the existing rules.168 
If combined with effective overall court management, there is nothing 
inherently wrong with a reasonable limit on interrogatories.169 The Federal 
York, Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, reprinted in 102 F.R.D. 
339 (1984); see also Christine E. Sherry, Section Forms Task Force on Civil Justice Reform Act, 
Lma. NEWS, Dec. 1991, No.2, at 1 (ABA task force seeks to reduce expense and delay in civil 
actions, in part by improving discovery rules); Spencer M. Punnett, Half of Pilot Districts Turn to 
Automatic Disclosure, LmG. NEWS, Oct. 1992, No.1, at 7 (discussing proliferation of automatic 
disclosure rules in local rules under a pilot program of Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990). 
165. See Brieant, supra note 14, at 466 (under proposed amendments, courts will be respon-
sible for determining what discovery is necessary). . 
166. See, e.g., Frost v. Williams, 46 F.R.D. 484, 485 (D. Md. 1969) (court struck entire group 
of two hundred form interrogatories in ordinary rear-end collision case). 
167. See Schroeder & Frank, supra note 3, at 490 (proposing that courts be permitted to cap 
number of interrogatories); see also In re U.S. Fin. Sees. Litig. 74 F.RD. 497, 498 (S.D. Cal. 
1975) (large number of interrogatories struck sua sponte by court); S.C.M. Societa Commerciale 
v. Industrial & Commercial Research, 72 F.RD. 110, 113 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (criticizing wide 
use of "canned" or "form" interrogatories). 
168. FED. R CIV. P. 26(f), enacted as part of the 1980 amendments to Rule 26, provides 
that counsel who has attempted without success to effect a reasonable program or plan for dis-
covery and whose dispute cannot be resolved by resort to Rules 26(c) or 37(a), is entitled to the 
assistance of the court through a special discovery conference, or as part of a pretrial conference 
under Rule 16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f) Advisory Committee's Notes (1980). 
169. Before the 1983 amendments, Rule 26(a)(I) provided that unless the court ordered 
otherwise, the "frequency of use" of permitted discovery methods was not to be limited. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26, infra Appendix A. The 1983 Advisory Committee deleted this provision in an 
attempt to reduce the problems of duplicative, redundant and excessive discovery. 1983 Advi-
sory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 217. The Advisory Committee intended to encourage 
district judges to identify and limit needless discovery by deleting the old rule's provision for 
virtually unlimited discovery while giving courts express authority under Rule 25(b) to limit the 
amount of discovery on matters that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. 1983 Advisory 
Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 216. 
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Rules authorize courts to impose such limits,11o and many courts, including 
the Eastern District of Virginia, impose limits on interrogatories,171 or other 
forms of discovery.172 In a court with efficient pretrial case management, 
reasonable numerical limits on some forms of discovery tend to limit certain 
types of discovery abuse, and are unlikely to work a serious hardship so long 
as litigants are free to seek leave of court to exceed the numerical limit in an 
appropriate case without the severe penalties contemplated by the 1993 
amendments.173 Arbitrary limits alone are useless in deterring abuse. With-
out a more effective (and not just more efficient) pretrial management sys-
tem throughout the federal courts, however, this restriction should be left to 
the individual district courts, which know what types of cases predominate in 
their districts, and what limits are therefore appropriate.174 
170. 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 218. 
171. Rule 11.1 DISCOVERY of the Local Rules of The Eastern District of Virginia 
provides: 
(A) LIMITS ON INTERROGATORIES: Unless otherwise permitted by the Court for good 
cause shown, such permission being granted only upon written motion to the Court 
pursuant to Local Rule 11 [Motions - Continuances) no party shall serve upon any 
other party, at anyone time or cumulatively, more than 30 written interrogatories, in-
cluding all parts and sub-parts. This limit may not be waived by agreement of counsel. 
E.D. VA. LoCAL RULES OF PRACTICE, 11.1. 
172. E.D. VA. LoCAL RULE l1.1(B) provides: 
Unless otherwise permitted by the Court for good cause shown, such permission being 
granted only upon written motion to the Court pursuant to Local Rule II [Motions -
Continuances), no party shall take more than five depositions ... upon non-parties. 
Any party may be deposed. This limit may not be waived by agreement of counsel. 
173. Most of the local rules are not absolutes, providing instead that the maximum number 
of interrogatories may be exceeded with the permission of the court. In practice, however, "the 
courts have often refused a larger number of interrogatories." Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 
25, at 264. Sherman and Kinnard note that reported cases indicate allowance of additional inter-
rogatories in complex cases. [d. at 264 n.77; see M.P.L., Inc. v. Cook, 90 F.R.D. 570, 573 (N.D. 
Ill. 1981) (where plaintiffs did not answer defendant's interrogatories, court permitted defend-
ants to exceed limit in local rule); Crown Center Redev. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 82 
F.R.D. 108 (W.O. Mo. 1979) (discussion of history and rationale for local limitation rules); see 
also 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2 (courts may restrict number of interrogato-
ries "in an appropriate case," but must be careful not to deprive a party of discovery that is 
reasonably necessary to give it a fair opportunity to develop and prepare its case). 
Local rules limiting the number of interrogatories to 30 have been adopted in a number of 
districts. See, e.g., Rule 230-1 (S.D. Cal.); Rule 3.03(a) (M.D. Fla.); Rule 10-1(1) (S.D. Fla.); 
Rule 7.4 (S.D. Ga.); Rule 9.(6) (N.D. Ill.); Rule 12(c) (S.D. Ind.); Rule 15(d) (D. Kan.); Rule 
6(B) (D. Md.); Rule 3(B) (D. Minn.); Rule C-12 (D. Miss.); Rule 8 (E.D. Mo.); Rule 2(e) (W.O. 
Mo.); Rule 10(e) (D.N.M.); Rule 12(B)(4) (S.D. Tex.); Rule 26(d)(1) (W.O. Tex.); Rule 11-l(A) 
(E.D. Va.); Rule 7(f)(D. Wyo.). This approach remains controversial, and opponents point out 
that the number "30," or any other number, is arbitrary and might deny a litigant with limited 
resources an inexpensive method of discovery. 
A number of state courts have also adopted interrogatory limitations, e.g., TEXAS R. CIv. P., 
R. 168(5) (1981) (may not require more than 30 answers or serve more than two sets of interrog-
atories); RULES OF THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILL., R. 3.1(a) (interrogatories lim-
ited to 35) (cited in Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 25, at 263). 
174. Brieant, supra note 14, at 465-66. 
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4. Abuse of Depositions 
The 1993 amendments also seem unlikely to have any significant effect 
on the abuse of depositions. Amended Rule 30 establishes a presumptive 
limit of ten depositions per side (not per party),175 while Rule 26(b)(2)(B) 
precludes more than one deposition of a given witness.176 While evenhanded 
on its face, this rule, like the limitation of twenty-five interrogatories, is a bed 
of Procrustes which will frustrate litigants in unequal bargaining positions by 
failing to address the many obstructive tactics available in defending deposi-
tions.177 Judge Schwarzer proposed limiting all depositions to no more than 
six hours on the record, asserting that 
[t]he need to obtain a court order [for additional depositions or to 
continue a deposition for more than six hours on the record] will 
concentrate the attorneys' attention on how to minimize the 
number, length and scope of depositions. Having previously re-
ceived all material documents, witness statements and experts' re-
ports, attorneys should be prepared to propose streamlined 
discovery programs involving minimum time and expense.178 
Even without the mandatory six-hour limit, this assumption may prove overly 
optimistic. Under the 1993 amendments, deponents are still able to wander 
off onto harmless, tangential subjects to distract and consume time.179 
175. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30, infra Appendix C. Amended Rules 30(a)(2)(A) and (B) re-
quire court permission to take more than ten depositions per side in a given case, or to depose 
any person more than once. Amended Rule 30(a)(2)(C) requires court permission for a party to 
take a deposition before its disclosures have been made, unless the notice contains a certifica-
tion, with supporting facts, that the proposed deponent is expected to leave the country and be 
unavailable for examination after the time that disclosures are due. However, as Ms. Brieant 
points out, 
The ten-deposition limit is arbitrary, and will not change the number of depositions in 
any given case that are truly necessary. It will merely burden the court with determin-
ing if every deposition over ten needs to be taken, and would thus increase the time and 
costs of litigation. 
[Also, t]he proposed amendments do not take into account the possibility of multi-
party actions where defendants are not united in a defense strategy. In any such case, 
the defendants would not be able to agree on how to use their "allotment" of deposi-
tions, and the matter would end up before the court. The Notes indicate that the parties 
should be able to resolve this issue amicably, but such a pleasant resolution is doubtful 
in many cases. The rules also make no provisions for situations where a party joins the 
action after ten witnesses have already been deposed. 
With the limit on the length of depositions, depositions which would otherwise 
have been handled by more junior (and less expensive) lawyers may now be handled by 
more senior (and more expensive) lawyers, defeating the intended purpose of this pro-
posed amendment. 
Brieant, supra note 14, at 483. 
176. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B), infra Appendix A. 
177. Id. Procrustes, whose name means "he who stretches," was a mythical Greek robber 
who made his victims fit the length of his bed by amputating the legs of those who were too tall, 
and stretching the short victims on the rack until they reached a suitable size. See, e.g., THE 
OXFORD UNIVERSAL DICTIONARY 1591 (3d ed. 1933 revised, with addenda 1955). 
178. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 182. 
179. Brazil, Civil Discovery, supra note 37, at 854. 
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If courts adopt Judge Schwarzer's suggestion to limit depositions to a 
particular length of time, objections and claims of privilege can easily run out 
the clock.180 In that event, more time, not less, will be consumed in hearings 
to determine when the arbitrary time limit can be exceeded.181 In any event, 
depositions in high-stakes litigation will certainly continue to be marred by 
interruptions, obstruction, thinly-veiled coaching,182 and instructions not to 
answer,183 and hearings will undoubtedly be required to determine which of 
multiple parties on any given side will be allowed what number of the ten 
available depositions. 
Indeed, in a given case the number of parties may exceed ten per side, 
180. Earlier drafts of the 1993 rule amendments had provided for Judge Schwarzer's pro-
posed six-hour time limit. Commenting on this proposal, The Federal Bar Council Committee 
on Second Circuit Courts (which recommended a two-day limit on depositions), acknowledged 
that 
such a stark time limit may result in a perception that obstructionism by the defending 
attorney will be rewarded; i.e., if the deposition must end after two days, defending 
attorneys may feel it is in their clients' interest to ensure that few questions are an-
swered during that period. However, several of the suggested rules which follow-such 
as those limiting objections and reducing the availability of conferences between attor-
ney and client-will reduce the possibility of obstructionism .... 
We do not believe there is a method of similarly limiting the number of depositions 
in all cases, although we encourage the use of that device tailored to the needs of the 
particular case, through a discovery conference called pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f). 
Federal Bar Council Committee on Second Circuit Courts, A Report on the Conduct of Deposi-
tions, reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 613, 616 (1990) (emphasis added). 
181. Apart from being time-consuming, it may be very difficult even for a very active court 
to determine without "satellite" hearings whether proposed discovery is cumulative or otherwise 
obtainable. As Judge Patrick Higginbotham observed: 
It's very difficult for the judge to ask, "Well, you're spending too much time with John 
Jones, Sales Vice-President of the Company. Why are you spending so much time with 
a salesman?" He can't know why you're spending so much time with him; he can't 
know that much about your case. 
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Discovery Management Considerations in Antitrust Cases, 51 ANTI· 
TRUST L.J. 231, 236 (1982). Judge Higginbotham's solution is to set a limit on the number of 
depositions and leave it to the lawyers to decide how to allocate their limited opportunities. [d.; 
see also Marcus, supra note 67, at 368. 
182. The Federal Bar Council Committee on Second Circuit Courts noted: 
Virtually every active litigator has encountered the situation where, while purporting to 
voice an objection to a question, the defending attorney is actually engaged in coaching 
the witness, attempting in the course of articulating the objection to direct the witness's 
attention to what the "right" or "correct" answer should be. Frequently, depositions 
degenerate into more "testimony" from the attorney than from the witness. 
Such suggestive objections, also known as "speaking objections," should be prohibited 
.... Responses should generally be limited to the statement "objection as to form" .... 
Continued speaking objections should be grounds for sanctions by the court. 
Federal Bar Committee on Second Circuit Courts, supra note 180, at 617. 
183. See, e.g., Falk v. United States, 53 F.R.D.ll3, 115 (D. Conn. 1971) (criticizing "meticu-
lous objections and evasive answers from experienced counsel"). But cf Martin I. Kaminsky, 
Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Complex Civil Litigation, 48 FORDHAM L. REv. 907, 909 
(1980) (it is sometimes questioner's provocative conduct or grossly improper questions that elicit 
these responses). 
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exhausting the opponent's quota of depositions before any non-parties, in-
cluding experts, are deposed, and in some cases, before all defendants have 
even been served. This points out another problem with the 1993 amend-
ments, which is that redundant depositions (sometimes resulting from poor 
planning and failure to read earlier depositions)184 are most common in 
large, high-stakes cases.18S These are the very cases that are likely to be ex-
empted, by category, under local rules promulgated pursuant to the Civil Jus-
tice Reform ACt.186 The 1993 amendments are likewise silent as to such 
tactics as scheduling depositions at inconvenient places and times to harass 
the opponent.187 Thus, the 1993 amendments fail to address abuses that oc-
cur in ordinary cases, and concentrate on abuses more likely to occur in cases 
that will be exempt from the application of the amended rules. 
5. Class Action Abuse 
As applied to class actions, the mandatory disclosure rule raises some 
particularly thorny questions. Some discovery regarding the propriety of the 
class action is essential to certification of a class under Rules 23(a) and (b), 
but mandatory disclosure will likely place class members in a significant 
quandary as to disclosure on the merits after certification. It appears that the 
1993 amendments will effectively shift the burden to class members affirma-
tively to protest why they should not disclose all kinds of personal informa-
tion (rather than waiting to object if the defendant makes objectionable or 
harassing discovery requests of individual class members). 
Of course, class action discovery abuse occurs among plaintiffs, too, in-
cluding would-be plaintiffs hoping to "discover a claim" upon which to base a 
class action. Boilerplate allegations can serve as a launching pad for burden-
some discovery calculated to fish for a claim or coerce a settlement, whether 
or not a valid claim is discovered. 
Class action litigation is subject to all of the forms of abuse that afflict 
184. See, e.g., Nicholas Katzenbach, Modern Discovery: Remarks from the Defense Bar, 57 
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 732,733 (1983) (citing 45-day deposition of IBM's CEO, 11 years into litiga-
tion, at which deponent was asked, inter alia, "Where is the corporate office of IBM?"). 
185. Schroeder & Frank, supra note 3, at 478. 
186. See Brieant, supra note 14, at 462 n.2. 
187. In a story that illustrates such tactics, one commentator noted: 
One well-respected legal services attorney reported scheduling a client's deposition to 
be taken at the attorney's storefront offices. The offices were located in an area with a 
very high crime rate, and the attorney scheduled the deposition shortly before sundown 
in hopes of persuading his wealthier, suburban opponent to cancel the deposition, or at 
least to make it a short session so they would be finished before dark. Conversely, the 
same attorney complained of an opponent in a wife-beating case who insisted on dis-
covering the new address and telephone number of the attorney's battered client, in 
hopes that the client would drop the assault charges rather than reveal her new wherea-
bouts. Conversation with a legal services attorney, Fall, 1983. 
Weissbrod, supra note 32, at 186 n.27; cf. Obiter Dicta, 78 A.B.A. J. 42, 43 (May 1992) (two 
Michigan lawyers directed to inspect records produced by their opponents, as kept in the ordi-
nary course of business, in an abandoned semi-trailer in northern Mississippi, infested with bees, 
spiders, rats' nests, and a poisonous snake). 
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other types of litigation, but class actions are subject to some rather special-
ized abuses that also deserve mention in the context of the 1993 amendments, 
particularly in the area of discovery on the merits, aimed at class members. ISS 
Under the previous rules, at least one district court tried unsuccessfully to 
deny this type of class discovery on the theory that absent class members 
were not "parties" to the lawsuit.189 This position is unlikely to prevail,l90 
however, and the existence of contrary authority could subject the party as-
serting this position to sanctions. Mandatory disclosure exacerbates this 
quandary because the class members, as plaintiffs, cannot wait for a request, 
but must disclose voluntarily early in the litigation, before defendants have 
made any disclosures. Again, this burden falls disproportionately on those 
who have the least power in our society, and further restricts their access to 
the courts and their ability to redress legitimate grievances. 
It seems inevitable that the intricacies of mandatory disclosure in class 
actions will create more, rather than less, "satellite" litigation on discovery. 
Must all class members file motions for clarification to learn whether they 
must make disclosure or face the threat of dismissal or other sanctions?191 
188. See Peter Gruenberger, Discovery from Class Members: A Fertile Field for Abuse, 
Ln"IG., Fall 1977, at 35 (detailing instances of abuse of discovery process in class action claims). 
189. See, e.g., Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 55 F.R.D. 129, 132 (W.D. Ky. 1971) (interrogatories 
of absent class members not permitted); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Who is a "Party" Within 
Provision of Rule 60(b) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permitting Court to Relieve "Party or 
His Legal Representative" from Final Judgment or Order for Specified Reasons, 35 A.L.R. FED. 
973, § 2 (1977) (courts have generally denied relief to unnamed parties on grounds that they lack 
standing). 
190. See Commonwealth v. Local Union 542, International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 507 
F. Supp. 1146, 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (argument that absent class members are not parties because 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 does not designate them as such is "specious at best"), rev'd on other grounds, 
458 U.S. 375 (1982); Richard H. Underwood, Legal Ethics and Class Actions: Problems, Tactics, 
and Judicial Responses, 71 Ky. LJ. 787, 826 (1983) (most courts will not restrict discovery on 
grounds that absent class members are not parties); United States v. Trucking Employers, 72 
F.R.D. 98, 104 (D.D.C. 1976). The Trucking Employers court said: 
The evolving view ... seems to be that the court has the power ... to permit reasonable 
discovery by way of interrogatories of absent class members when the circumstances of 
the case justify such action ... [The] party seeking the discovery must demonstrate its 
need for the discovery for purposes of trial of the issues common to the class, that the 
discovery not be undertaken for purposes or effect of harassment of absent class mem-
bers or of altering the membership of the opposing class, and that the interrogatories be 
restricted to information directly relevant to the issues to be tried ... with respect to 
the class action aspects of the case ... Discovery is not to be allowed as a matter of 
course ... but only when the Court is satisfied that the required showing has been 
made. 
[d.; see also Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (interrogatories of unnamed 
class members permissible if tendered in good faith and not unduly burdensome), cert. denied, 
438 U.S. 916 (1978). The 1993 amendments shift the burden to the class action plaintiffs to make 
such disclosure voluntarily, without a request from the defendants, before plaintiffs may seek 
any disclosure or discovery from defendants. 
191. See, e.g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999, 1006 (7th Cir. 
1971) (class members who failed to comply with discovery faced dismissal from the case with 
prejudice), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 921 (1972). 
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When faced with a choice between expensive and possibly burdensome dis-
closure and motions for clarification, and risking sanctions for non-compli-
ance, members may elect to "opt out" of the class, destroying any chance of 
the case being tried on the merits.l92 By placing such burdens on class-action 
plaintiffs, the 1993 amendments destroy the effectiveness of the class action 
as an instrument for the redress of systematic wrongs to the disadvantaged in 
our society, particularly in such areas as civil rights and employment. 
v. THE MYTH OF NEUTRAL RULES 
One reason for the severe flaws in the 1993 amendments is that they rest 
on the myth that procedural rules are neutral, i.e., that they transcend the 
substantive law of any given case, affecting all litigants equally. This fiction is 
maintained despite the demonstrably different impact these rules will have 
on certain foreseeable categories of litigants. Supporters of the "efficiency" 
movement often contend that rules are neutral in themselves,193 and that it 
is, in effect, just the luck of the draw if they happen to affect a particular 
litigant adversely. While this may be true for some kinds of cases, it would be 
more accurate to say that procedure has been political all along.194 Careful 
analysis reveals that the myth of trans-substantive procedure is far from true 
in the kinds of cases that typically involve relatively powerless litigants on 
one side and "repeat players" on the other. Efficiency for efficiency's sake 
may strike at these powerless litigants to a degree that is both disproportion-
ate and unfair. 
One definition of a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination," 
within the meaning of Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, is that the dispute is resolved "A) on 
the merits, and B) as determined by governing substantive law."195 As Judge 
Keeton noted: 
[T]he facts that are relevant to the just determination of the merits 
are defined by "laws," or by what we more commonly call "rules of 
192. See Underwood, supra note 190, at 825; see also Gruenberger, supra note 188, at 35 
(discovery tactics in class action suit designed to promote defection from class); Impervious 
Paint Indus. v. Ashland Oil, 508 F. Supp. 720, 724 (W.O. Ky.) (plaintiffs who opted out after 
defendants contacted them and threatened them with discovery ordered restored to class), ap-
peal dismissed without opinion, 659 F.2d 1081 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v. Trucking Employ-
ers, Inc., 72 F.R.D. 98, 104 (D.D.C. 1976) (absent class members need not be brought personally 
before court); Jean F. Rydstrom, Annotation, Absent Class Members in Class Action Under Rule 
23 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Subject to Discovery, 13 A.L.R. FED. 255, §§ 2 & 3, & 
supp. § 3 (1976). 
193. What is "neutral," is also not easy to define. "[W]hat is understood as objective or 
neutral is often the embodiment of a white middle-class world view." Kimberle Williams Cren-
shaw, Toward a Race Conscious Pedagogy in Legal Education, 11 NAT'L BLACK LJ. 1,3 (1989) 
(cited with approval in Mari J. Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness 
Problem,63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1763, 1769 n.27 (1990». 
194. Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
gence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999,2050 (1989). 
195. Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 
U. PITT. L. REv. 853, 853 n.* (1989) Keeton is a United States District Judge for the District of 
Massachusetts. 
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substantive law." Rules of procedure are meant to facilitate hearing 
and deciding 1) any disputes over the applicable rules of substantive 
law and 2) any disputes of fact that are relevant to disposition of the 
case under those rules of substantive law. 
If, on the other hand, we fashion rules that are too rigid, they 
will tend to produce decisionmaking that is to some extent arbitrary. 
Decisionmaking under such rules will often ignore circumstances 
that fair-minded persons untrained in legal niceties would consider 
relevant. That is an inevitable consequence of unduly rigid rules.196 
In other words, in our adversary system, substantive law can only be 
applied within the confines of procedural rules. For that reason, procedural 
rules like the 1993 rules amendments cannot fairly be considered neutral if 
they weigh so heavily in favor of the "institutional players" that they ignore 
circumstances that fair-minded persons would consider relevant, and be-
come, for all practical purposes, outcome-determinative. When that hap-
pens, the playing field is no longer level: it is tilted in favor of the 
institutional party whose position the rules protect. 
Judge Robert Carter directly challenged the purportedly "neutral" 
agenda of "efficiency" that fueled such rule revisions as the 1993 amend-
ments, arguing that many contemporary "reforms" are intentionally designed 
to "exclude[] certain kinds of substantive claims."197 Judge Carter argued 
that the revisions of the rules reveal a "political agenda hostile to the substan-
tive rights of certain classes of federallitigants,"198 and he proposed that any 
revision of the federal rules should have as its goal the provision of ready 
access to courts and the opportunity for the heretofore silent to make new 
claims of legal rights.t99 Notably, the 1993 amendments fail to provide such 
196. Id. at 854 (footnote omitted). 
197. Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights, 
137 U. PA. L. REv. 2179, 2182 (1989). 
198. Id. at 2181. 
199. Id. at 2182. Interestingly, in his dissent to the transmission of the rules, Justice Scalia 
pointed out that opposition to the mandatory disclosure proposals cut across the lines between 
those who represent injured consumers and those who represent the interests of manufacturers 
in product liability cases. 61 U.S.L.W. at 4393-94 (Apr. 22,1993); see Jeffrey J. Mayer, Prescrib-
ing Cooperation: The Mandatory Pretrial Disclosure Requirement of Proposed Rules 26 and 37 
of the Fed. R. Civ. P., REv. LITIG., Fall 1992, at 77, 78 ("The reaction of the organized bar to the 
prospect of disclosure ... can best be described as sheer horror."). Professor Mayer noted: 
The legal community responded to the August 1991 disclosure proposal with the most 
commentary in the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with almost all of 
the commentary harshly critical. See Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, 
NAT'L L.J., May 4, 1992, at 1 (noting the numerous negative responses to the 
mandatory disclosure proposal); see also Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive 
Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1992) 
(asserting that additional rule changes mandating disclosure will not solve discovery 
crisis) .... 
The General Counsel of Michelin TIre Corp. wrote: "The imposition of these 'au-
tomatic disclosures' is needlessly burdensome and inefficient, and it unfairly shifts the 
delicate balance of the notice pleading system against the defendant." Letter from 
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access. 
Commenting on Judge Carter's views at a symposium on the fiftieth an-
niversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Judith Resnik 
remarked: 
[A] remarkable aspect of this conference has been the repeated ref-
erence to the "political" aspects of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. From a variety of perspectives, many of the speakers have 
made comments about the political implications of various Rules. 
Others, seeming to accept the political content of the Rules, have 
warned that "we" (that is, all litigants) are safer when the facade, if 
James C. Morton, General Counsel, Michelin Tire Corp., to Committee on Rules of 
Practice and Procedure 2 (Feb. 13, 1992) (unpublished letter available at the University 
of Michigan Law School). 
The protestors were not only corporate lawyers. Plaintiffs' lawyers and public in-
terest lawyers also weighed in with serious complaints. See Letter from D. Michael 
Dale, Oregon Legal Services, to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Jan. 
29, 1992) (unpublished letter available at University of Michigan Law School) (stating 
that the mandatory disclosure requirement of proposed Rule 26 will work to the detri-
ment of migrant farmworkers because they are "particularly vulnerable to intimidation 
or retaliation"). 
Lawrence Jensen had some of the harshest words for disclosure, writing that the 
proposed changes offered by "Reaganauts" will "keep all but the richest plaintiffs out 
of court." Letter from Lawrence R. Jensen, Hallgrimson, McNichols, McCann & In-
derbitzen, to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 2 (Feb. 13, 1992) (unpub-
lished letter available at University of Michigan Law School). 
Id. at 81-82 n.8; cf. Richard L. Edwards, What's Happening in the Law: Surveying the New Devel-
opments: Advocacy, Practice and Procedure, 60 DEF. CoUNS. J. 371 (1993): 
By far the biggest news during 1992-93 in the arena of practice and procedure was 
the inexorable movement of the revolutionary changes in the Federal Rules of Civil 
procedure toward an effective date of December 1, 1993 .... 
The proposed changes in Rule 26 to impose prediscovery disclosure on litigants 
has met with considerable opposition .... The main focus has been on the requirement 
of disclosure of "discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with partic-
ularity in the pleadings," ... [in] Rule 26(a)(1). The argument against the disclosure 
proposal has been twofold. 
First, more than 95 percent of the 208 judges, bar organizations, scholars, corpora-
tions and individual members of the bar who commented on the August 1991 initial 
version of the proposed disclosure amendment were against it . ... 
Responding to those comments, the advisory committee voted in early 1992 to reject 
disclosure, but then reinstated a substantially revised version of it at its April 1992 meet-
ing. See "Advisory Committee Flip-flops, Opts Again for Disclosure," 59 Defense 
Counsel Journal 315 (1992). This new proposal, which changed the language of the 
disclosure requirement to "alleged with particularity in the pleadings," was approved 
and forwarded to the standing committee without publication or public comment .... 
[In addition to other flaws], ... the disclosure proposal undermines the attorney-
client relationship by creating a disclosure obligation running from the attorney to the 
opponent. In addition, the disclosure provision would be inconsistent with the policies 
underlying the work product doctrine. This arises from the fact that the duty of disclo-
sure would inevitably require a party to reveal to an opponent a line of factual inquiry 
or legal reasoning that the opponent might never have considered or litigated on its 
own. 
Id. at 371-72 (citations omitted). 
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not the reality, is maintained that "neutral" Rules are applied to 
"anonymous" (that is, not identifiable in advance) plaintiffs and de-
fendants. I believe we cannot and should not ignore the political con-
tent and consequences of procedural rules. Over the last decade, a 
variety of powerful "repeat" players have sought, sometimes 
openly, to influence "court reform" efforts .... However appealing 
might be the notion that writing the Rules of Civil Procedure. . . is 
a "neutral" task with diverse consequences on anonymous and in-
terchangeable civil plaintiffs and defendants, that description is no 
longer available .... 
Finally, ... we must wonder about whether litigation of individ-
uals' cases will be available fifty years hence.200 
The scenario Professor Resnick describes is frightening, and should 
serve as a wake-up call to repeal the 1993 amendments. Certainly, it may be 
difficult to divine the intent of the drafters of the rules (or any other group of 
people), but it is not necessary to divine the drafters' intent to make claims 
"directly for 'substantive justice in the federal courts.' "201 One need not be-
lieve that the original drafters of the Federal Rules thought that substantive 
justice was central in order to believe that "the Federal Rules should neither 
be written nor construed in a manner that systematically limits opportunities 
in court for blacks, other minorities, women, the poor, and others who are 
oppressed . . . . [T]he legitimacy of our concerns for such groups does not 
hinge upon our predecessors' visions.''202 Rather, the legitimacy of our con-
cerns should rest on fundamental principles of fairness, and of equal justice 
under the law. 
Professor Paul Carrington, Reporter of the Advisory Committee on the 
Civil Rules,203 acknowledged that the rulemaking process is a political one, 
adding that if the premise of judicial rulemaking is that it is apolitical or neu-
tral, "then it would be subject to the popular contemporary criticism that 
nothing can be neutral, that all is politics."204 He argued that this politiciza-
tion results from 
[t]he aspiration and the role shared by [the courts and law schools] 
... to balance the influences of factional interests ... [and] to cele-
brate the values and traditions that we hold in common. The para-
mount role of courts in our tradition is to earn and keep the trust of 
the whole public, perhaps especially of those most likely to be hos-
tile or alienated from the democratic polity. Essential to the per-
formance of that role is the practice by the courts of classical civic 
virtue, of being and seeming to be impartial, disinterested, in-
200. Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2219, 2219-20 (1989) (em-
phasis added); see Carter, supra note 197, at 2183 (discussing adverse impact rules changes have 
had on civil rights claimants). 
201. Resnick, Domain, supra note 200, at 2222. 
202. [d. 
203. See Richard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of 
Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REv. 725, 752 & n.138 (1989) 
(discussing Dean Carrington's suggested set of amendments). 
204. See Carrington, supra note 100, at 162. 
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dependent of faction, or at least partaking of those traits within the 
limits of human capacity .... 205 
225 
Conceding that "[i]t is of course nonsense to say that procedure is not 
political, just as it is nonsense to say that our courts are not political institu-
tions,"206 Professor Carrington asserted that 
the politics embodied in sound procedure is a celebration of some of 
those political ideas that all of us hold in common. Procedure is 
part of the structure that all of us hope that our political institutions 
will generally abide. It is, like the forms of judicial independence, a 
means by which we reduce the factional political commitments of 
judges in order to gain the trust and acceptance of those who are 
disfavored by the controlling law ... . 200 
He added, however, that 
there is ... no natural and effective lobby for sound judicial admin-
istration, no political force that regularly favors impartiality or dis-
interest, ... [so that] legislative solutions to the problems of courts 
are prone to favor those factional interests that are best organized, 
thus reflecting the procedural preference of those whom Marc Ga-
lanter has aptly described as "repeat players." This adds to the ad-
vantage already held by such litigants.2os 
Paradoxically, Professor Mullenix blames the "politicization" of the 
rulemaking process on the Rules Enabling Act's requirement of openness, in 
the form of public comment and debate, and blames the powerless, rather 
than the powerful "repeat players," for politicizing the rulemaking pro-




208. Id. at 162-63. Such "repeat players" necessarily include the judges, and Professor Car-
rington points out that "it is likely that rules made by courts tend to be centered on the interests 
of the judges, interests that are not necessarily identical with the public interest." Id. Senator 
Joseph Biden (D-Del.) and the Bush-Quayle administration were behind some of the proposals. 
Id. at 164. See Dan Quayle, Vice-President, Proposed Civil Justice Reform Legislation, 60 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 979, 981 (1992) (proposing mandatory disclosure, "free round" of discovery, and 
requiring requesting party to pay for subsequent discovery). 
In 1990, Senator Biden, who chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee, introduced S. 2027, the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, based on a study by the Brookings Institution and the Founda-
tion for Change, mandating certain features of so-called "delay reduction" plans to be required 
of every federal district court. Joseph P. Esposito, Mandatory Aspect of Biden Bill Opposed, But 
Section Supports Concept of Case Management, Lmo. NEWS, Oct. 1990, No.1, at 1. The ABA 
Board of Governors voted to oppose the bill, and Sen. Biden later introduced S. 2648, The 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Title I of which contained the revised Civil Justice Reform 
Act. Id. The Council and Committee Chairs of the ABA Litigation Section endorsed the gen-
eral concept of case management, but opposed the mandatory nature of the proposed law. Id. 
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee was also preoccupied with the cost of civil 
litigation, and in 1991 the Executive Branch under former President George H.W. Bush took the 
initiative to urge greater economy in civil litigation as part of its efforts to ensure competitive-
ness. Id. 
209. Mullenix, supra note 2, at 830. 
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one [likely] reason for the absence of factional politics in 1938 was 
that the rules were drafted in secret over 18 months and promul-
gated after only a brief period of public comment .... There was 
not sufficient notice and time for interest groups then active to iden-
tify ways in which they might be adversely affected by the new rules 
and then organize to make their views known to Congress. Factional 
politics was defeated by an undemocratic fait accompli conducted in 
the name of the Supreme Court.210 
However, "[i]t has not been civil rights litigants who have sought open 
politicization of the rulemaking process. Rather, powerful repeat players 
have begun to speak of 'court reform' -to change the rules of procedure so as 
to achieve specific substantive effects."211 This has resulted in "decreasing in-
terest in paying attention to individual problems, to the adjudication of small 
disputes and individual cases. . .. [T]here is an unwillingness to accord such 
societal resources to respond to individual problems. "212 
In support of her thesis, Professor Resnik drew a persuasive analogy be-
tween the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. As to the former, she noted: 
Id. 
[W]e know up front that there are some rules that will be used ex-
clusively by the prosecution ... and some designed exclusively for 
criminal defendants, who, as a class, are poor and typically repre-
sented by counsel paid for by the government. We know a power 
210. Carrington, supra note 100, at 165. Professor Carrington explained: 
There is a large benign consequence of this activity, one that is not fully acknowledged 
in Professor Mullenix's article. Many communications received from special interest 
groups are helpful to rulemakers, as they may be in any lawmaking context. This is 
especially so to the extent that comments are rooted in shared public concerns rather 
than particular interests .... 
At the same time, it is useful to hear even from selfish interests. I recall that the 
most effective advocate of highway safety for many decades was said to be the lobby of 
the railroad industry. Selfish interests can and do make good suggestions. 
Still, genuinely selfish interests are likely to get short shrift in rulemaking discus-
sions. While Professor Mullenix expresses concern that the rulemakers may yield too 
freely to coercive lobbying, I do not share that concern. 
211. Resnik, Domain, supra note 200, at 2226 (emphasis added). Professor Resnick 
continued: 
Some of this repeat playing is overt; advertisements in newspapers promote control 
over juries and blame litigation for many of the ills of society. Some of the repeat 
playing is more subtle; insurance companies and corporations have funded surveys and 
conferences at 'neutral' settings such as law schools and think tanks-all with the aim 
of exposing the civil justice system's ills and of 'reforming' the Rules. 
In short, the politicization of rulemaking has already happened-caused not by the 
vulnerable of the society but by the powerful. Yet, as Judge Carter, Professor Burbank, 
Professor Carty-Bennia, Professor Minow, and Judge Weinstein have demonstrated, it 
is the vulnerable who are being hurt by revision of "neutral," "anonymous" rules, and 
we must all take responsibility for exploring the impact of civil rule making on the 
diverse participants in the civil justice system. 
Id. at 2226-27. 
212. Id. at 2227. 
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imbalance exists, and we write rules to take into account our under-
standing of the resources of the two sides of a criminal case.213 
227 
Just as we accept, to some degree "the idea that the Federal Criminal 
Rules embody substantive visions about the power disequilibrium between 
prosecution and defense and between defendant and judge, . . . and try to 
take the identity of the parties into account, up front"214 we should do the 
same for the civil rules. Professor Resnick continued: 
On the civil side, two theories-of neutrality and of anonymity-
govern. By "neutrality," I mean that in theory, on the civil side, the 
Rules have virtually no political content .... 
A second feature of the civil side is an assumption of "anonym-
ity" .... [O]ne never knows in advance in a civil case whether one 
will be a plaintiff or defendant. . .. Further, with trans-substantive 
pleadings, one never knows the kind of case that may be involved. 
With these theories of anonymity and neutrality, one can make 
claims that-whatever the rules-we all suffer them equally, and 
thus that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have no political 
content.215 
However, as Professor Resnik pointed out, in practice, civil rights plain-
tiffs will be women or minorities, while the defendants must necessarily be 
those "acting under color of state law."216 Similarly, while "in some kinds of 
cases, corporations may be either plaintiffs or defendants, corporations are 
the defendant employers in TItle VII cases. In tort litigation, corporations 
are more frequently the defendants than the plaintiffs."217 (Even in tort 
cases that are nominally between individuals, the defendants are likely to be 
defended by their insurers, who are also repeat players in the system.) Thus, 
neither the theory of neutrality nor the theory of anonymity is true in prac-
tice. As Professor Resnik noted: 
[T]he civil side resembles the criminal rules in this respect: in a sub-
stantial category of cases we can know up front the identity of those 
who will be the "plaintiffs" and the "defendants." Thus, we can ask 
as Judge Carter does so well: will this rule help or hurt plaintiffs in 
general and civil rights plaintiffs in particular? In short, we do not 
all suffer the civil rules equally .... 218 
It is appropriate, therefore, to consider the political aspects of civil rules 
drafting, so that we may understand 
213. Id. at 2222-23, 2224 ("The political content of the Criminal Rules is reflected in the 
Criminal Rules drafting process. It is widely recognized that the United States Department of 
Justice is the critical 'repeat player' ... I have often been told that, if 'Justice' is unhappy about a 
rule change, the change doesn't go forward."). 
214. Id. at 2224. 
215. Id. at 2224-25 (discussing the likelihood that rule drafters have always had visions that 
many would describe as "political"). 
216. Id. at 2225. 
217. Id. But cf. id. at 2225 n.17 (citing Justice Jackson's concurrence in Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947» (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Discovery is a two-edged sword, and we 
cannot decide this problem on any doctrine of extending help to one class of litigants."). 
218. Id. 
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the political agendas of the Rules ... and see the values embodied 
in procedural systems that stress either 'getting to the merits' or 
case disposition, the value of systems that give trial judges ever-
growing discretion, the values that contract opportunities for appel-
late review, the values that prize settlement over adjudication. I 
hope that we will turn our attention to the roles of the Department 
of Justice and other interest groups ... in the creation, critique, and 
implementation of the Federal RUles.219 
There is nothing intrinsically antagonistic between "getting to the mer-
its" as opposed to "case disposal," but unfortunately, as defined by the repeat 
players in the civil side, "reform" has almost become code for procedures 
that, like the 1993 amended discovery rules, serve to deny many litigants 
equal access to the courts and remove the courts as a force for protecting 
society's relatively powerless members. The 1993 amendments are thus 
closely linked to other "reform" measures, which are outside the scope of this 
article, but deserve serious study, including mandatory court-annexed Alter-
nate Dispute Resolution, and the so-called "tracking" system, which ad-
dresses courts' case-flow problems with rigid categorizations leading to a 
"systematic, differential treatment" of different types of civil cases.220 As 
Professor Yamamoto noted: 
The reforms assume and facilitate a procedural system hospitable to 
litigants with disputes involving well-settled legal principles. Effi-
ciency reforms make expendable those raising difficult and often 
tenuous claims that demand the reordering of established political, 
economic and societal arrangement, that is, those at the system's 
and society's margins. Had efficiency reforms been firmly in place 
in 1983, they would have deterred the Korematsu legal team from 
timely initiating and forcefully litigating the coram nobis 
proceeding.221 
It is essential that the values of individual human rights not be swept aside in 
an all-consuming quest for efficiency at any price. As Judge Stephen Rein-
hardt wrote to Senator Joseph Biden and Representative Jack Brooks, 
The federal courts must continue to handle the kinds of cases that 
affect individual rights and involve the problems of the poor, the 
oppressed, the disabled and the victims of discrimination. Those 
who believe that these problems are beneath them do not under-
stand the true purpose of our Constitution and our federal court 
system.222 
219. Id. at 2226. 
220. Edward F. Mannino, Philadelphia, Chair of the Special Review Committee on the Fed-
eral Civil Rules, quoted in Howard Spierer, Aggressive Case Management Highlights District 
Court Plans: Differential Treatment Relies on Tri-Level Case Tracking System, LmG. NEWS, Oct. 
1992, No.1, at 7. Civil Rights, asbestos suits, and "other federal statutory claims" [read - em-
ployment discrimination, ERISA, and the like], are lumped in with such "standard" cases as 
"simple torts," requiring minimal time, although more than social security appeals and enforce-
ment of judgments. Id. 
221. Yamamoto, Efficiency'S Threat, supra note 17, at 21. 
222. Letter from Judge Stephen Reinhardt (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
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V. THE "ROCKET DOCKET" 'S223 CASE-MANAGEMENT ApPROACH: 
PROMOTING EFFICIENCY AND CURBING DISCOVERY ABUSE 
WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO PARTIES WITH UNEQUAL 
RESOURCES 
229 
What are we then to learn from our experience with generations of rules 
amendments, and what strategies are available to counter potentially harmful 
trends? How, in short, can we achieve greater efficiency without sacrificing 
fairness? 
"[T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure historically linked efficiency 
with access .... The drafters of the rules intended to simplify the traditional 
procedural model, making the system more accessible by making it more effi-
cient."224 In contrast to the 1993 amendments, the original Federal Rules 
along with the first forty years of amendments, revolutionized com-
mon law and code pleading regimes in basic philosophy as well as in 
technical form .... More people with legal grievances could gain 
entry into the system . . . . Liberal discovery prevented surprises. 
These reforms responded to the technical rigidity of prior systems, 
which had fostered procedural manipulation and emphasized deci-
sions on the merits .... The drafters created a less technical system 
designed to test claims according to information discovered during 
the litigation, thereby opening the system to many previously 
Circuit) to Sen. Joseph Biden, (D-Del.), and Rep. Jack Brooks, (D-Tex.), reprinted in Stephen 
Reinhardt, A Plea to Save the Federal Courts: Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, 79 A.B.A. J. 52, 
52 (1993). 
223. See Ray McAllister, State's "Rocket Docket" is Fastest, THE RICHMOND TIMES-
DISPATCH, Dec. 27, 1987, at E-l. 
I heard [the term "Rocket Docket"] for the first time, maybe three or four years ago 
from a young lawyer with Hunton & Williams in Washington .... 
I was at a dinner party ... and he referred to [the E.D. Va.] as a rocket docket. 
The name spread from there. 
The rocket docket is an apt name for the caseload of the Eastern District of 
Virginia, which has 12 judges in Alexandria, Richmond and Norfolk on active or semi-
retired status. 
The district is, officially, the nation's speediest in handling cases: No.1 of 93. 
The ranking is based on civil cases because most criminal cases, for which time 
limits are set by law, are tried equally as fast across the country. But there is a huge 
difference in civil cases. 
According to the annual report of the director of the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts, there were 9,690 civil trials conducted by the nation's 742 federal district 
judges in the year ending June 30. 
From filing of lawsuit to final decision, the median time for the nation's civil trials 
was 14 months. In many districts, it was over two years, topped by the District of New 
Hampshire, whose median time is a whopping 34 months. 
But for the rocket docket's 282 cases, the median time is only 5 months, the fastest 
in the nation. In fact, 90 percent of the civil cases in the Eastern District of Virginia are 
tried within eight months, again the nation's best figure. 
No one else is even close. 
ld.; see also Barrett, infra note 227. 
224. Yamamoto, Efficiency'S Threat, supra note 17, at 356 & nn.77-79. 
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excluded.225 
It is, of course, axiomatic that justice delayed can be justice denied.226 
Delaying tactics can keep powerless litigants out of court as effectively as 
over-zealous "fast track" measures. The challenge, then is to look at case 
management from the perspective of eliminating many of the procedural 
roadblocks to a fair and equitable, as well as expeditious, resolution of cases 
without denying access to legitimate claimants. One way to accomplish this is 
to repeal the 1993 amendments, and to adopt as a model the orderly but fair 
procedures of the Eastern District of Virginia that have earned that court the 
nickname, "The Rocket Docket. "227 
A. The Need to Restructure Pretrial Case Management 
Legal procedure, after all, is a means, not an end.228 It makes sense, 
then, to target reforms that will, in fact, be effective. While reforming the 
practice of law is beyond the power of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
reforming pretrial management is not. For this reason, the 1993 amend-
225. Id. at 357-58 & nn.77-SO. 
226. Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 100, at 399 & 399 n.8 (citing Walter E. Hoff-
man, Forward, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS vii (1977) ("Justice delayed may be justice denied or justice 
mitigated in quality."). 
227. See Paul M. Barrett, "Rocket Docket:" Federal Courts In Virginia Dispense Speedy Jus-
tice, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1987, at 33: 
Id. 
[I]n the federal courts of eastern Virginia, the judges hate foot-dragging and frivolous 
paper wars. Their courtrooms have come to be known widely as the "rocket docket." 
They produce speedy justice with a combination of unforgiving rules and fierce pride in 
efficiency. Around here, says one attorney, the judicial philosophy is "put up or shut 
up." 
228. Roscoe Pound, The Canons of Pro~edural Reform, 12 A.B.A. J. 541, 543 (1926) ("That 
procedure is best which most completely realizes the substantive law in the actual administration 
of justice."). 
Judge Walter E. Hoffman, after whom the United States District Courthouse in Norfolk is 
named, remembered that the Eastern District of Virginia was once as backlogged as any other 
federal court. Judge Hoffman became a judge in 1954 when, as he recalled: 
"[T]here was a backlog just in Norfolk alone of about 1,300 cases." Hoffman became 
interested in the problem, then more so as he attended seminars. "In 1962, I decided I 
was going to do something down there in Norfolk and Newport News, and set up a 
system for cutting off pretrial conferences, and setting pretrial dates and trials." 
The system involves setting trial dates, pretrial investigation cutoff dates, hearing 
dates, and the like. Hoffman says he doesn't think the formal system has been adopted 
by judges in Richmond and Alexandria. But a similar approach is used. 
As Hoffman notes, judges elsewhere often grant one side's request for a continu-
ance, or postponement, then they grant the other side's. "So you have two continu-
ances automatically before you get to trial," he says. 
McAllister, supra note 223, at E1 (quoting Senior United States District Judge Walter E. Hoff-
man). Judge Hoffman was succeeded as Chief Judge of the Norfolk Division by Judge J. Calvitt 
Clarke, Jr., who took senior status in August of 1991, and then by Judge Robert G. Doumar, 
both of whom have maintained the "Rocket Docket" 's standards for efficiency and fairness. 
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ments' focus on changing attorney behavior and their reliance on wishful 
thinking is inherently unworkable. A "Rocket Docket" style of reform is 
workable, as the Eastern District of Virginia has shown for more than three 
decades.229 Few would dispute that effective case management is desirable, 
229. See David O. Loomis, Why Norfolk's "Rocket Docket" is the Fastest, Fairest, Federal 
Court in the Country, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT & LEDGER STAR, Apr. 3, 1988, at B-1 (Interview 
with Senior United States District Judge Walter E. Hoffman). 
[d. 
Q. What is it about the way this court handles its civil caseload that warrants the 
name "the rocket docket"? 
A. When I took over in 1954 there were about 1,300 cases that were pending. Fortu-
nately, I had the opportunity to work on various committees headed by Judge Alfred P. 
Murrah, who was the chief judge of the 10th Circuit. '" He was my predecessor as 
director of the Federal Judicial Center in Washington. 
Judge Murrah was a man devoted to the proper administration of justice and trying 
to expedite cases through trial. In 1962 I adopted some of the suggestions that I had 
learned from Judge Murrah. And I put them into effect [in Norfolk's United States 
District Court] on August 1, 1962. I really didn't get any genuine relief on the docket 
until 1967 when two additional judges joined me here. We rapidly brought that docket 
right up to date. Whether it was the system or whether it was the added manpower, we 
very soon hit the top and have pretty well led the nation in most instances since then. 
Q. What are the rules that the judges here borrowed to keep cases moving? 
A. Probably the most important factor is setting a case for trial on a definite date and 
ensuring that that case will be tried on that date .... 
Q. Well. the records not only show that this federal bench is the speediest, they also 
show that it has the lowest reversal rate of any other in the country .... 
According to the latest annual report of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts, the 4th Circuit is by far the lowest in the nation in the reversal rate. So why 
aren't the administrative principles applied in this court, that make it work so quickly 
and so correctly, applied in other circuits? 
A. On Aug. 1, 1983, there became effective a Rule 16 under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The rule called for pretrial conferences and scheduling management. The 
rule refers here to the Eastern District of Virginia, as a matter of fact. They came down 
here and got every form that we had and then compiled Rule 16, which was a shock to 
many courts when it came out, but we didn't have to change anything. 
The difficulty with this rule is that they did not place the language in mandatory 
form. And we now have many, many district courts that don't have a scheduling con-
ference, and they don't have a final pretrial conference. The net result is that Rule 16 is 
not going to solve any problem until and unless they either mandate this scheduling 
conference and mandate the final pretrial conference so they make the judges and their 
staffs get these cases lined up on proper fashion .... 
We schedule the trial date right at the time that the lawyers first meet. . .. And 
everybody knows they've got a firm trial date because we don't miss the date here in 
Norfolk .... 
But we are about to get involved in a more serious situation. My prediction is that 
new sentencing guidelines which are now in effect for anybody who commits a [federal] 
crime on or after Nov. 11, 1987, mean that practically all of our criminal cases are not 
going to have to be tried .... 
Q. Does that mean that this docket is going to be swamped again? 
A. We'll probably make out better than most of them .... All of the courts are going 
to be in bad shape. I give it four years, then Congress is going to have to move [to 
amend the civil pretrial rules]. 
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at least in theory, but many argue that it is not possible in practice,230 be-
cause it "obviously" requires a larger court staff,231 or more time on the part 
of overworked judges,232 or because judges find it difficult to learn enough 
about each case to control discovery effectively.233 The use of magistrate 
judges in pretrial matters is also perceived to offer lawyers tempting opportu-
nities to engage in time-consuming and expensive discovery disputes, frus-
trating case management.234 As Judge Milton Pollack perceptively 
remarked: 
Most judges do not like to become overly involved with discovery 
matters. The Courts are reluctant to become involved with the fac-
tual development of a case. The Courts have by and large either 
abdicated or lost control of the pre-trial discovery phases of com-
plex cases. Consequently, cases take shape without judicial man-
agement. Judges stand aloof and prefer the solitude and loftiness of 
dealing with "legal" matters, ignoring the cardinal circumstance that 
the facts invariably shape the legal result-whether through settle-
ment or trial. 235 
The 1993 amendments will require judges to become involved with the 
factual development of the cases,236 taking litigation decisions out of the 
hands of the parties and their counsel. As at least one commentator has 
noted, the 1993 amendments provide that courts "will now be asked to as-
sume responsibility for determining what discovery, beyond a bare minimum, 
will be necessary. It is at best unclear that the court will be able to acquire 
the necessary level of knowledge about each case to make this type of 
decision. "237 
Other piecemeal proposals to streamline the present hodge-podge ap-
proach to case management have included the use of special masters,238 and 
230. See, e.g., Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 180 (arguing that moving from indi-
vidual calendars to master calendar constitutes diminution of individual responsibility, which is 
heavy price to pay). Judge Schwarzer asserted, without explanation, that, "given the present 
heavy and growing criminal and civil caseload in the federal courts, few judges are able to set 
early credible trial dates." Id.; cf. Frank Green, Court District in State Viewed as Model, RICH-
MOND TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 2, 1991, at A1 (noting that Eastern District of Virginia, with one of 
nation's busiest calendars, typically disposes of cases within four months). 
231. Edmund Wright, Controlling Discovery Abuse: A Microcosm of Procedural Reform, 
66 LA REVUE Du BARREAU CANADIEN 551, 567 (1987). 
232. Kieve, supra note 13, at 80 (asserting that judges find suggestion of more active role, 
"well, funny"). 
233. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 180. 
234. The Norfolk Division of the Eastern District of Virginia does not normally assign pre-
trial matters to magistrate judges, who have their own dockets (also managed by the central 
docket clerk). However, parties may elect to have their case heard by a magistrate judge instead 
of a district judge if they wish. 
235. Milton Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse And Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 223 (1978). 
236. Brieant, supra note 14, at 466. 
237. Id. 
238. See David L. Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. 
L. REv. 1055, 1057 (1979) (discussing implementation of rules by special masters); Irving R. 
Kaufman, Use of Special Pre-Trial Masters in the "Big" Case, 23 F.R.D. 572, 578 (1959) (using 
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the assignment of each case to a magistrate judge for all pretrial matters, and 
then to a particular district judge for trial.239 But while the time for such 
tinkering changes is long past, the procrustean 1993 amendments are ill-con-
ceived, at best, and will have to be repealed before serious progress can be 
made. 
As the "Rocket Docket"'s success illustrates, there is a readily available 
solution: to implement a systemic streamlining of the pretrial process that 
does not favor one class of litigants over another, and does not require the 
judge to assume the role of litigation strategist for either side. 
B. What Measures Should Be Adopted for Effective, Fair Case 
Management? 
The Eastern District of Virginia has been praised as "so efficient that it 
could be used as a model for the rest of the country."240 As the Norfolk 
special masters would reduce burden on judges, lead to better preparation at trial, and increase 
likelihood of early settlement); see also, e.g., Eggleston v. Chicago Journeyman Plumbers' Local 
Union No. 130,657 F.2d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 1981) (recommending use of special master rather 
than magistrate to expedite discovery), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982); United States Oil Co., 
Inc. v. Koch Refining Co., 518 F. Supp. 957,963 (E.D. WIS. 1981) (special master appointed to 
make recommendations for disposition of discovery motions); Park-Tower Dev. Group, Inc. v. 
Goldfield, 87 F.R.D. 96, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (ordering that special master's rulings be final and 
subject to court review until filing of master's final report). 
Authority for such recommendations is derived from the Federal Magistrate's Act of 1988, 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (amended 1979), allowing a judge to appoint a magistrate as special master 
without regard to FED. R. CN. P. 53(b), which provides that "reference to a master shall be the 
exception and not the rule." See Oliver v. Allison, 488 F. Supp. 885, 888 (D.D.C. 1980) (findings 
of magistrate designated as special master should be accepted "unless clearly erroneous" per 
rule 53(e)(2». But see Pope v. Harris, 508 F. Supp. 773, 777 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (finding that 
"clearly erroneous" standard not required due to magistrate's limited advisory function). See 
generally James R. Withrow & Richard P. Larm, The Big Antitrust Case: 25 Years of Sisyphean 
Labor, 62 CoRNELL L. REv. I, 49 (1976) (use of special masters during pretrial period speeds 
discovery process in large antitrust cases). 
239. It is sometimes assumed that such a system provides for more effective case manage-
ment. See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of 
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1969, 1983 (1989) (citing this practice as an example of efficient 
case management). 
However, in the Norfolk Division of the Eastern District of Virginia, the judges do not keep 
separate calendars. 1\vo full-time docket clerks manage the court's calendar as a whole, and firm 
trial dates are set according to the court's overall availability of courtrooms and judges, not 
according to anyone judge's schedule. Preliminary motions may be ruled on by any judge avail-
able if the judge assigned to the case is unavailable, and the judges eat lunch together daily, 
which affords an opportunity to talk about pending matters as needed. 
Litigants do not necessarily know which judge will try the case, as assignments may be 
changed at the last minute; if one judge becomes unavailable to try a case, another judge will try 
it, instead of the case being rescheduled for the first open date on the original judge's calendar. 
Through this system, the court's resources are kept in full use, allowing more cases to be tried, 
and preventing one judge's calendar from delaying the operation of the court as a whole. Con-
versation with Mrs. Michael Gunn, Docket Clerk (Fall 1987). 
240. Green, supra note 230, at At. Green cited a paper by University of Kansas Professor 
A. Kimberly Dayton, which noted: 
The Eastern District of Virginia, with one of the nation's heaviest civil and criminal 
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experience proves, a well-run docket means that each case. takes less, rather 
than more time for admittedly overburdened judicial officers to handle.241 
According to Professor A. Kimberly Dayton, the Eastern District of Virginia 
handled nearly twice the national average of civil and criminal cases, dispos-
ing of the equivalent of 647 civil cases per judge, with an average of fifty-nine 
civil and criminal cases going to trial during the most recent available statisti-
cal year, 1990.242 The Norfolk division's success in maintaining a backlog-
free civil docket, despite heavier than average criminal and asbestos dockets, 
refutes the argument that streamlining pretrial procedure is not feasible in 
district courts with heavy criminal and civil case loads, even with a master 
calendar system.243 
Id. 
caseloads, does not have a problem with undue expense or delay with respect to its civil 
or criminal caseload. Given this, it is difficult to understand why the dockets of so 
many federal courts are hopelessly backlogged. 
241. Barrett, supra note 227, at 33. This approach to pretrial management, although not 
perfect, is manifestly more fair and reasonable than the procrustean pretrial process contem-
plated by the 1993 amendments. The purpose of pretrial management should be to facilitate the 
movement of cases through the docket, not to be a substitute for trial. See Identiseal Corp. v. 
Positive Identifications Sys., Inc., 560 F.2d 298, 302 (7th Cir. 1977) (parties, rather than court, 
should determine litigation strategy); Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 548-49 (2d Cir. 
1961) (federal rules were intended to eliminate the evils of special pleading, which should not be 
brought back under guise of pre-trial). 
242. Green, supra note 230, at A3. The national average, given the same statistical weight-
ing, was 448 civil cases and 36 trials completed per judge. Id. 
243. Judge Schwarzer apparently dismissed the Norfolk model out of hand: 
[G]iven the present heavy and growing criminal and civil caseload in the federal courts, 
few judges are able- to set early credible trial dates. Some courts attempt to do it by 
essentially moving from individual assignment to master calendars, with any available 
judge trying the case. Many judges, as well as litigators, would view this diminution of 
individual responsibility for cases as a heavy price to pay. 
Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 180. 
Judge Schwarzer did not explain why Norfolk's district judges have been setting early credi-
ble trial dates since the early 1960s, despite having a criminal caseload approximately 50% 
higher per judge than any other court in the United States. See Green, supra note 230, at AI. 
Green noted that in the statistical year 1990, a total of 5,263 felony and civil cases was filed in the 
Norfolk district court, amounting to 513 civil cases per judge, with an average time to trial in the 
civil cases of four months. The national average, given the same statistical weighting, was 448 
civil cases and 36 trials completed per judge. Id. at A3. 
Responding to comments such as those of Judge Schwarzer, Justice Louis Ceci of the Wis-
consin Supreme Court commented that "[p]art of the problem with discovery has to do with the 
fact that too many judges are the victims of tight shoes and twisted shorts." Eric Herman, Put-
ting The Rocket In The Docket, 76 A.B.A. J. 32, 32 (1990) (quoting Justice Louis Ceci): 
The judge also stressed the importance of setting a firm date for trial, saying, "It's 
amazing how much lawyers can get done if they know it's crash and burn next month." 
Many panelists praised U.S. District Judge Robert Merhige Jr., known for quick 
case disposal and an uncrowded "rocket docket." Merhige, of Richmond, Va., recom-
mended that each judge control his or her docket. When judges set firm trial dates, 
attorneys do not have time for discovery abuses if they hope to win cases, he said. 
At the 1989 ABA Annual Meeting, however, Judge Schwarzer dismissed the suggestions of 
United States District Judge Robert Merhige Jr., Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Virginia's 
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An essential component of the "Rocket Docket" approach is the system 
of two mandatory pretrial conferences in every civil case. 
1. Pretrial Conferences and Scheduling Based on a Master Calendar 
System 
It has been said that the hallmark of the managerial judge is early inter-
vention in and control over the civil litigation process.244 However, this need 
not always mean the judge's personal involvement in the minutiae of individ-
ual cases, if, as in the Eastern District of Virginia, the early intervention 
comes in the form of setting up and enforcing an effective pretrial 
procedure.245 
In the Eastern District of Virginia, the pretrial process begins with an 
initial pretrial conference (usually handled by a law clerk or docket clerk), 
held within weeks of the first responsive pleading or motion. All counsel 
must be present, and must provide the court with dates when they will be 
available. All must agree to a firm trial date no more than six months away 
from the date of the initial pretrial conference (unless special permission is 
obtained from a judge).246 Once set, the trial date is immutable, so the case 
Richmond Division, as "unworkable," insisting, despite the 30-plus years of success in the East~ 
em District of Virginia, that their system is "simply not feasible." Id. 
The Eastern District of Virginia, notwitstanding Judge Schwarzer's disbelief, has managed 
to keep to its system of firm trial dates for more than thirty years. Green, supra note 230, at AI, 
A3, despite the fact that it encompasses the port city of Norfolk, the Washington, D.C. suburbs, 
and the 1-95 drug corridor cities of Richmond and Petersburg, and therefore has an abundance 
of drug cases, as well as shipyard-related asbestos cases. 
Id. 
244. Yamamoto, Case Management, supra note 100, at 403-04. 
245. Id. at 405. Professor Yamamoto pointed out: 
The managerial judge also controls the pretrial process by controlling discovery. [The 
judge) does so by setting discovery schedules pursuant to rules 16, 26(b)(I) and 26(f), 
by preventing the filing of "unreasonable" discovery requests and responses ... and 
perhaps most important, by "limiting" discovery at the outset even before there has 
been abuse or overuse. 
246. Out of town counsel must have local counsel, whether or not the out of town counsel is 
admitted to the bar of the Eastern District of Virginia. The local counsel may represent the out 
of town counsel at the initial pretrial conference, though not at the final pretrial conference. 
However, the out of town counsel who is absent from the initial pretrial conference must provide 
local counsel with the out of town counsel's available dates, and is held to those dates. If out of 
town counsel becomes unavailable for trial at the last minute, local counsel is expected to try the 
case. 
See E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. 
REv. 306, 313 (1986) (perhaps the most important single element of effective managerial judging 
is setting a firm trial date). Professor Elliott suggested that limiting the amount of time available 
before trial creates incentives for attorneys to establish priorities and to narrow areas of inquiry 
and advocacy to those they believe to be truly relevant and material, thus reducing the amount 
of resources invested in litigation. Id. at 313-14 (footnote OIniUed); see also Robert F. Peckham, 
A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning 
and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 253, 258 n.13 (1985) (firm trial dates 
encourage parties to establish priorities). 
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appears on the docket (and the attorneys' calendars) only once. Everyone 
concerned knows that the case will be settled or tried by that date. 
Working backward from the trial date, dates for other pretrial matters 
such as the final pretrial conference, discovery cutoffs, attorneys' conference, 
and other matters are set, and made binding in an initial pretrial order pre-
pared by the docket clerk for the judge's signature.247 This procedure is an 
essential part of the "Rocket Docket"'s case management system. Unlike 
the 1993 amendments, however, this system puts the calendar under the 
court's control, but without requiring the judge to learn the details of each 
case during the pretrial stage,248 and without taking the litigation out of the 
hands of the parties or their attorneys. 
The 1993 amendments distort the concept of a pretrial conference by 
improperly substituting the pretrial conference for a trial on the merits on at 
least some matters.249 This is certain to work to the disadvantage of minori-
ties, the disabled, and other plaintiffs in unequal positions relative to their 
opponents. Additionally, although not specifically required, Judge 
Schwarzer's proposed "motion for clarification" will likely become standard 
defense practice. According to Judge Schwarzer, such a motion (and its at-
tendant hearing) 
would serve the purposes of a Rule 16 conference. It would bring 
the judge into the issue defining and narrowing process at an early 
stage, but only when needed . . . . When a judge does become in-
volved, it will be in a meaningful way rather than in what is now 
247. At the initial pre-trial conference, the trial date and time and location are set (no more 
than six months from the date of the initial pre-trial conference). The final pretrial conference is 
set three weeks before the trial. The attorneys' conference, at which all exhibits must be ex-
changed, is two weeks before the final pre-trial conference, and the de bene esse deposition 
cutoff date is one week before the attorneys' conference. The defendant(s)'s discovery cutoff is 
two weeks before the de bene esse cutoff, and the plaintiff(s)'s discovery cutoff is one month 
before the defendant(s)'s cutoff date. Third-party complaints, and any cross-claims or counter-
claims can be filed up to 30 days after the initial pre-trial conference. Oral argument is rarely 
heard on any motion, and no party may request a hearing on any motion without first ascertain-
ing her own and her opponent's available dates, and providing those dates to the court. Thus, 
when hearings are set, they are also immutable. Motions are heard in the morning, before any 
trials start for the day, and during recesses in trials, so no time is wasted. See Eastern District of 
Virginia worksheets and pre-trial order (on file with author). See generally E.D. VA. LoCAL 
RuLES 12(E). 
248. Cf Second Circuit Committee on the Pretrial Phase of Civil Litigation, Final Report 
(1986), reprinted in 115 F.R.D. 349, 458 (1986), suggesting courtwide management procedures: 
The important point is that there must be some central supervision over crowded dock-
ets in multi-judge courts utilizing the individual calendar system, or that, at a minimum, 
there be a recognized collective obligation to respond to the self-generated action of 
the judge whose docket, particularly whose criminal docket, is in arrears. The advan-
tages of the individual calendar cannot justify rigid adherence to that system at the ex-
pense of the rights of individual litigants. 
[d. (quoting United States v. DeLeo, 422 F.2d 487, 496 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1037 
(1970» (emphasis added). 
249. See Padovani v. Bruchhausen, 293 F.2d 546, 548-49 (2d. Cir. 1961) (pretrial conference 
should not become a substitute for trial). 
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often a perfunctory Rule 16 conference. A motion for clarification 
of the disclosure obligation will call on the judge to address the case 
in the context of the documents and information previously dis-
closed and the issues they have raised. By advancing the definition 
and narrowing of issues, such motions would serve to focus cases 
early in the litigation and forestall wasteful activity.2so 
237 
The possibilities of manipulating such a system into increased obstruc-
tion and delay are fertile indeed. In contrast, the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia's system, without requiring one minute of a district or magistrate 
judge's time, makes the existing Rule 16 initial pretrial conference meaning-
ful by setting firm, credible dates for discovery cutoff and trial, so that liti-
gants must focus cases early in the litigation and forestall wasteful activity. 
Plaintiffs typically file their discovery requests before the initial pretrial con-
ference, and opposing counsel either raise any objections to already-served 
discovery requests or commit at the pretrial conference to responding on 
time. This commitment becomes part of the pretrial order. The defendant 
has thirty days to complete discovery after the close of the plaintifrs discov-
ery, but if the defendant adds extra witnesses during that time, the plaintiff 
may either depose them or request that they be excluded (a request that is 
frequently granted).251 
It seems clear that the 1993 amendments will generate a series of mini-
trials during the pretrial phase in order to define issues subject to mandatory 
disclosure, and this, along with the Rule 26 provision for filing all disclosures 
with the court, seems a bizarre way, at best, of reducing delay and promoting 
fairness and efficiency. 
Ill. 
250. Schwarzer, Monsters, supra note 70, at 181. Judge Schwarzer noted: 
Resort to motions would be minimized by requiring a prior conference of counsel. 
Abuse of the motion process, as well as evasion of the obligation to disclose, would be 
deterred moreover by the prospect of having later to come before the same judge to 
request discovery. A lawyer who appears to have misused or frustrated the system, or 
filed a false certificate, will not be in good standing before the judge whose discretion 
she seeks to invoke. In addition, abuse would be deterred by the threat of sanctions, 
shifting the resultant fees to the party making a baseless motion or opposing it without 
reasonable grounds, as under Rule 37(a)(4). 
251. In the Eastern District of Virginia, for example, objections to discovery requests must 
be filed in writing within 15 days after service of the request, and the objection does not extend 
the time for answering any discovery not objected to. E.D. VA. LoCAL RULE 11.1(0). If discov-
ery motions are filed, a response is due within 11 days of service, E.D. VA. LoCAL RULE 
11.1(G), and after the court has ruled on the discovery motion, compliance is required within 11 
days, unless otherwise ordered by the court. E.D. VA. LoCAL RULE 11.1 (H). 
The "Rocket Docket," by its own internal operating rules, requires motions to be ruled on 
within 30 days, and requires a written explanation from each judge if any motion is not ruled 
upon within 60 days. Oral argument is rarely entertained on motions, and when necessary, is set 
for the nearest Friday, after ascertaining counsel's availability on that date. Court schedules 
have built-in times to accommodate emergency motions. Conversation with Mrs. Michael Gunn, 
Docket Clerk, E.D. Va. (FaI11987). 
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2. Limiting Only Non-party Depositions 
The 1993 amendments will more than likely have the undesirable effect 
of forcing courts to become involved in every deposition, perhaps reviewing 
transcripts to determine whether to allow an extension beyond time limits 
enacted pursuant to Rule 26(b )(2), or whether to force parties to depose 
fewer than all parties and experts in cases where the parties and expert wit-
nesses exceed Rule 30(a)(2)(A)'s limit of ten depositions per side. 
It is at best questionable whether arbitrary limits, absent effective pre-
trial management, will have any beneficial effect. If such limits are deemed 
desirable, however, a better solution would be to adopt a reasonable numeri-
cal limit on non-party depositions only, similar to that in use in the Eastern 
District of Virginia, and to couple this restriction with the implementation of 
an effective pretrial management system. 
3. Promptly Applying Existing Sanctions for Delay or Non-compliance 
If the docket is managed effectively, the existing sanctions, including wit-
ness exclusion, the preclusion of claims or defenses, and imposition of fees 
and costs when a party or counsel behaves obstructively, are adequate. 
Under the 1993 amendments, however, sanctions for incomplete or evasive 
disclosure are limited to those expenses incurred in "making the motion," not 
in "obtaining the order" compelling discovery, as under the previous rules.252 
This is an additional obstacle that the information-rich litigant will be able to 
use as a weapon of attrition against a less financially secure, information-
poor opponent. Under the 1993 amendments, one who unsuccessfully moves 
for an order compelling such disclosure is liable for all the opponent's resul-
tant costs and fees. These, of course, can greatly exceed the costs of "making 
the motion," and under the amended rules will be an additional weapon 
against a less financially secure litigant. 
The party seeking disclosure under the 1993 amendments will also be 
precluded from seeking court intervention, on pain of sanctions, without 
making a good faith effort to obtain disclosure.253 Again, this unfairly favors 
the information-rich defendants, who can delay disclosure and file endless 
252. See text of amended Rule 26, supra note 7; see also Brieant, supra note 14, at 468 n.3. 
253. Such an effort is likely to be futile, and serve as an additional drain of time and re-
sources on those occasions when the opponent is acting in bad faith. See, e.g., Bell v. Automo-
bile Club, 80 F.R.D. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 918 (1979). In Bell, the 
defendant Automobile Club concealed a relocation study and other materials known as the 
"book of blacks," which plaintiffs had sought to discover.ld. at 231. The court found no excuse 
for defendant's failure to produce these materials, and assessed $52,089.73 against defendants to 
offset plaintiffs' additional discovery costs. ld. at 235. The court noted that if defendants had 
been acting in good faith, they should have disclosed the existence of the materials sought, ad-
ding "[d]iscovery is not to be treated as a game of hide and seek." ld. at 231; see also Ohio v. 
Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12, 22-23 (D. Colo. 1977), affd sub nom. Ohio v. Arthur Anderson & 
Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.) (trial court imposed expenses and attorney's fees of almost $60,000 
on defendant Arthur Anderson for failure to produce requested documents, including costs of 
defendant's appeals applying Rules 37(a) and (b», cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978). 
1994] DISCOVERY RULES AMENDMENTS 239 
quibbling motions for clarification knowing that if they lose their opponent's 
motion, the sanctions involved will be limited to ·those costs involved in 
"making the motion," not in "obtaining the order," under the disparate stan-
dards of amended Rule 26. Also, if the plaintiff, lacking information that 
only the defendant possesses, cannot prove that defendant's disclosure is in-
complete, amended Rule 37(a)(4)(B) provides that the plaintiff will pay all 
the defendant's costs and fees involved in resisting the plaintiffs motion. 
Civil rights plaintiffs and other plaintiffs whose financial position is typi-
cally less secure than that of the defendant, may well be forced to abandon 
legitimate causes of action after being forced to go into court repeatedly to 
obtain disclosure (after first making futile efforts to obtain voluntary disclo-
sure from an obstructive opponent) without a hope of having the attendant 
costs reimbursed. 
When management fails to control abuse, sanctions are necessary, but 
without effective management, sanctions are demonstrably ineffective as a 
means of controlling discovery.254 Judges will continue to need to use sanc-
tions to encourage compliance with rules and court orders, and to prevent 
more powerful parties from imposing financial burdens on their opponents or 
on the judicial resources of the United States.255 Sanctions, if used at all, 
should be used consistently as a predictable part of an overall system of effi-
cient case management, and not, as under the 1993 amendments, as a means 
of intimidating and discouraging the less powerful, non-institutional litigants 
from bringing their cases, or from seeking compliance from their more pow-
erful "repeat player" opponent. 
C. Advantages of the "Rocket Docket'''s System of Pretrial Management 
The importance of fairly allocating scarce judicial resources cannot be 
over-emphasized. Proponents of increased judicial management have argued 
all along that the self-policing nature of discovery permits attorneys to harass 
the opposition and obtain delays even though the aggrieved party may later 
seek a protective order. If attorneys fail to cooperate, having the trial judge 
control the pace of discovery from the beginning means that improprieties 
can be dealt with without delay.256 As judges act upon their increasing con-
cerns about various litigation practices, and begin to participate more actively 
in the pre-trial process, the much-decried "atmosphere of lawlessness"257 in 
pretrial practice must diminish as litigators come to view the judge as an ally 
254. See Edna Selan Epstein, An Up-Date on Rule 37 Sanctions After National Hockey 
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 84 F.R.D. 145, 171 (1979) (concluding that discovery sanc-
tions cannot control abusive requests). 
255. Abraham D. Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery Abuse Under the New Fed-
eral Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 680, 706 (1983); see also 
Underwood, supra note 190. 
256. 1983 Advisory Committee's Notes, supra note 2, at 220. 
257. Walsh v. Schering-Plough Corp., 758 F.2d 889, 895 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing Miller, Dino-
saur, supra note 6, at 21). 
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against the common enemy: the abusive opponent.258 Unlike the 1993 
amendments, the "Rocket Docket" plan has the advantage of being even-
handed: it does not burden either plaintiffs or defendants disproportionately, 
and has been recommended as a national model by a congressional advisory 
group.259 
This is not to say that the "Rocket Docket" 's system is without flaws. 
Senior United States District Judge Richard Williams of the Rocket Docket's 
Richmond division, for example, carries the "rocket" concept over into the 
courtroom, and has been criticized for "streamlin[ing] trials so much that ... 
he doesn't let you try your own case."260 Attorneys with backlogs in their 
own case management systems may find it difficult, at first, to organize their 
cases in the shorter time frames. Also, it is sometimes difficult for local attor-
neys to convince attorneys from out of town that the dates set in the pretrial 
scheduling order are serious, credible dates, and that they will be met. 
However, implementation of any system that eliminates backlogs and 
promotes expeditious trial and settlement of pending cases will require ad-
justments. With cases appearing on their calendars only once, even attorneys 
with personal caseload backlogs will gradually find their backlogs diminishing 
and their workload lessened accordingly. Unlike the essentially untested 
provisions of the new mandatory disclosure rule, the "Rocket Docket" ap-
proach has been working effectively for many years, despite vacancies on the 
bench, and a heavier than average civil and criminal case load. Any approach 
this effective should be given a fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The 1993 discovery rules amendments should never have been enacted. 
These amendments purport to move federal litigation from a purely adver-
sarial mode to a shared power relationship between bench and bar,261 but 
they are fatally flawed, and should be repealed. The practical demonstration 
that the Eastern District of Virginia has provided for the last three or four 
decades shows clearly that courts can deal effectively, fairly, and even effi-
ciently with increasing civil and criminal caseloads, without "novel case 
procedures, extrajudicial dispute resolution techniques ... or other extraordi-
nary rules of practice ... contemplated by Congress. "262 
258. Miller, Dinosaur, supra note 6, at 17. 
259. See, e.g., Virginia's U.S. Courts Feeling Effects of Political Stalemate, RICHMOND 
TIMES-DISPATCH, December 8, 1991, at E-4 (noting the court's efficiency despite unfilled vacan-
cies on the courts of the Eastern District of Virginia). 
260. See McAllister, supra note 223, at E-7 (even those lawyers who criticize Judge Wil-
liams agree that a fast-moving docket is preferable to a slow-moving one, both in unclogging the 
courts and in saving litigants time and money). 
261. See Sherwood, supra note 41, at 570-71 (trial judge could minimize discovery abuses 
and delays by supervising discovery from inception). 
262. Green, supra, note 230, at A3 (citing interview with Professor Dayton concerning her 
report on operation of Eastern District of Virginia) ("She said that 'despite the court's excep-
tionally burdensome caseloads, case management figures for the Eastern District of Virginia 
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Until the 1993 amendments can be repealed, district courts should sus-
pend the amendments' application for as long as possible pursuant to the 
authority of the Civil Justice Reform Act.263 Repealing the 1993 amend-
ments and adopting some version of the Eastern District of Virginia's 
"Rocket Docket" provisions will help to assure that the balance of power is 
not unfairly weighted toward monied, 'repeat player' litigants, and against 
those who would try to right institutionalized, as well as individual wrongs.264 
Implementing the Eastern District of Virginia's pretrial system may, in 
the short run, create some time demands on already overworked federal 
judges, but the experience of the "Rocket Docket" has shown that the de-
mands and frustrations are far less in the long run, as cases are expedited and 
dockets cleared.265 We must repeal the unfair, unworkable, and unrealis-
tic266 1993 amendments to the discovery rules, and begin implementing pro-
cedures that allow a claimant to get to court in a reasonable length of time, 
without setting up a one-sided system that denies the disadvantaged their day 
in court. 
The alternative is grim. To paraphrase Professor Miller's 1985 warning, 
if the 1993 amendments remain in effect, "we might as well chisel off the 
legend above the Supreme Court's door, 'Equal Justice Under Law,' and re-
place it with a sign that says, 'Closed-No Just, Speedy, or Inexpensive Adju-
dication for Anyone.' "267 
show that the court has significantly shorter disposition rates' for both civil and criminal cases 
'than the national average'. "). 
263. See In Re Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Temporary Order Re-
garding Discovery Procedures (Nov. 30, 1993) (unpublished opinion; on file with author). By 
temporary order filed in the United States District Court, District of Hawai'i, the United States 
District Judges Kay, Fong, and Ezra declined to implement the 1993 amended discovery rules. 
264. As the Powell dissent to the 1980 amendments pointed out: 
[Tloo often, discovery practices enable the party with greater financial resources to 
prevail by exhausting the resources of a weaker opponent. The mere threat of delay or 
unbearable expense denies justice to many actual or prospective litigants .... Litiga-
tion costs have become intolerable, and they cast a lengthening shadow over the basic 
fairness of out legal system. 
48 U.S.L.W. 4497,4500 (May 6,1980) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
265. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 30. 
266. See Prepared Statement of Alfred Belcuore, President, Federal Bar Association, State-
ment of the Federal Bar Association to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, Feb. 7, 1992, at 4 (on file with author) ("[Allmost uni-
formly, different chapters and individuals characterize the proposed amendments relating to 
Rule 26(a)(1) as unworkable, unrealistic, unnecessary and potentially counterproductive."). 
267. MILLER, supra note 1, at 14-15. 
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APPENDIX A 
New material is underlined and deleted material is lined through. 
RULE 26. GENERAL PROVISIONS GOVERNING DISCOVERY; DuTY OF 
DISCLOSURE 
(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURES; DISCOVERy-METHODS TO DIS-
COVER ADDITIONAL MATTER. 
(1) INITIAL DISCLOSURES. Except to the extent other-
wise stipUlated or directed by order or local rule, a party shall, 
without awaiting a discovery reguest, provide to other parties: 
(A) the name and, if known, the address and tele-
phone number of each individual likely to have discovera-
ble information relevant to disputed facts alleged with 
particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of 
the information; 
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and loca-
tion of, all documents, data compilations, and tangible 
things in the possession, custody, or control of the party 
that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particular-
ity in the pleadings; 
(C) a computation of any category of damages 
claimed by the disclosing party, making available for in-
spection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or 
other evidentiary material, not privileged or protected 
from disclosure, on which such a computation is based, in-
cluding materials bearing on the nature and extent of inju-
ries suffered; and 
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any 
insurance agreement under which any person carrying on 
an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of 
a judgment which may be entered in the action or to in-
demnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the 
judgment. 
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, 
these disclosures shall be made at or within 10 days after 
the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). A party 
shall make its initial disclosures based on the information 
then reasonably available to it and is not excused from 
making its disclosures because it has not fully completed 
its investigation of the case or because it challenges the 
sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because an-
other party has not made its disclosures. 
(2) DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
(A) In addition to the disclosures reguired by para-
graph (1), a party shall disclose to other parties the identity 
of any person who may be used at trial to present evidence 
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under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by 
the court, this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness 
who is retained or specially employed to provide expert 
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of 
the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be ac-
companied by a written report prepared and signed by the 
witness. The report shall contain a complete statement of 
all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons 
therefor; the data or other information considered by the 
witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as 
a summary of or support for the opinions; the qualifica-
tions of the witness, including a list of all publications au-
thored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the 
compensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and 
a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testi-
fied as an expert at trial or in deposition within the preced-
ing four years. 
(C) These disclosures shall be made at the times 
and in the sequence directed by the court. In the absence 
of other directions from the court or stipulation by the par-
ties, the disclosures shall be made at least 90 days before 
the trial date or the date the case is to be ready for trial or, 
if the evidence is intended solely to contradict or rebut evi-
dence on the same sub'ect matter identified b another 
art under ara ra h 2 B, within 30 da s after the dis-
closure made by the other party. The parties shall supple-
ment these disclosures when required under subdivision 
(e) (1). 
(3) PRETRIAL DISCLOSURES. In addition to the disclo-
sures required in the preceding paragraphs, a party shall pro-
vide to other parties the following information regarding the 
evidence that it may present at trial other than solely for im-
peachment purposes: 
(A) the name, and if not previously provided, the ad-
dress and telephone number of each witness, separately 
identifying those whom the party expects to present and 
those whom the party may call if the need arises; 
(B) the designation of those witnesses whose testi-
mony is expected to be presented by means of a deposition 
and, if not taken stenographically, a transcript of the perti-
nent portions of the deposition testimony; and 
(C) an appropriate identification of each document 
or other exhibit, including summaries of other evidence, 
separately identifying those which the party expects to of-
fer and those which the party may offer if the need arises. 
Unless otherwise directed by the court, these disclosures 
shall be made at least 30 days before trial. Within 14 days 
243 
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. (5) METHODS TO DISCOVER ADDITIONAL MATTER. Par-
ties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following 
methods: depositions upon oral examination or written ques-
tions; written interrogatories; production of documents or 
things or permission to enter upon land or other property 
under Rule 34 or (a) (1) (C), for inspection and other purposes; 
physical and mental examinations; and requests for admission. 
(b) DISCOVERY SCOPE AND LIMITS. Unless otherwise limited 
by order of the court in accordance with these rules, the scope of 
discovery is as follows: 
(1) IN GENERAL. Parties may obtain discovery regard-
ing any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject 
matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the 
claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim 
or defense of any other party, including the existence, descrip-
tion, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, doc-
uments, or other tangible things and the identity and location 
of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It-is 
not a ground for objeetion that tThe information sought need 
not be will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought 
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence. 
(2) LIMITATIONS. By order or by local rule, the court 
may alter the limits in these rules on the number of depositions 
and interrogatories and may also limit the length of depositions 
under Rule 30 and the number of requests under Rule 36. -
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set 
forth in subdiJ/ision (a) otherwise permitted under these rules 
and an local rule shall be limited by the court if it determines 
that: i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or du-
plicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more 
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party 
seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in 
the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the diseoJ{ 
ery is unduly burdensome or expensive the burden or expense 
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of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit taking 
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, 
limitatiaas aa the parties' resources, and the importance of the 
issues at stake in the litigation and the importance of the pro-
posed discovery in resolving the issues. The court may act 
upon its own initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a 
motion under subdivision (c). 
(2) hlSURAtlCE AOREElotEPR'S. A party may aataia ais 
sa¥ery af the existease aaa saateats af aay iasHraase agree 
meat Haaer whish aay persaa sarryiag aa aa iasHraase eHsiaess 
may ae liaele ta satisfy part ar aU af a jHagmeat whish may be 
eaterea ia the astiaa ar ta iaaemaify ar reimbHrse fer pay 
meats maae ta satisfy the jHagmeat. Iafermatiaa saaseraiag 
the iasHraaee agreemeat is Rat ey reasaa af aiselasHre aamissi 
ble ia e¥iaeaee at trial. For pHrpases af this paragraph, aa ap 
plieatiaa fer iasHraaee shall aat ae treatea as part af aa 
iasHraaee agreemeat. 
**** 
(4) TRIAL PREPARATION: EXPERTS. 
Dissavery af fasts kaawa aaa apiaiaas held ay experts, 
atherwise aisea'/eraale Haaer the pra¥isiaas af sHbaivisiaa (e) 
(1) af this rHle aaa aeqHirea ar ae'/elapea ia the aatieipatiaa af 
litigatiaa ar far trial may be abtaiaea aaly as fallaws: 
(A)fJj A party may thraHgh iaterragataries reqHire 
aay ather party ta iaeatify eaeh persaa wham the ather 
party expests ta eall as aa expert witaess at trial, ta state 
the sH9jeet matter aa whieh the expert is expeetea ta tes 
tify, aaa ta state the sHbstaaee af the fasts aaa apiaiaas ta 
whish the expert is expestea ta testify aaa a SHmrRary af 
the graHaas far eaeh apiaiaa. (ii) Vpaa matiaa, the 
saHrt may araer fHrther aissavery by ather meaas, SHbj eet 
ta sHeh restrietiaas as ta seape aaa sHeh pra¥isiaas, pHrsH 
aat ta sHbai'lisiaa (a) (4) (C) af this mle, eaaeemiag fees 
aaa expeases as the eaHrt may aeem apprapriate. depose 
any person who has been identified as an expert whose 
o inions rna be resented at trial. If a re ort from the 
ex ert is re uired under subdivision a 2 B, the de o-
sition shall not be conducted until after the report is 
provided. 
(B) A party may, through interrogatories or by dep-
osition, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert 
who has been retained or specially employed by another 
party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial 
and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial; 
only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of ex-
ceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for 
the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on 
the same subject by other means. 
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the 
245 
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court shall require that the party seeking discovery pay the 
expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to dis-
covery under this subdivisions (e) (4) (A) (ii) aRa (e) (4) 
(8) of this ryle; and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained 
under sy9Eli'lisioR (e) (4) (A) (ii) of this rYle the soyrt may 
reqYire, aRa '""ith respest to aisso'lery oetaiRea YRaer sub-
division (b) (4) (B) of this rule the court shall require, the 
party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair por-
tion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the 
latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the 
expert. 
(5) CLAIMS OF PRIVILEGE OR PROTECTION OF TRIAL 
PREPARATION MATERIALS. When a party withholds informa-
tion otherwise discoverable under these rules by claiming that 
it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation ma-
terial, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall de-
scribe the nature of the documents, communications, or things 
not produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing 
information itself privileged or protected, will enable other par-
ties to assess the applicability of the privilege or protection. 
[subsection (c) provides for the issuance of protective orders 
which justice may require in various factual situations "to protect a 
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or un-
due burden or expense .... "] 
(d) SEQUE~.CE A~m TIMING AND SEQUENCE OF DISCOVERY. 
Except when authorized under these rules or by local rule, order, or 
agreement of the parties, a party may not seek discovery from any 
source before the parties have met and conferred as required by 
subdivision (f). Unless the court upon motion, for the convenience 
of parties and witnesses and in the interests of justice, orders other-
wise, methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the 
fact that a party is conducting discovery, whether by deposition or 
otherwise, shall not operate to delay any other party's discovery. 
[Under subsections (e)(1) and (2), parties have a continuing 
obligation to supplement and correct disclosures or discovery re-
sponses in certain circumstances set forth therein] 
(f) MEETING OF PARTIES; PLANNING FOR DISCOVERybeN-
FERm.CE. At aRY time after sommeRsemeRt of aR astioR the soyrt 
may airest the attorReys for the parties to appear eefore it for a 
sORfereRse OR the sy9:jest of aisso'lery. 'The soyrt shan ao so ypOR 
metioR ey the attorRey for aRY party if the motioR iRsIyaes Except 
in actions exempted by local rule or when otherwise ordered, the 
parties shall, as soon as practicable and in any event at least 14 days 
before a schedulin conference is held or a schedulin order is due 
under Rule 16 b , meet to iscuss the nature and basis of their 
claims and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or 
resolution of the case, to make or arran e for the disclosures re-
uired b subdivision a 1, and to develo a ro osed discove 
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plan. The plan shall indicate the parties' views and proposals 
concerning: 
(1) A statemeRt of the issues as they theR appear; what 
chan es should be made in the timin ,form, or re uirementfur 
disclosures under subdivision a or local rule, includin a state-
ment as to when disclosures under subdivision a 1 were 
made or will be made; 
(2) A proposeel plaR aRel seheelule of eliseo'/ery; the sub-
jects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery 
should be completed, and whether discovery should be con-
ducted in phases or be limited to or focused upon particular 
issues; 
(3) ARy limitatioRs proposeel to I:le plaeeel OR eliseo'/ery; 
what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery 
imposed under these rules or by local rule, and what other limi-
tations should be imposed; and 
(4) Aany other proposeel orders with respeet to eliseo'/ery 
that should-be entered b the court under subdivision c or 
under Rule 16 band c .; and 
The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that 
have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging 
and being present or represented at the meeting, for attempting 
in good faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and for 
submitting to the court within 10 days after the meeting a writ-
ten report outlining the plan. '" 
(g) SIGNING OF DISCLOSURES, DISCOVERY REQUESTS, RE-
SPONSES, AND OBJECTIONS. 
Eve disclosure made ursuant to subdivision a 1 
or subdivision a 3 shall be si ned b at least one attorne of 
record in the attorney's individual name, whose address shall 
be stated. An unrepresented party shall sign the disclosure and 
state the party's address. The signature of the attorney or 
party constitutes a certification that to the best of the signer's 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable 
inquiry, the disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it 
is made. ' 
ill Every discovery request! for eliseo'/ery or response! 
or objection thereto made by a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the 
attorney's individual name, whose address shall be stated. A!! 
unrepresented party who is ROt represeRteel I:ly aR attomey 
shall sign the request, response, or objection and state the 
party's address. The signature of the attorney or party consti-
tutes a certification that the sigRer has reael the reEJuest, re 
spoRse, or of:l:jeetioR, aRel that to the best of the signer's 
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knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable 
inquiry! it the reguest, response, or- objection is: 
(lA) consistent with these rules and warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law; 
(~B) not interposed for any improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation; and 
(JC) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or ex-
pensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery already 
had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation. 
If a request, response, or objection is not signed, it 
shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omis-
sion is called to the attention of the party making the re-
quest, response, or objection, and a party shall not be 
obligated to take any action with respect to it until it is 
signed. 
ill If without substantial justification a certification is 
made in violation of the rule, the court upon motion or upon its 
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the cer-
tification, the party on whose behalf the disclosure, request, re-
sponse or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, 
which may include an order to pay the amount of the reason-
able expenses incurred because of the violation, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee. 
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APPENDIX B 
New material is underlined and deleted material is lined through. 
RULE 33. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES 
(a) AVAILABILITY; PROCEDURES FOR USE. Without leave of 
court or written stipulation, aAny party may serve upon any other 
party written interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number including 
all discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served or, if the 
party served is a public or private corporation or a partnership or 
association or governmental agency, by any officer or agent, who 
shall furnish such information as is available to the party. Leave to 
serve additional interro atories shall be ranted to the extent con-
sistent with the rinci les of Rule 26 b 2. Without leave of court 
or written stipulation, ilnterrogatories may, ' .... iths\:lt leave sf 
~not be served \:Ipsa the plaiatiff after ssmmeasemeat sf the 
astisaaad \:Ipsa aay sther party with sr after servise sf the s\:lm 
msas aad esmplaiat \:Ipsa that party before the time specified in 
Rule 26(d). 
(B) ANSWERS AND OBJECfIONS. 
ill Each interrogatory shall be answered separately and 
fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to, in which 
event the objecting party shall state the reasons for objection 
shall ae stated ia lie \:I sf aa aaswer and shall answer to the ex-
tent the interrogatory is not objectionable. 
ill The answers are to be signed by the person making 
them, and the objections signed by the attorney making them. 
ill The party upon whom the interrogatories have been 
served shall serve a copy of the answers, and objections if any, 
within 30 days after the service of the interrogatories, eKeept 
that a defeadaat may senre aaS'Ners sr sajeetisas withia days 
after ser'/ise sf the s\:lmmsas aad esmplaiat \:Ipsa that defead 
am. The sS\:lrt may aHsw aA shorter or longer time may be 
directed by the court or, in the absence of such an order, 
agreed to in writing by the parties subject to Rule 29. 
(4) All grounds for an objection to an interrogatory shall 
be stated with specificity. Any ground not stated in a timely 
objection is waived unless the party's failure to object is ex-
cused by the court for good cause shown. 
ill The party submitting the interrogatories may move for 
an order under Rule 37(a) with respect to any objection to or 
other failure to answer an interrogatory. 
(Be) SCOPE; USE AT TRIAL. Interrogatories may relate to any 
matters which can be inquired into under Rule 26(b)ill, and the 
answers may be used to the extent permitted by the rules of 
evidence. 
An interrogatory otherwise proper is not necessarily objection-
able merely because an answer to the interrogatory involves an 
opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to 
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fact, but the court may order that such an interrogatory need not be 
answered until after designated discovery has been completed or 
until a pre-trial conference or other later time. 
(€o) Option to produce Business Records. 
* * * * 
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APPENDIX C 
As amended December 1, 1993, Rule 30 provides as follows. New material is 
underlined and deleted material is lined through. 
RULE 30. DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION 
(a) When Depositions May be Taken; When Leave Required. 
ill A:fter semmeasemeat ef the astiea, aay party may 
take the testimony of any person, including a party, be deposi-
tion upon oral examination without leave of court except as 
provided in paragraph (2). Lea'le ef seurt, graatea with er 
witheut aetiee, must ae eataiBea ealy if the plaia tiff seeks te 
take a aepesitiea prier te the eKpiratiea ef JQ aays after servise 
ef the summeas aaa semplaiat upea aay aefeaaaat er servise 
maae uaaer Rule 4(e), eKsept that lea'le is Bet require a (1) if a 
aefeaaaat has servea a aetise ef takiag aepesitiea er etherwise 
seught aisse'/ery, er (2) if spesial aetise is gi'/ea as pre'liaea ia 
suaai'lisiea (a)(2) ef this rule. The attendance of witnesses 
may be compelled by subpoena as provided in Rule. The aep 
esitiea ef a persea seafiaea ia prisea may ae takea ealy ay 
leave ef seurt ea sush terms as the seurt pressriaes. 
(2) A party must obtain leave of court, which shall be 
granted to the extent consistent with the principles stated in 
Rule 26(b )(2), if the person to be examined is confined in 
prison or if, without the written stipulation of the parties, 
(A) a proposed deposition would result in MORE 
THAN TEN DEPOSITIONS BEING TAKEN UNDER THIS RULE 
OR RULE 31 by the plaintiffs, or by the defendants, or by 
third-party defendants; 
(B) the person to be examined already has been de-
posed in the case; or 
(C) a party seeks to take a deposition before the 
time specified in Rule 26( d) unless the notice contains a 
certification, with supporting facts, that the person to be 
examined is expected to leave the United States and be 
unavailable for examination in this country unless deposed 
before that time. (b) Notice of Examination: General Re-
quirements; Spesial Netise; NeB SteBegraphie Method of 
Recording; Production of Documents and Things; Deposi-
tion of Organization; Deposition by Telephone. 
(1) A party desiring to take the deposition of any person 
upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to 
every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time 
and place for taking the deposition and the name and address 
of each person to be examined, if known, and, if the name is 
not known, a general description sufficient to identify the per-
son or the particular class or group to which the person be-
longs. If a subpoena duces tecum is to be served on the person 
to be examined, the designation of the materials to be pro-
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duced as set forth in the subpoena shall be attached to, or in-
cluded inz the notice. -
(2) Lea¥e of eourt is not required for the taking of a dep 
osition by the plaiatiff if the aotiee (A) states that the persoa to 
be e*amiaed is about to go out of the distrist where the aetioa 
is pendiag aad more thaa 100 miles from the plaee of trial, or is 
about to go out of the Vaited States, or is bouad oa a voyage to 
sea, asd will be uaa¥ailable for e*amination ualess the persoa's 
deposition is takea before e*piration of the dO day period, aad 
(B) sets forth faets to Sl:lpport the statemest. The plaintifFs at 
torney shall sign the aotiee, and the attorney's signature eonsti 
tutes a eertifieation b~r the attorney that to the best of the 
attorney's knowledge, isformation, and belief the statemeat 
and sl:lpportisg fasts are true. The sasctions provided by Rule 
11 are applicable to the eertifieatios. 
If a party shows that when the party was served with sotiee 
under this sl:lbdi¥ision (b)(2) the party was uaable through the 
e*ercise of diligence to obtain couasel to represeat the party at 
the takisg of the 
depositios, the depositioa may sot be l:lsed against the 
~ 
The party taking the deposition shall state in the notice the 
method by which the testimony shall be recorded. Unless the 
court orders otherwise, if may be recorded by sound, sound-
and-visual, or stenographic means, and the party taking the 
deposition shall bear the costs of the recording; Any party may 
arrange for a transcription to be made from the recording of a 
deposition taken by nonstenographic means. 
(3) The eourt may for cal:lse sho .. m enlarge or shorten 
the time for takiag the depositioa. With prior notice to the de-
ponent and other parties, any party may designate another 
method to record the deponent's 
testimony in addition to the method specified by the per-
son taking the deposition. The additional record or transcript 
shall be made at that party's expense unless the court otherwise 
orders. 
(4) The parties may stipulate ia writing or the eourt may 
upoa motioa order that the testimony at a depositioa be re 
eorded by other thaa stenographie meass. The stipulatioa or 
order shall desigsate the persoa before whom the depositioa 
shall be takes, the maaser of reeordisg, preserviag aad filiag 
the depositios, asd may include other proy.jsioas to assure that 
the reeorded testimony '»ill be aeeurate and trustworthy. A 
party may affaRge to ha'le a steaographie traaseriptioa made at 
the party's own e*pease. Aay objeetioas under subdivision (e), 
any ehanges made by the witness, the witness' signature identi 
tying the deposition as the 'Nitness' own or the statemeat of the 
offieer that is requireEl if the 'l'litness does not siga, as pro¥ided 
in subdi¥ision (e), anEl the eertifieation of the offieer required 
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(7) The parties may stipulate in writing or the court may 
upon motion order that a deposition be taken by telephone or 
other remote electronic means. For the purposes of this rule 
and Rules 28(a), 37(a)(1), and 37(b)(1), and (d), a deposition 
taken by telephone such means is taken in the district and at 
the place where the deponent is to answer question5--jH'&-
pounded to the deponent. 
(c) Examination and Cross-Examination; Record of Exami-
nation; Oath; Objections. Examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial under the provisions 
of the Federal Rules of Evidence except Rules 103 and 615. The 
officer before whom the deposition is to be taken shall put the wit-
ness on oath or affirmation and shall personally, or by someone act-
ing under the officer's direction and in the officer's presence, record 
the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be taken steno-
graphically or recorded by any other means ordered in aeeordanee 
with- method authorized by subdivision (b)(42) of this rule. IH:a-
Etuested by one of the parties the testimony shall be transeribed. All 
objections made at the time of the examination to the qualifications 
of the officer taking the deposition, er-to the manner of taking it, eF 
to the evidence presented, 9£-to the conduct of any party, and any 
other objeetion to or to any other aspect of the proceedings, shall be 
noted by the officer upon the record of the deposition, E'/idenee 
objeeted to shall be ; but the examination shall proceed, with the 
testimony being taken subject to the objections. In lieu of partici-
pating in the oral examination, parties may serve written questions 
in a sealed envelope on the party taking the deposition and the 
party taking the deposition shall transmit them to the officer, who 
shall propound them to the witness and record the answers 
verbatim. 
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(d) Schedule and Duration: Motion to Terminate or Limit 
Examination. 
(1) Any objection to evidence during a deposition shall 
be stated concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-sug-
gestive manner. A party may instruct a deponent not to answer 
only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limita-
tion on evidence directed b the court, or to resent a motion 
under ara ra h 3. 
(2) By order or local rule, the court may limit the time 
ermitted for the conduct of a de osition, but shall allow addi-
tional time consistent with Rule 26(b (2 if needed for a fair 
examination of the deponent or if the deponent or another 
party impedes or delays the examination. If the court finds 
such an impediment, delay, or other conduct that has frustrated 
the fair examination of the deponent, it may impose upon the 
persons responsible an appropriate sanction, including the rea-
sonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by any parties as a 
result thereof. 
(3) At any time during the takiag of the a deposition, on 
motion of a party or of the deponent and upona showing that 
the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such man-
ner as unreasonably to annoy embarrass, or oppress the depo-
nent or party, the court in which the action is pending or the 
court in the district where the deposition is being taken may 
order the officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith 
from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner 
of the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c). If the 
order made terminates the examination, it shall be resumed 
thereafter only upon the order of the court in which the action 
is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent, 
the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time 
necessary to make a motion for an order. The provisions of 
Rule 37(a)(4) apply to the award of expenses incurred in rela-
tion to the motion. 
(e) SlIbmission to Review by Witness; Changes; Signing. 
When the testimony is fully transGribed, the deposition shall be slib 
mitted to the witness for e*amiRation and shall be read to or by the 
witness lInless SliGh eKamination and reading are wai'/ed by the wit 
ness and by the parties. Any ehanges in fOffR or slibstanGe whieh 
the witness desires to make shall be entered lipan the deposition by 
the offiser '.'Iith a statement of the reasons given by the witness for . 
making them. The deposition shall thea be sigfled by the witness, 
lIsless the parties by stiplilation wawe the signing or the witness is 
ill or sannot be follnd or refuses to sign. If the deposition is not 
signed by the 'Nitness within 30 d~s of its sllbmission to the witness, 
the offiser shall sign it and state on the reGard the faGt of the waiver 
or of the illness or absenee of the '.'Iitness or the faet of the refllsal to 
sign, together with the reason, if any, given therefor; and the deposi 
tion may then be lIsed as fully as thollgB sigfled lInless on a motion 
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to sl:IfJfJress I:IREier Rl:Ile 32(Ei)(4) the sOl:lrt holEis that the reaSORS 
giveR for the refusal to sigR re~l:Iire rejestioR of the EiefJositioR iR 
whole or iR fJart. If requested by the deponent or a party before 
completion of the deposition, the deponent shall have 30 days after 
being notified by the officer that the transcript or recording is avail-
able in which to review the transcript or recording and, if there are 
changes in form or substance, to sign a statement reciting such 
changes and the reasons given by the deponent for making them. 
The officer shall indicate on the certificate rescribed b subdivision 
f 1 whether an review was re uested and, if so, shall a end an 
changes made by the deponent during the period allowed. 
(f) Certification and Filing by Officer; Exhibits; Copies; No-
tice of Filing. 
(1) The officer shall certify OR the EiefJositioR that the 
witness was duly sworn by the officer and that the deposition is 
a true record of the testimony given by the witness. This certif-
icate shall be in writing and accompany the record of the depo-
sition. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the officer shall 
theR--securely seal the deposition in an envelope or package 
indorsed with the title of the action and marked "Deposition of 
[here insert name of witness]" and shall promptly file it with 
the court in which the action is pending or seREi it by registereEi 
or eertifieEi mail to the elerk thereof for {iliRg or send it to the 
attorney who arranged for the transcript or recording, who 
shall store it under conditions that will protect it against loss, 
destruction, tampering, or deterioration. Documents and 
things produced for inspection during the examination of the 
witness, shall, upon the request of a party, be marked for iden-
tification and annexed to the deposition and may be inspected 
and copied by any party, except that if the person producing 
the materials desires to retain them the person may (A) offer 
copies to be marked for identification and annexed to the dep-
osition and to serve thereafter as originals if the person affords 
to all parties fair opportunity to verify the copies by compari-
son with the originals, or (B) offer the originals to be marked 
for identification, after giving to each party an opportunity to 
inspect and copy them, in which event the materials may then 
be used in the same manner as if annexed to the deposition. 
Any party may move for an order that the original be annexed 
to and returned with the deposition to the court, pending final 
disposition of the case. 
(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed by 
the parties, the officer shall retain stenographic notes of any 
deposition taken stenographically or a copy of the recording of 
any deposition taken by another method. Upon payment of 
reasonable charges therefore, the officer shall furnish a copy of 
the transcript or other recording of the deposition to any party 
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APPENDIX D 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26, Advisory Committee's Notes (1993). All material is new; 
underlining is for emphasis only. 
SUBDIVISION (A). Through the addition of paragraphs (1)-(4), 
this subdivision imposes on parties a duty to disclose, without await-
ing formal discovery requests, certain basic information that is 
needed in most cases to prepare for trial or make an informed deci-
sion about settlement. The rule requires all parties (1) early in the 
case to exchan e information re ardin otential witnesses, docu-
mentary evidence, damages, and insurance, 2 at an appropriate 
time during the discovery period to identify expert witnesses and 
provide a detailed written statement of the testimony that may be 
offered at trial through specially retained experts, and (3) as the 
trial date approaches to identi the articular evidence that rna be 
offered at trial. The enumeration in Rule 26 a of items to be dis-
closed does not prevent a court from requiring by order or local rule 
that the parties disclose additional information without a discovery 
request. Nor are parties precluded from using traditional discovery 
methods to obtain further information regarding these matters, as 
for example asking an expert during a deposition about testimony 
given in other litigation beyond the four-year period specified in 
Rule 26(a)(2)(B) .... 
PARAGRAPH (1). As the functional equivalent of court-or-
dered interrogatories, this paragraph requires early disclosure, with-
out need for any request, of four types of information that have 
been customarily secured early in litigation through formal discov-
ery. The introductory clause permits the court, by local rule, to ex-
em t all or articular t es of cases from these disclosure 
requirement sic or to modify the nature of the information to be 
disclosed .... By order the court may eliminate or modify the dis-
closure requirements in a particular case, and similarly, the parties, 
unless precluded by order or local rule, can stipulate to elimination 
or modification of the requirements for that case .... 
Authorization of these local variations is, in large measure, in-
cluded in order to accommodate the Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990, which implicitly directs districts to experiment during the 
study period with differing procedures to reduce the time and ex-
pense of civil litigation. '" [T]he present revision puts in place a 
series of disclosure obligations that, unless a court acts affirmatively 
to impose other requirements or indeed to reject all such require-
ments for the present, are designed to eliminate certain discovery, 
help focus the discovery that is needed, and facilitate preparation 
for trial or settlement. 
Subparagraph (A) requires identification of all persons who, 
based on the investigation conducted thus far, are likely to have 
discoverable information relevant to the factual disputes between 
the parties. All persons with such information should be disclosed, 
whether or not their testimony will be supportive of the position of 
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the disclosing party. As officers of the court, counsel are expected 
to disclose the identity of those persons who may be used by them 
as witnesses or who, if their potential testimony were known, might 
reasonably be expected to be deposed or called as a witness by any 
of the other parties. Indicating briefly the general topics on which 
such persons have information should not be burdensome, and will 
assist other parties in deciding which depositions will actually be 
needed. 
Subparagraph (B) is included as a substitute for the inquiries 
routinely made about the existence and location of documents and 
other tangible things in the possession, custody or control of the 
disclosing party .... As with potential witnesses, the requirement 
for disclosure of documents applies to all potentially relevant items 
then known to the party, whether or not supportive of its conten-
tions in the case. 
The disclosing party does not, by describing documents under 
subparagraph (B), waive its right to object to production on the ba-
sis of privilege or work product protection, or to assert that the doc-
uments are not sufficiently relevant to justify the burden or expense 
of production. 
The initial disclosure requirements of subparagraphs (A) and 
(B) are limited to identification of potential evidence "relevant to 
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings. " . . . 
Broad, vague, and conclusory allegations sometimes tolerated in no-
tice pleading - for example, the assertion that a product with many 
component parts is defective in some unspecified manner - should 
not impose upon responding parties the obligation at that point to 
search for and identify all persons possibly involved in, or all docu-
ments affecting, the design, manufacture, and assembly of the prod-
uct. The greater the specificity and clarity of the allegations in the 
pleadings, the more complete should be the listing of potential wit-
nesses and t es of documenta evidence. Although paragraphs 
1 A and 1 (B by their terms refer to the factual disputes de-
fined in the pleadings, the rule contemplates that these issues would 
be informally refined and clarified during the meeting of the parties 
under subdivision (f) and that the disclosure obligations would be 
adjusted in the light of these discussions. The disclosure require-
ments should, in short, be applied with common sense in light of the 
principles of Rule 1, keeping in mind the salutary purposes that the 
rule is intended to accomplish. The litigants should not indulge in 
gamesmanship with respect to the disclosure obligations. 
Subparagraph (C) imposes a burden of disclosure that includes 
the functional equivalent of a standing Request for Production 
under Rule 34. A party claiming damages or other monetary relief 
must, in addition to disclosing the calculation of such damages, 
make available the supporting documents for inspection and copy-
ing as if a request for such material had been made under Rule 34. 
This obligation applies only with respect to documents then reason-
ably available to it and not privileged or protected as work product. 
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Likewise a party would not be expected to provide a calculation of 
damages which, as in many patent infringement actions, depends on 
information in the possession of another party or person. . .. 
Unless the court directs a different time, the disclosures re-
quired by subdivision (a)(l) are to be made at or within 10 days 
after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). One of the 
purposes of this meeting is to refine the factual disputes with respect 
to which disclosures should be made .... 
Before making its disclosures, a party has the obligation under 
subdivision (g)(l) to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts of the 
case. The rule does not demand an exhaustive investigation at this 
stage of the case, but one that is reasonably under the circum-
stances, focusing on the facts that are alleged with particularity in 
the pleadings. The type of investigation that can be expected at this 
point will vary based upon such factors as the number and complex-
ity of the issues; the location, nature, number, and availability of 
potentially relevant witnesses and documents; the extent of past 
working relationships between the attorney and the client, ... and 
of course how long the party has to conduct an investigation, either 
before or after filing of the case. As provided in the last sentence of 
subparagraph (a)(l), a party is not excused from the duty of disclo-
sure merely because its investigation is incomplete. The party 
should make its initial disclosures based on the pleadings and the 
information then reasonable available to it. As its investigation 
continues, and as the issues in the pleadings are clarified, it should 
supplement its disclosures as required by subdivision (e)(l). A 
party is not relieved from its obligation of disclosure merely because 
another party has not made its disclosures or has made an inade-
quate disclosure. 
It will often be desirable, particularly if the claims made in the 
complaint are broadly stated, for the parties to have their Rule 26(f) 
meeting early in the case, perhaps before a defendant has answered 
the complaint or had time to conduct other than a cursory investiga-
tion. In such circumstances, ... they can and should stipulate to a 
period of more than 10 days after the meeting in which to make 
these disclosures, at least for defendants who had no advance notice 
of the potential litigation. A stipulation ... affording such a defend-
ant at least 60 days after receiving the complaint in which to make 
its disclosures under subdivision (a)(l) ... should be adequate and 
appropriate in most cases. 
Paragraph (2)(B) requires that persons retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony, or whose duties as an em-
ployee of the party regularly involve the giving of expert testimony, 
must prepare a detailed and complete written report, stating the tes-
timony the witness is expected to present during direct examination, 
together with the reasons therefore. 
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APPENDIX E 
Amended Rule 37 reads as follows. New material is underlined, while 
deleted material is lined through. 
RULE 37. FAILURE TO MAKE DISCLOSURE OR COOPERATE IN DIscov-
ERY: SANCTIONS 
(a) Motion For Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery. 
A party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons 
affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling disclosure or 
discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate Court. An application for an order to a 
party may-shall be made to the court in which the action is 
pending, er~aHers relatiag te a def)esitiea, te the eeHrt ia 
the distriet where the def)9sitiea is eeiag takea. An application 
for an order to a def)eaeat person who is not a party shall be 
made to the court in the district where the deflesitiea is eeiag 
taken discovery is being, or is to be, taken. 
(2) Motion. 
A 
(3) Evasive or Incomplete Disclosure, Answer, or Re-
sponse. For purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incom-
plete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure 
to disclose, answer, or respond. 
(4) Award ef EXfleases ef Metiea and Sanctions. 
~ If the motion is granted or if the disclosure or 
requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, 
the court shall, after affording an opportunity fer heariag, 
to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct 
necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising 
such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party 
the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the 
ordermaking the motion, including attorney's fees, unless 
the court finds that the motion was filed without the mo-
vant's first making a good faith effort to obtain the disclo-
sure or discovery without court action, or that the 
eflflesitiea te the metiea opposing party's nondisclosure, 
response, or objection was substantially justified! or that 
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
{!!L.If the motion is denied, the court may enter any 
protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, af-
ter affording an opportunity fer heariBg, to be heard, re-
260 TEMPLE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
quire the moving party or the attorney advising filing the 
motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent 
who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred 
in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless 
the court finds that the making of the motion was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award 
of expenses unjust. 
~ If the motion is granted in part and denied in 
part, the court rna enter an rotective order authorized 
under Rule 26 c and may, after affording an opportunity 
to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in 
relation to the motion among the parties and persons in a 
just manner. 
**** 
(C) Expenses an Failure to Disclose; False or Mis-
leading Disclosure; Refusal to Admit. 
1 A art that without substantial 'ustification fails to 
disclose information re uired bRule 26 a or 26 e 1 shall 
not, unless such failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evi-
dence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or 
information not so disclosed. In addition to or in lieu of this 
sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an opportu-
nity to be heard, may impose other appropriate sanctions. In 
addition to requiring payment of reasonable expenses, includ-
ing attorney's fees, caused by the failure, these sanctions may 
include any of the actions authorized under subparagraphs (A), 
(B), and (C) or subdivision (b)(2) of this rule and may include 
informing the jury of the failure to make the disclosure. 
ill If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any docu-
ment or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, 
and if the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the 
genuineness of the document or the truth of the matter, the 
requesting party may apply to the court for an order requiring 
the other party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in 
makin that roof, includin reasonable attorne 's fees. The 
court shall make the order unless it finds that (±A the request 
was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (~B) the ad-
mission sought was of no substantial importance, or(~C) the 
party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe tilat the 
party might prevail on the matter, or ($...Q) there was other 
good reason for the failure to admit. 
(d) Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition or Serve 
Answers to Interrogatories or Respond to Request for Inspection. 
**** [sic] 
(g) Failure to Participate in the Framing of a Discovery Plan. 
If a party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith in 
the development and submission framing of a proposed discovery 
planby agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after 
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opportunity for hearing, require such party or attorney to pay to 
any other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, 
caused by the failure. 
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APPENDIX F 
As amended in December, 1993, Rule 16 provides as follows. New material 
is underlined, and deleted material is lined through. 
RULE 16. PRETRIAL CONFERENCES; SCHEDULING; MANAGEMENT 
**** 
(b) Scheduling and Planning. Except in categories of actions 
exempted by district court rule as inappropriate, the district judge, 
or a magistrate judge when authorized by district court rule, shall, 
after receiving the report from the parties under Rule 26(f) or after 
consulting with the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented 
parties; by a scheduling conference, telephone, mail, or other suita-
ble means, enter a scheduling order that limits the time 
(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings; 
(2) to file and hear motions; and 
(3) to complete discovery. 
The scheduling order may also include 
(4) modifications of the times for disclosures under Rules 
26(a) and 26(e)(1) and of the extent of discovery to be 
permitted; 
( -) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final 
pretrial conference, and trial; and 
(~) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances 
of the case. 
The order shall issue as soon as practicable but in B&-any event 
Hiore than 120within 90 days after filing of the somplaint the 
appearance ofa defendant and within 120 days after the com-
plaint has been served on a defendant. A schedule shall not be 
modified except upon a showing of good cause and by leave of 
the district judge or, when authorized by local rule, by a magis-
trate judge when authorized by distriet sourt rule upoa a sho ..... 
ing of good sause. 
(c) Subjects to be DissHssed for Consideration at Pretrial 
Conferences. The partisipaats aAt any conference under this rule 
may eonsider aad take astioa consideration may be given, and the 
court may take appropriate action, with respect to 
(1) the formulation and simplification of the issues, in-
cluding the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses; 
(2) the necessity or desirability of amendments to the 
pleadings; 
(3) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of 
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations re-
garding the authenticity of documents, and advance rulings 
from the court on the admissibility of evidence; 
(4) the avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumula-
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tive evidence, and limitations or restrictions on the use of testi-
mony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence; 
(5) the appropriateness and timing of summary adjudica-
tion under Rule 56; 
(6) the control and scheduling of discovery, including or-
ders affecting disclosures and discovery pursuant to Rule 26 
and Rules 29 through 37; 
(~7) the identification of witnesses and documents, the 
need and schedule for filing and exchanging pretrial briefs, and 
the date or dates for further conferences and for trial; 
(as) the advisability of referring matters to a magistrate 
judge or master; 
(+9) ths possieility of settlement 9f and the use of 6*tfa-
jl:lai6iaf special procedures to fS6Si'ls assisf1i1iesolving the dis-
pute when authorized by statute or local rule; 
(810) the form and substance of the pretrial order; 
(911) the disposition of pending motions; 
(!G2) the need for adopting special procedures for man-
aging potentially difficult or protracted actions that may in-
volve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, 
or unusual proof problems; 
(13) an order for a separate trial pursuant to Rule 42(b) 
with respect to a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, or with respect to any particular issue in the case; 
(14) an order directing a party or parties to present evi-
dence early in the trial with respect to a manageable issue that 
could, on the evidence, be the basis for a . ud ment as a matter 
of law under Rule 50 a or a ·ud ment on artial findin sunder 
Rule 52 c ; 
(15) an order establishing a reasonable limit on the time 
allowed for presenting evidence; and 
(1~) such other matters as may aiEi-ia facilitate the just, 
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of the action. At least one 
of the attorneys for each party participating in any conference 
before trial shall have authority to enter into stipulations and to 
make admissions regarding all matters that the participants 
may reasonably anticipate may be discussed. If appropriate, the 
court may reguirethat a party or its representative be present 
or reasonably available by telephone in order to consider possi-
ble settlement of the dispute. 
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